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 The continued steady growth of public sector unions compels public administrators to 
understand the influence labor organizations exert upon local governments. The following study 
demonstrates the extent of union influence upon police expenditures in Florida. Union influence 
not only increases total police expenditures and personal services expenditures, it also causes 
operating expenses to rise. Union influence is less pronounced, and possibly even non-existent in 
capital outlays expenditures because of possible lack of interest on the part of the union in this 
area and also because of the existence of economically predetermined policies regarding capital 
outlays such as vehicle purchases. 
 Public sector unions, by formalizing and enhancing the exit-voice phenomenon within 
government systems, influence the expenditures of local government. This influence manifests 
its presence specifically in local government expenditures. By examining the association 
between unionization and the level of expenditures in local government, this study attempts to 
illustrate the influence of unions upon local governments. Specifically, this study assesses the 
impact of police unionization has upon local government police department expenditures for 
municipalities in the state of Florida. A qualitative inquiry combines with a quantitative study to 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Growth of Public Sector Unions 
 
 According to the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2004c), public 
sector employees represented by unions constituted 41.5% of total government employment in 
the year 2003.  No other major private sector occupational category or subcategory exceeds the 
union representation density (percentage of workforce unionized) of the public sector.  While 
union membership has declined in the private sector, unionization in the public sector has grown 
or remained stable in the last fifty years (Carrell & Heavrin, 2004). Public sector employees 
boast the greatest rate of union growth in the entire labor market of private and public sector 
employees. Since 1956, the ranks of public sector union members increased almost nine fold, 
even though total government employment just slightly more than doubled (Sloane & Witney, 
2004).  
Between the years 1998 and 2003, the private sector experienced a further decline in total 
union membership despite an increase in the number of total employed. During the same period, 
the public sector experienced an increase of union membership concomitant with the growth in 
total government employees. In 1998, 13.9% of the total number of private sector workers was 
unionized, while in 2003 the percentage of unionized private sector employees declined to 
12.9%. Again, during the same period, the percentage of public sector unionized employees only 
slightly declined from 37.5% in 1998 to 37.2% in 2003. However, public sector unions actually 
added 419, 000 union members between 1998 and 2003, as a result of increased total 
governmental staffing (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004c; U.S. 
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Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1999)1. The Fraternal Order of Police alone 
experienced a 75% increase in membership between 1982 and the year 2000 (Hurd, 2003: 10). 
 Scholars attribute unionization to a number of causes, the most common being that 
employees are dissatisfied with one or more conditions in their workplaces (Carrell & Heavrin, 
2004; Fossum, 1999; Katz & Kochan, 2000; Sloane & Witney, 2004). Since the public sector in 
the United States employed nearly 19.7 million individuals, or 16% of the total number of 
working Americans 16 years and over in 2003 (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2004c), the topic of union impact on public sector budgets, particularly wages and 
benefits, has attracted the attention of many studies, a number of which are the focus of the 
accompanying literature review.  Among the occupational groups tracked by the Bureau of Labor 
statistics, protective services, which include government workers such as police officers and 
firefighters, are 36.1% unionized, second only to teachers for all occupational categories, private 
or public (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004c). One study found that 
over 70 percent of large (100 or more sworn officers) police agencies in the United States engage 
in collective bargaining (Zhao & Lovrich, 1997: 513). Despite this information, very few studies 
have researched the actual extent of union influence on the budget decision process and none of 
the studies examined to what extent that influence affects local government decisions regarding 
operating expenses and capital outlays.  
The Complications of Public Sector Budgets and Union Wages 
 
 Governments that are confronted with challenges to provide services with tightening 
cost-revenue constraints often must rely on workload adjustments and productivity measures to 
                                                 
1 In 1998, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that there were 18.4 million public sector employees in all levels 
of government, of which 4.37 million were unionized. In 2003, these figures increased to 19.7 million public sector 
employees, of which 7.32 million were unionized. 
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meet budgets (Hatry, 1972).  As Perry and Porter (1982) point out, government is more labor 
intensive than other sectors of the American economy because the government by definition is a 
provider of personal services. Since most state and local governments spend approximately 70% 
of their operating budgets on personnel pay and benefits, cutbacks in public sector human 
resources would likely be inevitable, and fewer public sector employees would be available to 
perform government services (Klingner, 1993).  Cutback conditions tend to influence employee 
job satisfaction, perceptions of job security (Bender & Sloane, 1998; Jurkiewicz & Brown, 1998; 
Meng, 1990) and perceptions of resource adequacy (Kalleberg, 1977; Schwochau, 1987). 
Employees surviving personnel cutbacks often believe that as a result of downsizing, there is 
insufficient labor available to provide satisfactory government services. Thus, government 
budgets, and tightened fiscal controls ultimately affect job satisfaction among public sector 
employees, including unionized law enforcement officers.  
Union members, whether satisfied or dissatisfied, will use labor organizations to exercise 
a “voice” mechanism that exerts influence in the local government policy making process, 
particularly in the area of budget decision making. The “voice” mechanism refers to the ability of 
employees, as represented by labor organizations to express their opinions and values to 
management.  The presence of a union provides security to employees who otherwise would not 
exercise voice. Unions also render employee voice more effective by formalizing voice within 
the organization. Unionization results in employee influence that would not otherwise exist to the 
same degree. This study hypothesizes that such an influence extends to budgetary considerations 
of operating expenses and capital outlays as well as personal services items. Unions provide a 
formal venue through which employees can become more vocal and exert a greater influence in 
the workplace than their nonunion counterparts.  
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Framing the Issues 
 
As public sector unions become more vocal and exert a greater influence in society, many 
public administrators find themselves becoming more preoccupied with understanding the 
complex and intricate dynamics of labor relations. Unions affect governmental budgets primarily 
through collective bargaining that negotiates wages and benefits.  However, the impact of 
unionization may affect other portions of the budget as well, such as operating expenditures and 
capital outlays.  Government fiduciary responsibilities require that strategic allocations of scarce 
public funds include consideration of wage packages, working conditions and employee benefits.  
Collective bargaining, then, directly influences personal services expenses. However, a point 
overlooked in the literature is that collective bargaining and other forms of labor-management 
dialogue also affect local government budgeting that are not restricted to personal services 
expenditures. A better understanding of employee union affiliation and the role unions play in a 
local government budgeting process would benefit the public administrator by guiding decisions 
of governmental compromises that mediate the demands of labor with the demands of public 
administration.  
 
Purpose of Study 
 
 This study examines the impact law enforcement unions have upon local governments.  
The law enforcement function offers the most promising candidate for the type of analysis 
proposed by the study for a number of reasons. First, law enforcement represents the largest 
recipient of governmental fund resource allocations in most communities. While the 
proportionate share of total expenditures varies from community to community, law enforcement 
often is the most expensive service offered by local government. As an example, according to the 
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City of Orlando Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, police services expenditures required 
more than a third of total expenditures in general funds for the fiscal year 2002. Orlando is 
somewhat typical of local government law enforcement expenditures in the State of Florida. The 
actual average amount spent for law enforcement expenditures for a community in Florida is 
31.2% of general fund expenditures, or 11% of total annual municipal expenditures (Florida 
Department of Financial Services, 2004). Total annual municipal expenditures include capital 
investments such as buildings, bridges, roads, sewer, etc. for an entire community. Any influence 
on this large a portion of a city’s budget should be fully understood as a matter of fiscal 
responsibility, if for no other reason.  
Another factor favoring law enforcement as a candidate for analysis is the possibility that 
unionization or employee affiliation with unions has greater variance than does other 
departments such as fire protection services. Police organizations represent the second most 
common type of bureaucratic agency in the nation, second only to those managing public 
education (Nicholson-Crotty & O’Toole, 2004: 2). Large police agencies also tend to have a 
distinct union presence, while police agencies in smaller cities tend not to have union 
representation (Valletta, 1989: 433). As will be demonstrated by the data used in this study, cities 
of similar size and even those in the same metropolitan statistical area will differ from each other 
according to whether or not their police workforce is unionized. 
This study will attempt to determine how unionization affects the size of government as 
measured by expenditures for municipal law enforcement. The expenditures would be identified 
according to the agency in which the union functions. Varying levels of expenditures might have 
an association with whether or not union representation is present within the agency. The 
research questions thus would concentrate on two different dimensions of union influence on 
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budgetary decision making: 1) the propensity of police unionization to affect local government 



















 Budget   







(As influenced by 
Memorandums of 
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Bargaining Agreements) 
Union Voice in the Alternate Process
Union Voice in the Routine Budget Process
Figure 1. The Union Effect Model. 
 
 
The Influence of Employee Beliefs and Values. 
 
Figure 1 posits that public sector employees, including police officers, have beliefs of 
what is expected of the employing agency. This perception is internalized into their self-identity 
(Ideology-infused contract). The employees respond to perceived organizational violations of 
these beliefs by vocalizing their concerns through the union voice mechanism of the exit-voice 
continuum. The union voice mechanism then bonds to an organizational voice through union 
influence within the organization. The union-influenced organizational voice then participates in 
budget decisions through interaction with the employing agency, a municipality for instance. The 
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government and union interaction results in a change in government budget, usually an increase 
not only in self-interest items such as salary and benefits, but possibly through capital outlays 
and operating expenses. These increases in capital outlays and operating expenses reflect the 
beliefs of union members regarding how the agency should serve the community. Capital outlays 
and operating expenses usually do not benefit union members in as direct of a manner as do 
personal services expenditures.  Union voice has two methods, or possible processes through 
which to influence police department expenditures. The first, more significant method is through 
the routine budget process which is altered by the collective bargaining agreement. The budget 
has to be reconciled to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Any changes in wages, 
benefits, and other related items negotiated through collective bargaining (formalization of union 
voice) will result in modification to the final operating budget. The  budget, upon finalization 
and approval then becomes the instrument of resource allocation for the following fiscal year.  
However, periodic adjustments may be required as the year progresses. This situation 
provides unions with the second process through which to express voice. As labor relations 
situations or issues arise during the course of the year(s) covered by the collective bargaining 
agreement, the union may successfully petition management for additional considerations related 
to working conditions or related to other items of interest to the union and its members. These 
agreements, usually referred to as memorandums of understanding, become part of the 
organization’s policy (organizational voice).  Such policies, if requiring additional resource 
allocations, then impact expenditures without proceeding through the routine budget processes. 
Usually, such mid-fiscal year alterations are not as sizable as year to year budget changes, but 
such alterations do impact municipal expenditures. 
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The Research Questions 
 
 Four different aspects of the effect of unionization on local government will be studied. 
Each aspect raises a separate research question. Each aspect requires a separate model to answer 
each resultant research question. This study’s methodology chapter will operationalize the 
component variables. The following research questions will guide the modeling process and 
attempt to determine the effect of union density upon the size and expenditures of local 
governments.  
Research Question One: Does unionization influence the level of total police expenditures?  
 
The purpose of this section of the study is to assess the involvement of police unions in the 
budget decision process for the overall level of police expenditures. Unions, out of concern for 
both the communities which they serve as well as their constituent members, might influence the 
amount of overall police expenditures within the local government. This aspect of the study will 
serve in some respects as a replication of previous studies that have concluded that the level of 
total police expenditures is affected by union influence. Only this study will draw samples from a 
single, right-to-work state. The study also differs from previous research by attempting to 
develop a more comprehensive understanding of the component expenditure categories and by 
determining exactly to what degree and in what categories unionization affects local government 
financial decisions. Such research would in effect measure the “voice” that unions provide public 
sector employees. It is expected that there will be a significant difference in the various 
expenditure categories between unionized and nonunionized police departments in Florida. 
Research Question Two: Does unionization impact the level of personal services expenditures? 
 
Figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that public sector employees represented by 
a public sector union have greater salaries than their counterparts not represented by public 
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sector unions. Previous studies corroborate this observation. This study will include a replication 
element that verifies these findings for Florida, and will also segregate the personal services 
expenditures from other police expenditures to better understand the union’s impact on local 
government spending process.   
Research Question Three: Does unionization affect the level of police operating expenses 
expenditures? 
 
Answers to this question will indicate to what extent unions enhance exit-voice by influencing 
the day-to-day operating expenses. Union influence may have evolved into participation in the 
decision-making process by impacting the quality of police service indirectly through 
encouraging higher levels of spending in police operating expenses. This could be accomplished 
through collective bargaining, labor-management relations, or appeals to the legislative bodies of 
local governments. Expense items such as training/formal education, equipment, lighting in 
public areas, etc. may increase as a result of union concern for such items.  
Research Question Four: Does unionization influence the level of capital outlay expenditures? 
 
As with Research Question Three, answers to Research Question Four will reveal the level of 
sophistication unions impart to exit-voice. Consistent with Exit-Voice Theory, public sector 
unions act as a formal voice for their members, and tend to promote the goals and concerns of 
their members within the local government. As an example, a police union may be concerned 
that additional patrol vehicles may be needed and this concern may be brought to the negotiating 
table or presented to the legislative body with the intent of securing additional patrol vehicles. 
Another example may be implementation of capital technology such as global positioning 
systems, improved communication technology, and so on that the police union may deem 
necessary for the protection of the community or better performance of its membership. Again, 
as suggested by Exit-Voice, police unions and their members are expected to advocate a position 
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regarding capital outlays to obtain the improved technology because it affects the communities 
which they serve. 
Contribution of Study 
 
Considering the disproportionately large local government expenditures on personal 
services, answers to the foregoing budget issues can assist local governments in controlling 
expenses related to personal services costs. Very little financial control can be exerted for 
situations in which administrators are incognizant of the results of their concessions.  On the 
other hand, the degree of union influence on budget categories may also be overstated in some 
cases, creating an inflexible, take-it-or-leave-it approach to negotiations that labor relations 
scholars dub as “Boulwarism.”  Such an approach may violate the “good faith bargaining” 
directive in Section 447.309 of the Florida Statutes. A better understanding of union influence on 
police operating expenses would decrease the likelihood that a public administrator would 
commit a similar error. 
Moreover, operating expenses and capital outlays merit attention as well since public 
demand for fiscal responsibility has escalated in the recent past. By understanding the impact of 
union influence, public administrators can better inform their union counterparts regarding the 
extent to which employee demands affect local government finances. Unions could benefit from 
answers to these same issues by understanding the methodology and extent of influence that 
unions wield in local government affairs. While the study will also examine unionization effect 
on personal services expenditures, the study’s unique contribution to budget decision making 
literature will be the determination of the effect of unionization on the day-to-day operating 
expenses and capital outlays in a local government agency.  Few if any studies have isolated 
 10
these expenditures in their research. Unions may actually be determining the levels of public 
service in local government.  
Review of the literature has demonstrated that unions impact salaries and benefits, but 
there is a paucity of information with regards to union influence on operating expenditures and 
capital outlays. This study contributes to the literature by examining the effects of unionization 
on operating expenses and capital outlays of local government police department expenditures. 
The untested hypotheses set forth by the study is that unionization, as an extension and 
elaboration of voice, impacts local government in areas that are considered of personal benefit to 
the union membership and in areas that may not always be of direct benefit to union members. A 
concept rooted in psychological contract theory, identified as an ideology-infused contract 
(Thompson & Bunderson, 2003), provides the catalyst that causes the exit-voice phenomenon to 
evolve beyond issues of self-interest alone.  The subsequent union influence upon local 
government policy no longer is restricted to working conditions, benefits and salaries.  Issues 
focusing upon public service capture union concerns as well. Public administration practitioners 
will obtain better understanding of public sector unions’ influence in local government. The 
study will also enable public sector unions to better evaluate and appreciate the ultimate effects 
of their strategies. Finally, theory in the areas of budget and in organization will receive added 
information to predict behavior and understand complex interactions. A greater understanding of 
local government financial dynamics can result through the increased understanding of the 
relationship between unionization and expenditures. Organization theory will benefit from the 
information resulting from the empirical study of the ideology-infused contracts and exit-voice 
effects on local government. The Exit-Voice theory designed by Hirschman will be examined 
with more current data in a modern labor market with proportionately more employers than when 
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the theory was first formulated. The presence of Exit-Voice in law enforcement employment will 
also be explored in a qualitative inquiry designed to augment information provided by statistical 
analysis in the quantitative section of the study.     
At present, the literature contains a gap in the accumulated knowledge regarding the 
impact of unionization on local government spending. By segregating the component elements of 
police service expenditures, this study reveals which of these elements are contributing to 
increased expenditures, and to what extent these elements impact government budgets. Public 
sector managers would thus be able to assess the relative impact collective bargaining decisions 
have upon operating expenses as compared to personal services expenses or capital outlays, and 
adjust their collective bargaining positions accordingly. Given access to this information, public 
administrators will be better empowered to control line item costs associated with collective 
bargaining and unionization.  
 
Definition of Terms 
 
For this study the following terms are defined: 
Bargaining Unit – The group of employees determined by the pertinent labor relations board to 
be an appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes (Carrell & Heavrin, 2004: 622).  
In state and local government employment, public sector employees are usually 
categorized in such a unit by a governmental public employee relations board. In Florida, 
this authority is vested in the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission.  
Blue-skying – Tactic of submitting exaggerated, excessive, and unrealistic demands into 
collective bargaining sessions, usually for strategic reasons (Sloane & Witney, 2004: 
438).   
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Boulwarism – Collective bargaining tactic in which management gathers all available pertinent 
facts related to negotiation issues, communicates directly with the employees regarding 
these issues, and devises an inflexible (take-it-or-leave-it) offer to the union (Sloane & 
Witney, 2004: 206). 
Capital Budget – Expenditures for the acquisition of major, long-lived assets. Should be an 
aggregation of expenditures and financings of all capital projects (Aronson & Schwartz, 
1996). Local government annual resource allocations are usually specified in either the 
capital budget or the operating budget. Capital assets, or items costing more than 500-
1,000 dollars can be funded through the operating budget.2 Capital Improvement Plan 
items, such as public facilities which require separate financial planning, while there is no 
set value, usually use $100,000 as the threshold or defining amount in Florida 
municipalities.3 While capital items less than the threshold amount are still considered 
capital assets, the operating budget provides funding for these items. Capital project 
funding for capital improvement projects is determined on a case by case basis, often 
according to funding source.  
Capital Improvements Program – Local government plan which defines major projects over a 
five to ten year period, provides justification for the projects, presents fiscal projections 
of amortization of debt, and specifies the ways and means to satisfy debt required to 
finance the projects (Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 134). 
Capital Outlay – Expenses for items that have a useful life of more than one year, including 
equipment, furniture, and possibly vehicles (Riley & Colby, 1991). Capital assets in this 
                                                 
2 The threshold for capital assets varies greatly from city to city. City One, according to the Director of Financial 
Services,  uses $500 as the threshold amount, while a Budget Manager from City Seven reports that his city uses 
$1,000 as a threshold amount. 
3 Information provided by City One Director of Financial Services, and City Seven Budget Manager. 
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category can be budgeted as current expenditures in the general fund or special revenue 
funds (Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 134).  
Capital Projects Funds –  A category of governmental funds which secure resources from long 
term debt and are used to acquire major, long-lived assets (Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 
127; Florida Department of Financial Services, 2000: Chapter 1, p. 2). Buildings, real 
estate and other major assets are financed through capital project funds. 
Collective Bargaining – Process whereby unions and managements negotiate and administer 
labor agreements (Sloane & Witney, 2004: 438).  
Collective Bargaining Agreement – Results of labor-management negotiations codified in 
written form (Katz & Kochan, 2000). 
Debt Service Funds – Governmental fund designated to account for the accumulation of 
resources for, and the payment of long term debt principal and interest (Aronson & 
Schwartz, 1996: 127; Florida Department of Financial Services, 2000: Chapter 1, p. 2). 
Enterprise Funds – A category of proprietary funds which, similar to private commercial 
operations, are maintained separately to account for revenues and expenditures in the 
subunit operations of a government entity that provides a specific, continuing service to 
the public, such as water and sewer, convention centers, etc. in which monies are kept 
separate from the general fund for more efficient and economical operations ((Aronson & 
Schwartz, 1996: 127; Florida Department of Financial Services, 2000: Chapter 1, p. 2) 
Exit-Voice – The phenomenon and theory identified by Hirschman (1970) that explains the 
processes by which employees respond to conditions in the workplace. Hirschman 
proposed that members of an organization will respond to that organization’s policies and 
practices through “voice,” in which the members express their concerns, or “exit,” in 
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which the members sever relations with the organization. Loyalty, an intervening force 
for exit and voice, represents the degree of attachment to the organization.  
Expenditures – The amount spent by a local government in a specific financial category. In 
addition to total departmental expenditures, police departments record their expenses 
according to personal services expenses, operating (or annual0 expenses, and capital 
outlays.  
Fund Accounting/Fund - A fiscal accounting entity with a self-balancing set of accounts 
recording cash and other financial resources, together with all related liabilities and 
residual equities or balances, and changes therein, which are segregated for the purpose 
of carrying on specific activities or attaining certain objectives in accordance with special 
regulations, restrictions, or limitations. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board 
(GASB) specifies that governmental accounting systems should be conducted on the 
basis of funds. (Governmental Accounting Standards Board, 1997: Section 1100.102) 
General Fund – Governmental fund which supports all services of a local government (e.g., 
police, fire, parks and recreation, etc.) not assigned to other funds (Aronson & Schwartz, 
1996: 127; Florida Department of Financial Services, 2000: Chapter 1, p. 2) 
Ideology-Infused Contract – Concept which describes an employee’s expectations of the 
employer’s obligation to society (Thompson & Bunderson, 2003). The concept may 
affect the employee’s identification with the employing agency, and subsequently self-
identification. 
Internal Service Funds – A category of proprietary funds in which the services of one 
government agency rendered to another government agency are billed to the client 
agency in order to better control costs of government operations. Services such as 
 15
printing, vehicle maintenance, custodial operations, central office supply departments, 
and so on are sometimes provided to local government departments through this method 
(Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 127; Florida Department of Financial Services, 2000: 
Chapter 1, p. 2) 
Memorandum of Understanding – 1) Supplement to a collective bargaining agreement, often 
used to resolve issues not covered at the time the collective bargaining agreement was 
negotiated (Gershenfeld & Gershenfeld, 1994: 60; ); 2) Separate or “local” addendum to 
a regional or national collective bargaining agreement, which addresses local issues not 
contained in the collective bargaining agreement. The United States Postal Service and 
other entities utilizes collective bargaining agreements with national union officers, but 
rely on local memoranda of understanding with union branches at local post offices and 
facilities; 3) Employment terms discussed with employees not accorded full bargaining 
rights (Gershenfeld & Gershenfeld, 1994: 60). Full bargaining rights include formal 
recognition of a union as the bargaining agent of employees within a work unit; the right 
of that union to conduct negotiations with the employing agency; and the right of redress 
for the union and its members to full redress should negotiated terms be violated by the 
employing agency. 
Multilateral Bargaining – Public sector unions advance their agenda not only through traditional 
negotiations, but also simultaneously through the political process acting as special 
interest groups (Valletta, 1989).  
Object Class (Object of expenditure) – A descriptive category which specifies the type of service 
or article obtained through government funds (Freeman & Shoulders, 1999: 245). 
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Operating Budget – Financial document that allocates resources needed to provide services for 
the fiscal year (Aronson & Schwartz, 1996). Includes three types of expenditures: 
Personal Services; Operating Expenses; and Capital Outlays (Riley & Colby, 1991). 
Operating Expenses – Usual, ordinary, and incidental expenditures for items and materials that 
will be consumed during the fiscal year in the course of providing services to the public 
(Gianakis & McCue, 1999: 21). Includes expenditures for goods and services which 
primarily benefit the current period, and are not defined as personal services or capital 
outlays. 
Organization Unit – Governmental entity or department charged with performing one or more 
governmental activities such as law enforcement or fire protection services. GASB 
requires use of such classification for governmental accounting purposes (Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board, 1997: Section 1800.119). 
Organizational Voice – Aggregation of information within the organization that the organization 
uses as feedback in determining policy (Banerjee & Somanathan, 2001). The decision 
maker acquires information from various groups and individuals within the organization 
that attempt to influence the outcome of the decision. 
Personal Services Expenses – Expenditures allocated to salaries, wages and benefits of 
employees (Florida Department of Financial Services, 2000: Chapter 5, page 1).  
Politicization – By-product of unionization in which the labor organization increases awareness 
within the workforce regarding unsatisfactory working conditions, which then leads to an 
expression of dissatisfaction among the union workforce (Borjas, 1979: 25). 
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Psychological Contract – Implicit, yet not formalized, understanding existing between employees 
and their employers which delineates the perceived expectations, rights, and 
responsibilities of both parties (Argyris, 1960).  
Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) – A regulatory, quasi-judicial agency of the 
State of Florida which: determines bargaining units; participates in dispute resolutions 
between public employers and public sector unions at the state and local levels; interprets 
the legality and appropriateness of local government labor relations policies; and in 
general governs labor relations procedures among state and local governments in the Sate 
of Florida (Salerno, 1981; Florida Public Employees Public Relations Commission, 
2004). 
Scope of Bargaining – Range of issues subject to negotiation (Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 415). 
Special Revenue Funds – Governmental fund which accounts for the proceeds of specific 
revenue sources that are restricted by law to specified purposes (Aronson & Schwartz, 
1996: 127; Florida Department of Financial Services, 2000: Chapter 1, p. 2). 
Trust and Agency Funds – A category of fiduciary funds which accounts for assets maintained 
by a government in a trustee capacity or by a government for other governments 
(Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 131; Florida Department of Financial Services, 2000: 
Chapter 1, p. 3). Although pension funds technically belong in this category, the 
Department of Financial Services requires local governments to report pension funds 
separately in the PDF Expenditure Detail Reports (Florida Department of Financial 
Services, 2004). 
Uniform Accounting System Chart of Accounts – A standard reporting system devised by the 
State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance that provides local governments 
 18
with consistent reporting procedures throughout the state (Florida Department of 
Financial Services, 2000). 
Union – Organization of workforce employees with the authority to represent its constituency in 
negotiations, rights issues, and grievance procedures. 
Union Density – Proportionate number or percentage of the workforce affiliated with an 
employee organization. The extent of union membership in a particular workforce (Katz 
& Kochan, 2000). 
Unionization – Affiliation of workforce members with an employee labor organization. In the 
United States, such a labor organization has exclusive bargaining rights when 
representing the bargaining unit. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 
 Research into union impacts on police expenditures requires an examination of the 
processes involved in affecting such impacts. Public sector unions differ from those in the 
private sector in several respects, some of which enhance the public sector unions’ ability to 
more readily fulfill their members’ concerns. The nature of public sector unions, particularly 
police unions, should be investigated, as well as the influence of such unions has on their 
surrounding environment.  
In order to understand what impact unions have on budgetary decisions, it must be 
determined which underlying mechanisms cause this impact, and exactly how the impact comes 
to fruition.  A concept or concern may germinate from the rank and file police officers, and 
eventually be expressed in a local government document, particularly in the police expenditures 
of a local government budget.  Several theories and their variants explain how this process is 
accomplished. Those theories, essentially the concepts of psychological contracts and a 
phenomenon labeled “Exit-Voice,” will be examined in this chapter. The presence of the 
mechanisms explained by theories reveal themselves in the functioning of government, 
especially in police union labor relations, and ultimately in the budgetary processes of local 
governments. This chapter will discuss these functions, relations and processes in order to 
perceive the theories’ manifestations in the real world. While later chapters will demonstrate the 
actual existence of union influence on local government budgets, this chapter will describe, in 
general terms, some of the obvious influences within society, and will also attempt to describe 
the dynamic forces that enable such influences to exist. 
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 Once the seminal forces of psychological contracts and exit-voice are discussed, the 
chapter will examine the environment in which these forces operate, and the manner in which 
these forces express themselves. Public sector labor relations management and the budgetary 
processes provide the environment in which psychological contracts and exit-voice exert their 
influence. The various facets of public sector labor relations and budget processes will thus be 
examined. Among the various facets to be discussed are labor management-relations, collective 
bargaining, government budgets, and the unions that prompt changes to occur in these areas.  
 Labor unions in the public sector differ substantially from those in the private sector: 
Public sector employees have slightly different values than their counterparts in the private 
sector, and tend to be more satisfied with their jobs; Public sector employees tend to be relatively 
more unionized; Public perceptions of government employee unions are different than that of the 
private sector; and finally, the labor laws and environment governing local government 
employees are very different than the laws and the environment governing private sector 
employees.  Private sector employees and their unions are governed by the National Labor 
Relations Act, while government employees are subject to the Federal labor Relations Act if they 
are employed by the federal government, or are subject to state labor laws if they are state or 
local government employees. The only exception to the preceding is that Title 39 of the United 
States Code specifies that postal employees and their labor organizations must follow the 
guidelines of the National Labor Relations Act.  Although some of the motivating factors for 
unionized private sector employees are very similar to unionized employees in the public sector, 
the very structure of government moderates these factors in the public sector. Moreover, the 
manner and methods in which public sector unionized employees exert influence with their 
employers are also different from those of the private sector.  
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Ultimately, the influences of public sector unions become manifest in local government 
expenditures. While a great deal of effort has been exercised to determine the extent of union 
influence on personal services expenditures in the public sector, little or no similar effort has 
been devoted to studying the extent of union influence on operating expenses or capital outlays 
in local government. At least one form of public sector unions, the police unions, exert 
significant influence on operating expenses and capital outlays of local government expenditures 
in a manner similar to the influence these unions have on wages and benefits. Union influence in 
the public sector thus subtly yet perceptibly affects more than just one category of police 
expenditures. The following sections will examine the literature to determine the existing 
evidence of police union influence on local government expenditures, and the manner in which 
these influences are expressed. 
 
Background: Unions and the Public Sector 
 
Differences between Public and Private Sector Employees 
 
 Significant differences exist between public and private sector employees in terms of job 
satisfaction, and union orientation.  Research using data from a 1991-94 study (Heywood, 
Siebert, & Wei, 2002), and from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (DeSantis & Durst, 
1996) indicate that public sector employees have a greater rate of job satisfaction than do private 
sector employees.4  DeSantis & Durst (1996) found that 44.8 percent of the public sector 
employees reported high levels of job satisfaction, while only 35.5 percent of those in the private 
sector expressed the same.  Roughly 16 percent of the private sector employees in that study 
stated that they experienced job dissatisfaction, as compared to only 10 percent of the surveyed 
                                                 
4 Both studies were cross-sectional, and thus did not describe specific job categories. 
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employees in the public sector saying that they were dissatisfied with their job to some degree.  
Steel and Warner (1990) also concluded that public sector employees experience more job 
satisfaction. The researchers utilized a cross-sectional subsample of 6,111 individuals from the 
Youth Cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys for the 1979 to 1987 survey waves. 
Steel and Warner experienced counterintuitive results in their studies by finding that “bureaucrat 
bashing” failed to dampen the comparatively higher levels of job satisfaction among public 
sector employees (Steel & Warner, 1990: 19).  
Despite their comparable overall levels of job satisfaction, proportionately more public 
sector employees tend to prefer union representation more than do employees in other industries.  
In terms of union density, data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(2004c) show that in 2003, 12.9% of the total number of private sector workers was unionized, 
while 37.2% of public sector employees were unionized. Using data from the National 
Longitudinal Surveys, Hills (1985:180) determined that nonunion workers that favored 
unionization ranged between 15 percent for private sector workers in finance, to the maximum of 
54 percent of government employees.   
Recent studies (Fiorito, Stepina, & Bozeman, 1996; Freeman, 1996) provide additional 
evidence that public sector employees demonstrate a stronger preference for unionization than 
their private sector counterparts. One study in particular (Fiorito, Stepina, & Bozeman, 1996) 
determined that the cause for the greater preference for unionization on the part of public sector 
workers can be attributed to a union role perception on the part of public sector employees. The 
role of public sector unions, employees believe, is mainly that of a protector of traditional 
government benefits, most notably job security (Fiorito, Stepina, & Bozeman, 1996: 476). 
Fiorito et al also concluded that public sector employees assigned greater political 
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instrumentality to their unions than did private sector employees (1996: 474). Political 
instrumentality of unions, which refers to perceptions of union influence in politics, might thus 
provide an added attraction of union membership for public sector employees. Fiorito, Stepina, 
& Bozeman (2001: 474), using data from the Union Image Survey, also concluded that public 
sector employees were much less likely to perceive a threat of retaliation from management as a 
result of unionization than were private sector employees.  
 A study by Hills (1985) indicates that public sector unions tend to retain their favorable 
image among members.  Hills’ data showed that in public administration, 92 percent of 
unionized respondents would vote for the union again in a certification election. Such a high 
affirmative percentage among public sector employees ensures the continued existence of these 
unions and a reduced likelihood that these unions would be replaced by other unions or cease 
their role as collective bargaining agents. This demonstrates that public sector unions are neither 
ephemeral nor transitory. Hills concluded that nonunion workers in public administration were 
almost twice as likely to support union representation as were workers in other private sector 
service industries. As indicated in the beginning of this discussion, data from the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2004c) confirms that unionization of public 
sector employees continues to be an ongoing, pervasive phenomenon.  
 Public sector unions also differ from private sector unions from an organizational 
perspective. While the reputation of some private sector unions became smudged with corruption 
and strikes, public sector unions remained relatively free of these negative images which then 
results in a more positive attitude toward unions among modern public sector employees (Fiorito, 
Stepina, & Bozeman, 1996: 465). There have been work stoppages and similar acts by public 
sector employees in the United States since the 1830s (Kearney, 2001: 257). The year 1979 
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experienced the most strikes by public sector employees with a total of 538 strikes or similar job 
actions (Nicholas, 1998: 303). Included in these episodes of 1979 was the New Orleans police 
strike which occurred shortly before Mardi Gras, effectively canceling festivities and costing 
business millions of dollars (Greene, 2005: 216). Since 1979, however, public sector employee 
strikes became far less common (Nicholas, 1998: 303). One notable exception was the strike by 
the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike in 1981 which did not 
receive public support (Kearney, 2001: 255).  The Reagan administration gave a return-to-work 
ultimatum to the striking air traffic controllers, and then fired those strikers that ignored the 
order. The consequences of the PATCO strike for organized labor appeared to have a dampening 
effect on future work stoppages by public sector employees (Schuman & Olufs, 1988: 353).   
Traditionally there has been less opposition to employee unionization by management in 
the public sector than by management in the private sector (Craft, 2003: 548). Troy (2001: 253) 
noted that while private employers oppose the unionization of their employees for competitive 
reasons, many public employers promote unionism for political reasons. In the private sector, 
unionization reduces managerial flexibility and increases the cost of labor, and thus makes it 
more difficult for private sector employers to compete. In the public sector, conditions differ 
from those in the private sector. Moreover, the public sector manager may find an ally in the 
public sector union to further departmental goals.  Troy (2001: 253) cited an example of 
unionization of 70 to 80 thousand home care workers in February, 1999 in which Los Angeles 
County played an active role. He further noted that in the private sector similar action would be 
deemed to be an unfair labor practice and the union would be labeled a company union and 
ultimately decertified. 
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 Another factor that could contribute to the relative successes of public sector unionization 
is the recent positive reaction of public opinion toward unions. While negative political rhetoric, 
union corruption, and strikes soured public opinion regarding unionization in the 1950s and 
earlier (Ichniowski, Freeman, & Lauer 1989), public sentiment in recent years has turned 
dramatically. Craft (2003: 548) notes that “This more positive environment with growing public 
approval suggests politically enabling possibilities for unions in organizing public sector workers 
and negotiations with management.” Craft notes that a 2001 Associated Press poll shows that 
general public approval of unions is about 3 to 1 whereas twenty years ago the margin was 2 to 
1. 
 
Union Political Force 
 
 American unions have demonstrated their influence over national sociological issues as 
well as labor issues. Freeman and Medoff (1984) credit unions with successfully pushing for 
such legislation as the Public Accommodation Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, anti-poverty legislation, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1971.  A Freeman and Medoff (1984) study demonstrated that senators (both Republicans and 
Democrats) from highly unionized states are more likely to vote for union sponsored issues than 
those from less heavily unionized states. This study acknowledges the possibility that unions use 
their political and negotiating influence to affect local government budgetary outcomes on more 
than just wages and benefits of their members.  More extensive discussion of the political role of 




Union Influences on Wages 
 
 Federal, state and local governments pay public sector union employees at a much higher 
rate (22.2% more) than public sector non-union represented employees (U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004d).  The median weekly earnings for a government 
worker represented by a union in 2003 were $795, for a government worker not represented by 
unions, $656 for the same government service.  The disparity is more pronounced in local 
government payroll than found in either state or federal government, even though local 
governments have more employees than federal and state governments combined.  The median 
weekly earnings for a local government worker represented by a union in 2003 were $803, while 
a local government worker not represented by a union received $606.  The earnings gap between 
union-represented and nonunion-represented local government employees expanded the margin 
of difference to 32.5% in 2003 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004d).   According to the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2004d), the median weekly earnings for non-union employees in the 
protective services (police and firefighters) category is only 60% that of median weekly earnings 
for union represented employees in the same category.  A review of empirical examples in the 
literature will discuss this matter in greater depth. The reason that public sector union members 
earn higher salaries than their nonunion counterparts can be attributed to a dynamic concept 
called voice. 
Exit Voice 
Overview of a Phenomenon 
 
 Union influence on local governments can best be understood by utilizing concepts 
identified by such theorists as Chris Argyris and Albert Hirschman. Argyris and Hirschman 
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defined two separate dimensions of organizational behavior that explain the manner in which 
constituent members of an organization impact policies and decisions within the organization. 
Argyris (1960), theorizing a “psychological contract” at the individual level, describes the 
presence of a seminal dynamism which could eventually evolve into a policy embraced by the 
entire organization. Hirschman (1970), with the ternary interactive mechanisms of exit, loyalty, 
and voice, explains the process which transforms an inceptive value at the individual level into 
an action or policy which affect both the individual and the organization of which the individual 
is a part.  
 The concepts inculcated by Argyris and Hirschman form the primary considerations in 
this study of the impact of unions upon local government expenditures. Argyris provides 
understanding as to how employees formulate opinions regarding the employing organization, 
while Hirschman categorizes employee reactions to these opinions and the manner in which the 
opinions may be expressed. Numerous other scholars have built upon the basic concepts 
advanced by Argyris and Hirschman, which thus provide a more sophisticated understanding of 
labor relations in the public sector.  Unionization supplies a formalized process through which 
voice can be exerted by employees without fear of employment-related repercussions.   While a 
propensity may exist for the individual employee or groups of employees to exert voice or 
influence within their employing local government, the effectiveness of such a voice may be 
dramatically limited in non-unionized work environments. The following sections will discuss 
the conceptual components of Psychological Contracts, the processes of Exit-Voice, and the 
ramifications and complexities dealing with these concepts. 
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The Psychological Contract and the Ideology-Infused Contract 
 
 The initial concepts of Psychological Contract Theory emerged from Chris Argyris’ 
book, Understanding Organizational Behavior (Argyris, 1960). Argyris posited that an implicit 
understanding existed between employees and their employers, more specifically between 
factory workers and their foremen.  This understanding delineated the exchange relationship 
between employees and their employing organization. The employer believes that the employee 
is obliged to provide certain services (such as productivity), and the employee believes that the 
employer is obliged to demonstrate certain characteristics (such as fairness).  
Soon other theorists (Levinson, Price, Munden, Mandl, & Solley, 1963; and Schein, 
1965) developed the concept of the psychological contract to include the perceptions of both 
employer and employee that have not been formalized in any way and may not even be able to 
be articulated by the parties themselves but still govern the relationships between the two parties. 
Both the employer and the employee believe that employment entails an obligation on the part of 
both members. The obligation extends beyond mere payment for services and includes such 
expectations that the employee will exercise due care with the employer’s property and that the 
employer will offer a safe work environment.   
Rousseau (1989: 124) expanded the concept further, arguing that unlike an implied 
contract, the psychological contract is perceptually subjective and does not require social 
consensus. The implied contract, according to Rousseau, often results from the relationship 
between two or more parties and its existence is often inferred by the public or by the courts. 
Established precedence by one or both parties often creates implied contracts as demonstrated in 
decisions rendered by courts and arbitrators. As an example, a labor contract or local 
memorandum might specify that employees are entitled to breaks without specifying the length 
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of the break. If the employees take 15 minutes instead of 10 minutes for the breaks, and the 
employer does not object, precedence is established, and an implied contract exists that breaks 
are 15 minutes in length. As a result, both parties are eventually obliged to honor the precedence-
established length of the break, even though the exact length of time for the break is not formally 
specified by either the local contract or a local memorandum of understanding.  
In contrast, terms of the psychological contract are more unilaterally perceived 
(Rousseau, 1989: 124; Rousseau, 1995: 9). An example of a psychological contract is the case of 
a newly hired employee who picked up on cues that employees committed to the company would 
have a fast track opportunity for promotion (Rousseau, 1995: 34-35). An ambitious employee 
responds by working hard for the company, expecting a reasonably quick promotion. While the 
employee has expectations of a quick promotion as a result of hard work, there are no guarantees 
or formal policies ensuring promotion in this instance. The employee has the perception that his 
or her contributions to the organization encumber the organization with an obligatory reciprocity.  
Details of a psychological contract emerge from the perceived promises emanating from 
various external cues such as documents, discussions, and organizational practices (Thomas, Au, 
& Ravlin, 2003: 452). Critical to understanding psychological contract formation is the 
realization that the external cues are subjectively interpreted by the individual employee based 
on individual dispositions and constructions of the employee (Rousseau, 1995: 34). Because 
subjective interpretations vary from individual to individual, parties of the same psychological 
contract are likely to hold somewhat different or possibly even very different beliefs regarding 
each other’s obligations in the relationship (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994: 246).   
 Psychological contracts remain distinct from simple expectations. Whereas expectations 
refer simply to what an employee may expect from his employer, a psychological contract 
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requires a belief that an employer is obliged to provide something based upon the perception that 
the employer had promised to provide such a benefit (Robinson, 1996: 575). In the same vein of 
reasoning, promises by either party alone do not create a contract. In order to define a contract, a 
promise has to be exchanged for some consideration on the behalf of the other party. As 
explained by Robinson and Rousseau (1994: 245): “Considerations such as hard work, accepting 
training or transfers can be offered in exchange for promises, either implied or stated, of pay, 
promotion, growth or advancement. Together, the promise and the consideration exchanged for it 
form the contract.”  
While a general agreement of the contractual terms may exist, a common understanding 
of all the terms does not exist. For instance, an employer might assure a new employee that hard 
work leads to promotions within the organization. The term “hard work” may elicit entirely 
different connotations from both parties. “Hard work” that is ineffective or unproductive 
probably would be unacceptable to the employer. Yet, unrewarded additional effort would result 
in resentment on the part of the employee.  
Researchers (Rousseau, 1995; Morrison & Robinson, 1997) have concluded that 
employees perceive psychological contracts to be violated by the employing organization as a 
result of two basic reasons: 1) reneging, in which an organization knowingly breaks a promise to 
the employee whether on purpose or through extenuating circumstances; and 2) Incongruence, in 
which the employee and the organization have different understandings of the obligations of 
either party. Theorists propose that a violation of the psychological contract is related to 
increased exit, increased use of voice, decreased loyalty, and increased neglect of job duties 
(Turnley, & Feldman, 1999; Turnley & Feldman, 1998). Some writers (Folger & Cropanzano, 
1998: 213) refer to negative employee reactions as “dark side responses.” Recently, an 
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increasing amount of attention has been directed toward this topic by organizational behavior 
scholars. Although somewhat related to the topic of this research, discussion of “dark side 
responses” lies beyond the scope of immediate focus for the study5.  
The concepts spawned by psychological contract theory become of particular interest to 
this study through mounting evidence that employees may also have expectations of their 
employing organizations that go beyond the concerns of immediate self-interest and personal 
treatment.  Thompson and Bunderson (2003) suggest that employees have beliefs that the 
employing organization has an obligation to fulfill a valued cause or principle. These beliefs, 
according to Thompson and Bunderson (2003: 574), are ideologically infused into the 
psychological contract.   The employee, by virtue of employment in that organization, feels 
obligated to perform in a manner that contributes to overall efforts in fulfilling organizational 
commitments and obligations to the valued cause or principle. “The salient beneficiary of this 
relationship is some constituency-however distal or poorly defined-that is assumed to benefit 
from the organization’s actions (e.g., ‘the poor,’ ‘society,’ ‘endangered species,’ ‘the 
environment,’ ‘future generations,’ or ‘people like me’)” (Thompson & Bunderson, 2003:  576).  
For the public sector employee and his/her union, that constituency is the community which they 
serve as public servants.  
The “protect and serve” motto associated with many police services is an example of the 
employee-perceived promissory obligation of a police department. A psychological contract  
 
                                                 
5 For detailed information on this topic, the reader is directed to: studies by Skarlicki and Folger (1997) regarding 
organizational retaliatory behavior; research by Duffy, Ganster, and Pagon (2002) concerning social undermining in 
the workplace; Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly (1998) and Aquino and Douglas (2003) involving anti-social behavior 
in the workplace; Bennett and Robinson (2000) on workplace deviance; and the Bowen and Blackmon (2003) work 
on “organizational spirals of silence.” As opposed to these “dark side” responses, voice is the constructive effort 
which attempts to influence the employer in order to repair the employee-employer relationship (Turnley & 




Table 1 Components of the integrated theory describing the impact of unionization upon local 
government spending. 
 




















Implicit understanding between employee 
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Exchange relationship between employee 
and employer delineated. 
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collective voice, a means of 










Organizational voice Voice considered as a means of 
information aggregation within the 
organization. Provides information to the 
organization. 
 
Employees are reluctant to use voice unless 
they receive support from co-workers. 
 
Unions affect changes in collective 




violation, as it is perceived by the employee, can include the belief that the organization has 
abandoned an espoused principle or cause (Thompson & Bunderson, 2003: 571). Should an 
employee perceive that the employing organization is not fulfilling its designated role, the 
employee’s ideology and the employee’s very identity becomes threatened (Thompson & 
Bunderson, 2003: 577). An example of this situation would be cutting back the number of patrols 
because of budget constraints. A perception of psychological contract violation might arise 
within the law enforcement employee because the reduced number of patrols may be considered 
by the employee to be excessively attenuated to provide adequate protection to the affected 
community.  Thus, if a law enforcement agency is perceived by the agency employees to be 
remiss in its role of protector and servant, the employees become dissatisfied with conditions and 
believe that a psychological contract has been violated. Concomitantly, when employees 
perceive a disparity between desired and actual conditions, they will attempt to communicate 
with management to change the existing conditions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
 Evidence exists in at least one study of police unions which indicates that law 
enforcement employees believe that they have a right to voice their opinions and possibly even 
influence law enforcement policy. Drawing on membership information provided by the 
National Association of Police Organizations and the Fraternal Order of Police, Kadleck (2003) 
surveyed over a thousand police organizations to determine the characteristics exhibited by these 
organizations. Kadleck’s study received a response rate of 58 percent for the survey. As a result, 
648 separate police organizations participated in the study. The organizations that participated in 
the study were both collective bargaining agents (unions) and fraternal organizations. A 
substantial majority (88%) of leaders from these organizations believed that the police employee 
organizations were entitled to an important role in policy development, not only when the 
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policies dealt with “employee issues,” but also when the policies dealt with other issues as well 
(Kadleck, 2003: 349).  
 
The Exit-Voice Phenomenon 
 
 Behavior resulting from the ideology-infused psychological contract based perceptions 
requires a vehicle for expression and manifestation within the work environment and the local 
government system. Hirschman (1970) proposed a trinomial theory pertaining to the internal 
dynamisms of organizations in a free society. Numerous researchers (Freeman, 1978; Borjas, 
1979; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Schwochau, 1987; Meng, 1990; Hersch & Stone, 1990; Bender 
& Sloane, 1998) have interpreted their findings (or refute others’ findings) by referencing 
Hirschman’s theory.   
Hirschman posited that members of an organization, be they consumers or employees, 
will respond to organizational dictums, situations, and conditions through the mechanisms of 
either:  voice, in which they express dissatisfaction or corrective dialogue; or exit, in which they 
sever relations with the organization.  Loyalty is an intervening factor that tempers the effects of 
both voice and exit. The three elements continually interact with the member and each other 
element to affect behavior. As an example, loyalty is predicated on the possibility of exit, and the 
effectiveness of the voice mechanism is strengthened by the possibility of exit. Management, 
Hirschman notes, will seek to identify the underlying causes that lead to exit and thus attempt to 
remedy or mitigate these causes. Voice serves to alert management to the nature of these causes. 
Although exit is the abandonment of the employee-employer relationship, exit plays a supportive 
role as well as an independent role in the process. According to Hirschman (1970: 83), “the 
effectiveness of the voice mechanism is strengthened by the possibility of exit.” The threat of 
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exit must be credible, however, in order for voice to be at its most effective (Hirschman, 1970: 
85). Conditions such as severely limited job markets would reduce this credibility. On the other 
hand, a high demand for labor would enhance threat-of-exit credibility. Enlightened members of 
management, in the effort to retain their workforce, would take the steps necessary and 
reasonable to minimize exit behavior.  
 Loyalty serves a crucial role in the process of exit-voice. Loyalty is defined as a “special 
attachment to an organization” related to the extent to which an organizational member is more 
likely to exit rather than take the risk that conditions will improve in the organization 
(Hirschman, 1970: 77). Further, according to Hirschman (1970: 82), because of loyalty, 
“members may be locked into their organizations a little longer and thus use the voice option 
with greater determination and resourcefulness than would otherwise be the case.”  Something 
about employment within a certain organization appeals to the employee and creates an 
attachment to that organization. This “attachment” changes the threshold for the propensity of 
exit and establishes an inverse relationship between loyalty and exit. As loyalty increases, the 
likelihood of exit decreases. Hirschman explained that without loyalty, the member perceives 
little chance of influencing the employing organization. Exit would become a more attractive 
alternative in such a situation.   
 The intricate relationship between voice, exit, and loyalty merits additional comment 
because of the external factors that add complexity to the concept. External factors include such 
conditions as the relative degree of monopolistic and competitive elements present in a situation. 
When an organization competes with close substitutes that offer similar benefits, employee exit 
becomes less costly for the employee, and loyalty becomes more functional, that is, more 
important as a mediator in employee exit (Hirschman, 1970: 80-81).   Hirschman believed that 
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when the exit option becomes unavailable, voice becomes the only way in which members of the 
organization can react (1970: 33). One example Hirschman used to illustrate this point was that 
of the exclusive bargaining rights of a specific labor organization. The option for exit in the 
monopolistic environs of a labor organization usually is quite costly to members. Exiting the 
organization often results in less influence and often less protection for the former member. 
Since the option to exit the bargaining unit but not the employing organization in these 
circumstances is someone diminished, voice is increased (1970: 79-80). Union members would 
thus be more likely to revitalize the union or engage in decertification efforts, which are both 
voice expressions. 
Even more essential to the theory, however, is the understanding that voice is both a 
complement and a substitute for exit. On one hand, if a member remains in the organization, the 
possibility for both voice and exit continues to exist. However, once a member has exited the 
organization, the option of voice is lost (Hirschman, 1970: 37). Anyone remaining with the 
organization is thus a candidate for voice, that is, the remaining members of the organization 
possess at least the possibility of expressing themselves. The exiting organization member no 
longer retains such a possibility once that member severs relations with the organization.  
Voice must have effectiveness, or at least have the potential of effectiveness, to reduce 
the threat of exit. According to Hirschman, if organization members believe that voice will be 
effective, they will postpone exit.  Thus, the decision not to exit would result despite a clearly 
more attractive alternative if  organization members believe that the complaints of others 
combined with their own loyalty are perceived to be successful (1970: 38). Hirschman notes that 
the individual may not personally be encumbered with voice, but the potential that someone will 
speak out or something will happen enhances loyalty within the member. Loyalty then increases 
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the opportunity cost of exit and the individual is thus more inclined to remain.    Employees who 
believe that their expressed concerns will be considered by management would tend to have a 
greater sense of loyalty, and less likely to exit, than employees who believe that their expressed 
concerns would have no effect on conditions. Employees seeking greater rate of pay, for 
instance, would be more likely to remain in the organization if the possibility exists that 
management would respond in a positive manner to their concerns for higher pay. On the other 
hand, employees seeking greater rate of pay would be less likely to remain in the organization if 
there is little hope of management even considering their request for higher pay, especially if 
other similar organizations are available in which the possibility for higher pay is greater.  
Hirschman proposed the exit-voice concept from a general organizational perspective, so 
that the theory could be applied to a variety of societal structures. Other scholars (most notably 
Freeman, 1976; Freeman & Medoff, 1979; and Freeman & Medoff, 1984) expanded 
Hirschman’s exit-voice concept to explain behavior of trade unions and union members in the 
context of labor relations with their employing organizations. Freeman and Medoff (1984: 94) 
credited unions with offering voice to their members, which in turn reduces turnover by creating 
desirable working conditions, and providing discontented union workers a voice alternative to 
quitting.  Freeman & Medoff (1979:71) emphasized that “In modern industrial economies, and 
particularly in large enterprises, a trade union is the vehicle for collective voice – that is, for 
providing workers as a group with a means of communicating with management.” Exit-voice 
theory, as applied to union environments, thus suggests that unionized employees are more likely 
to express voice to change undesirable conditions, whereas nonunion employees will be more 
inclined to exit. Miller & Mullvey (1991: 45) attribute this situation to the reluctance of a worker 
in a non-union environment in expressing voice for fear of being labeled a troublemaker. In 
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contrast, union environments encourage voice as a more or less acceptable activity which is 
sanctioned by established procedures such as grievance systems and collective bargaining. 
Unionism enables a view held by employees within an organization to be expressed as a 
collective voice. Employees often expect the ability to project voice as part of their 
psychological contract with their employing organization (Rousseau, 1995).  
The benefits of exit-voice, according to Freeman and Medoff, spills over into nonunion 
environs as well. The dissatisfied nonunion employee can respond to an undesirable situation by 
quitting the job or forming a union at the workplace. Freeman and Medoff based their exit-voice 
trade-off conclusions on substantial empirical research (Hamner & Smith, 1978; Schriesheim, 
1978; Herman, 1973; Kochan, 1979; DeCotiis & LeLouarn, 1981; Hamner & Berman, 1981; and 
Brotslaw, 1967). One especially notable research (Hamner & Smith, 1978: 415) studied 87,740 
salaried employees from 250 separate units of a single large employer. Hamner and Smith 
concluded that those units having greater levels of dissatisfaction experienced more intense 
union organization efforts. 
Voice, however, according to at least one study (Iverson & Currivan, 2003), does not 
always depend strictly on whether or not the employee is satisfied or not. Studying 674 
unionized public school teachers from 405 schools, Iverson and Currivan (2003: 105) found that 
“members use their participation in the union to voice irrespective of their level of job 
satisfaction.” The presence of unions thus increases not only the possibility for voice, but the 
likelihood that voice will be exercised. This likelihood becomes greater as conditions become of 
greater concern for the employee. When employees perceive a difference between desired and 
actual conditions, they will attempt to use direct communication with management to change the 
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existing conditions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Union activists, however, are more likely to 
voice their opinions than are ordinary union members (Cappellari, Lucifora, & Piccirilli, 2004).  
 The now classic studies of Freeman and Medoff (1984) noted that union members 
express voice more frequently in such areas as working conditions and safety than non-union 
members. The voice effect provided by unions alters exit behavior among union workers. 
Freeman and Medoff (1984: 94) compared tenure and quit rates for union and non-union 
employees. The researchers isolated the effect of union voice by controlling for age, sex, and 
other personal attributes.  In addition, Freeman and Medoff restricted their comparisons to union 
and non-union workers earning the same wages. They concluded that “With wages and other 
factors the same, unionized workers are likely to quit much less frequently than nonunion 
workers” (Freeman & Medoff, 1984: 95). Reduction in quits as a result of unionization varied 
between 31 to 65 percent, on the average. Moreover, large reductions in quits and increases in 
tenure caused by unionization were found to occur in National Longitudinal surveys (Freeman & 
Medoff, 1984), and in research conducted by Miller and Mulvey (1991). Leigh (1986: 65) 
discovered that the union voice mechanism encourages unionized workers to express 
dissatisfaction while increasing their demand for union representation. Leigh’s empirical analysis 
essentially confirmed Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) exit-voice observations that unions provide 
a voice through the collective bargaining process. Rees (1991: 31) found that teachers with the 
strongest types of grievance procedures in the contracts were less likely to quit than teachers 
working under weaker grievance procedures. Rees concluded that the results of this study 
provided evidence that unions reduce quits through a “voice” effect.  
A number of studies (Freeman, 1978; Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Borjas, 1979; Kochan & 
Helfman, 1981; Schwochau, 1987) discovered that while union members express more 
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dissatisfaction with their jobs than do nonunion employees, union employees are less likely to 
quit their jobs than are nonunion employees. However, some studies (Bender & Sloane, 1998: 
222) argue against evidence of the paradox by stating that the relative dissatisfaction among 
unionized workers emerges from environs of poor industrial relations which tend to increase the 
propensity of unionization. Heywood, Siebert and Wei (2002) wondered whether the voice 
function of unions attracts workers that are naturally given to complaining. The researchers 
believe that unionization creates a “sorting” effect. Heywood, Siebert and Wei (2002: 605) 
define sorting as “the tendency of those toward the lower end of the pay-satisfaction distribution 
to be sorted into union jobs.”  Similarly, Bender and Sloane (1998) argue that the larger 
proportion of the job satisfaction differential seems to arise from the differences in 
characteristics, which are usually negative, indicating that unions form in places where 
satisfaction is low anyway.  Heywood, Siebert and Wei (2002) used longitudinal data from the 
1991-94 British Household Panel Study (BHPS) to determine that the sorting mechanism did 
surface in the data pertaining to public sector employees in general, but not to overall reduced 
satisfaction in union jobs.   
 Hills (1985: 184) looked at a variation of the “sorting” mechanism, but labeled the 
mechanism “self-selection.” Hills speculated that, in highly unionized industries, self-selection 
would be more pronounced because he thought strongly anti-union workers in newly unionized 
firms would move into nonunion sectors within the industry. Hills rejected the self-selection 
variable from the equation when it failed to achieve statistical significance. Comparing different 
organizations with varying proportions of union affiliation could resolve the question of sorting.  
Borjas (1979) believed that the dissatisfaction expressed by the employees surveyed was 
not genuine because the expression was not consistent with behavior (i.e., “quits”). He suspected 
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that the expressed dissatisfaction was a “device” (Borjas, 1979:25) that the union could use to 
leverage more demands from the employer.  Contrary to the summary statements of Borjas and 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) regarding “genuine responses,” Hersch and Stone (1990: 750) 
concluded that the expressed dissatisfaction was indeed genuine for union and nonunion 
employees alike. They amended the exit voice position of Borjas to include the caveat that the 
expressed dissatisfaction had real consequences for the propensity to quit.  
Bender and Sloane (1998: 222), however, stated that their research did not tend to support 
Borjas’ and Freeman and Medoff’s argument. Contrary to the beliefs of Borjas, Freeman and 
Medoff, Bender and Sloane believed that the union members’ negative expression of job 
satisfaction are genuine. Bender and Sloane said other considerations, such as whether or not the 
employer was a monopsonist, come into play.  If indeed that were the case, the exit-voice 
tradeoff ceases to exist because the employee does not have the exit option readily available. 
Bender and Sloane, instead, believed that their findings, of the industrial relations variables in 
the regressions, cause the negative union effect to become insignificant. They attribute Borjas’ 
(and others) findings to statistical methodologies that create bias by omitting pertinent variables. 
Gordon and Denisi (1995: 234) dismissed the voice “device” altogether by saying that 
unions do not foment dissatisfaction with working conditions among their constituents because it 
is in the union’s interest to improve working conditions, not exacerbate existing problems. The 
research by Gordon and Denisi (1995: 225) quotes empirical studies (Eaton, Gordon & Keefe, 
1992; Gordon, Beauvais, & Ladd, 1984) which indicate that both private and public sector 
employees satisfied with their job also seem to be more satisfied with their unions. Gordon, 
Beauvais, and Ladd (1984: 359) in particular found support in their study for the concept of dual 
allegiance to both management and unions. A mutually beneficial labor relations climate would 
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be sought not only by management but also by union, and the employee would experience a 
greater level of job satisfaction. The unions, according to Gordon and Denisi (1995: 234), benefit 
from their ability to negotiate favorable collective bargaining agreements and successful 
handling of grievances, and thus actually enhance job satisfaction within the workforce.  
Moreover, regression analysis in a number of samples in the Fryxell and Gordon (1989: 862) 
studies conclude that “…in terms of worker satisfaction, a union has more at stake than a 
management when grievances are resolved.”   
Freeman and Medoff (1984:139), however insist that “The paradox is not that unionists 
are less well satisfied than others, but that their expressed dissatisfaction is inconsistent with 
their exit behavior.” The apparent paradox created by voice may actually result from a 
combination of the dual inherent factors within voice itself.  Voice, according to Krefting and 
Powers (1998: 274), can result in inherent tensions as well as provide an emacipatory function 
for employees. Fear of reprisals and sanctions for exercising voice must be weighed against the 
possibilities of achieving desired outcomes. Research by Harlos (2001: 335) suggests that the 
duality of employee voice may be more pronounced in informal systems such as open door 
polices.   The study also concluded that “the protocols of informal systems are poorly specified, 
allowing greater procedural variations from individual differences in voice managers’ complaint 
handling styles” (Harlos, 2001: 329). Formal systems, as found in union environments, typically 
are more standardized and thus foster more consistent implementation. 
 Exit-voice hypothesis has been especially utilized by Borjas (1979) and Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) to describe the phenomenon which “politicizes” (according to Borjas, 1979: 38) 
the workforce, encourages  employees to voice their complaints more effectively, and thus 
acquire a less exacting alternative to quitting their jobs.  Borjas (1979: 25) used the term 
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politicization to describe the communicative process through which the union increased 
awareness of less-than-satisfactory working conditions among union workers, which then 
resulted in expressed dissatisfaction among the workforce. Unions also use a similar 
communicative process in their dealings with legislative bodies in order to secure sought after 
goals for their members.  As demonstrated by various studies referenced in this paper, the 
“voice” political and negotiating power created by labor organizations thus enables public sector 
employees to exercise greater control over not only their destiny, but also the destiny of the local 
government which they serve. Public sector employee organizations, as noted by Freeman 
(1986), enjoy political power both as an integral player within the local government itself, as 
well as being constituents of the elected officials of that local government. As mentioned 
previously, more extensive discussion of the political role of unions will be presented in the labor 
relations section of this chapter entitled “Union Politicizing and Politics.” 
 
Exit in Police Departments 
 
Turnover rates in police departments suggest that the dynamics of exit-voice are very 
much present in the field of law enforcement. Large agencies tend to retain sworn officers longer 
than small agencies (Koper, Maguire, Moore, & Huffer, 2001). Large agencies also tend to have 
a distinct union presence, while agencies in smaller cities tend not to have union representation 
(Valletta, 1989: 433). Union presence in a law enforcement agency may result in officers 
remaining in their respective law enforcement agencies longer than in non-unionized law 
enforcement agencies. Such conditions would be consistent with findings in other organizations 
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Miller and Mulvey, 1991).  Evidence suggests that such conditions 
probably do exist in law enforcement agencies, based upon large agencies’ employee retention 
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rates. A report to the Urban Institute indicated that officer attrition due to retirement was only 
20% for small agencies as opposed to 49% in larger agencies. Small agencies exhibited a 
proportionately higher number of departing officers whom had five years or less before leaving 
their respective agencies. Small agencies reported 66% of departing officers having 5 years or 
less experience with the agency, while large agencies reported that only 33% of departing 
officers had 5 years or less service.  Small agencies also reported that 45% of their departing 
officers went on to work for other law enforcement agencies, while only 24% of departing 
officers at large agencies left to work for other law enforcement agencies (Koper, Maguire, 
Moore, & Huffer, 2001). These observations provide additional evidence that the “exit” choice 
of the exit-voice phenomenon appears stronger in the smaller, non-union agencies, and that the 
“voice” choice may be manifested more in the larger, unionized agencies.  Stated in different 
terms, larger, unionized agencies tend to attract and retain law enforcement professionals at a 
greater rate than do smaller, non-unionized agencies. 
Voice extends beyond just the issues of employee turnover and pay. Studies report that 
employees perceive organizations that include voice systems to be fairer than organizations that 
do not provide for voice, even in cases of adverse outcomes (Folger, 1977; Greenberg & Folger, 
1983). Moreover, Folger and Cropanzano (1998: 171) concluded that voice, which acts as a 
process control in decision making, is an important predictor of fairness in the workplace. 
Process control refers to empowered influence over decisions and events within an organization. 
The union, through the collective bargaining agreement and grievance systems, exerts process 
control, especially with regards to employee welfare and working conditions. The union’s level 
of effectiveness in the process contributes to the employees’ overall perception of the union. 
Fryxell and Gordon (1989) surveyed over 2300 union and nonunion employees in four different 
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samples, with more than 1700 of these employees were from the public sector. The researchers 
found that “The amounts of procedural and distributive justice afforded by a grievance system 
were the strongest predictors of satisfaction with a union” (Fryxell & Gordon, 1989: 851).  
Van Dyne and LePine (1998) further expand the definition of employee voice as non-
required promotive behavior that does more than merely criticize. “Voice is making innovative 
suggestions for change and recommending modifications to standard procedures even when 
others disagree” (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998: 109). Voice, as embodied in public sector unions, 
acts as a process control that affects policies and budgets of local governments. The 
modifications to standard procedures suggested by public sector unions represent the functioning 
of voice within local government. That voice exerts influence on budget considerations of capital 
outlays and operating expenses as well as personal services expenditures. Evidence of this 
influence exists in specific line items of the financial reports submitted by local governments to 
the State of Florida. Local governments with police unions, which offer voice to law 
enforcement personnel, experience statistically significant different levels of police expenditures 
than local governments without such unions.  
 
Organizational Voice: Successor of Exit-Voice 
 
 Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) examined the voice aspect from Hirschman’s 
(1970) Exit-Voice theory, focusing on voice as it functions within organizations. Banerjee and 
Somanathan argue that voice is a process of communication “whereby the members seek to 
influence the leader by providing him with information without being able to dictate his 
choice…” (Banerjee & Somanathan, 2001: 191). A group of individuals with the same job 
descriptions, working in the same community, with the same superiors, and experiencing similar 
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situations, will develop similar concerns. As these concerns become formalized in a union voice, 
communications between the union and the decision maker are more systematic and pronounced. 
Banerjee and Somanthan reason that the decision maker will choose what is optimal 
based on the decision maker’s assessment of the probabilities of alternative states available at the 
time of decision. Simply stated, a rational decision maker will attempt to choose the best possible 
outcome of all possible worlds based upon the decision maker’s perceptions. However, 
organization members may have different assessments and different perceptions in the same 
conditions experienced by the decision maker. Realizing that policy decisions are binding on all 
members of the organization, the only way in which members of the organization can influence 
the decision maker’s decision is to provide the decision maker with information that will change 
the decision maker’s assessment of the probabilities (Banerjee and Somanthan, 2001: 191). The 
information provided by the union to the employer at the time of bargaining is an effort to 
change the employer’s (decision maker) perception of what is optimal in a given situation. The 
union, though collective bargaining, the grievance procedures, and other labor-management 
relations, provides information to the decision maker that expresses perceptions of the 
organization’s members. As demonstrated by this study, these perceptions may extend beyond 
the immediate concerns of personal, immediate benefits, and may also include the members’ 
(unionized police officers’) perceptions of the levels of service being provided to the community, 
and the resources required to provide those levels of service. These concerns and influences 
would manifest themselves in the proportionate levels of spending in line item categories such as 
operating expenses and possibly even capital outlays.  
The decision maker benefits from the higher level of communication supplied by the 
organization members because more information is available. The authors posited that “The 
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ability to get good advice is often seen as an important attribute of successful political leaders, 
and political decentralization has often relied on the ability of decision makers to make use of 
local information through appropriately designed institutions of participatory democracy” 
(Banerjee & Somanathan, 2001: 189). Members of the organization, whom are represented by 
the union, benefit in the communication process as well because their concerns are addressed. 
However, Bowen and Blackmon (2003: 1394) did note that employees are reluctant to use voice 
unless there is support from their co-workers. Freeman & Medoff (1979: 73) explained that 
workers in unionized firms are “more willing and able to express discontent and to object to 
managerial decisions” than workers in nonunionized firms. Unions provide moral support as well 
as formal support to their members for organizational voice to be expressed.  
Public sector unions within local governments, functioning as “institutions of 
participatory democracy,” convey the values of their members’ ideology-infused contracts to 
policy makers within local government. Organizational voice, as envisioned by theorists 
(Banerjee & Somanathan, 2001; Bowen & Blackmon, 2003), and expressed through labor 
organizations, influences local government decision making. The voice phenomenon perpetuates 
the existence of labor organizations by bestowing upon these organizations a reason for being. 
Stated in different, but equally valid terms, the functionality of labor organizations actually 
personifies voice in labor-management relations.  
 
Police Unions, Collective Bargaining and Public Sector Labor Relations 
 
 Unions embody and personify the very concepts of psychological contracts, Exit-Voice, 
ideology-infused contracts, and organizational voice. While the work environment in the public 
sector provides the venue for the manifestation of these theories, public sector labor 
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organizations furnish the vehicle or the means through which these concepts exert their existence 
in reality.  The following section examines the processes that manifest the presence of 
psychological contracts, Exit-Voice, ideology-infused contracts and organizational voice. These 
processes in turn affect the functioning of local governments in a perceptible manner. Some of 
the effects of these processes will be demonstrated through existing empirical research and its 
attendant literature.  Public sector labor unions and police unions in particular, use a repertoire of 
activities to further the welfare and concerns of their members. The activities primarily utilized 
by public sector unions are collective bargaining, political activities, and a hybrid form of both 
the previous activities that has been named multilateral bargaining by public sector labor 
relations scholars. The following section describes these union activities and notes the combined 
effects of these activities on local governments.   
 As will be discussed, the major theme of existing literature measures the impact of public 
sector unions on salaries and benefits. The overall effect of these unions on total departmental 
expenditures is also described by a number of studies. However, the literature largely ignores 
two important dimensions of police expenditures, the day to day operating expenses (non-
personal services expenses), and the capital outlays required to equip law enforcement agencies. 
Since police unions in Florida collectively bargain for issues pertaining to working conditions 
and other concerns in addition to salaries and benefits, it would be reasonable to suspect that 
unionized police departments have greater expenditures than nonunionized police departments in 
line item categories other than salaries and benefits as well.  
The following section will demonstrate the relationship between unions, higher salaries 
and benefits, as well as between unions and higher overall police expenditures. Upon this 
understanding of the link between unions and higher expenditures, the study bases its inferences 
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that union presence in a police department causes increases in other forms of expenditures, 
especially operating expenses and capital outlays.  Additional training, equipment, or other 
considerations secured by unions at the negotiating table results in higher expenditures than in 
those departments not experiencing union presence. In later chapters, statistical analysis will 
document these inferences and determine the extent to which unions affect police department 
expenditures in all three categories of governmental object classification, personal services 
expenses, operating expenses, and capital outlays. 
 The following section also describes budgetary and financial processes within local 
governments. These processes translate negotiated issues secured during collective bargaining 
into funded realities. Both form and structure of these processes will be examined to determine 
the mechanisms responsible for implementing labor relations agreements. Statements of the 
research hypotheses result from and conclude the literature review. With these hypotheses, the 
study will attempt to isolate the effect of unionization on all three governmental expenditure 
categories, as well as the overall impact on total police expenditures. 
 
History of Police Unions and Labor Relations in Florida 
 
 Two national police unions largely influence Florida law enforcement labor relations: 
The Fraternal Order of Police, and the Police Benevolent Association. The Fraternal Order of 
Police formed in 1915 as a local employee organization at Fort Pitt, Pennsylvania largely in 
response to 12 hour days and other poor working conditions prevailing at the time (Fraternal 
Order of Police, 2004). Originally, the Fraternal Order of Police functioned largely as a political 
entity rather than a collective bargaining representative. Presently, the Fraternal Order of Police 
is the largest professional police organization in the country with over 310,000 members 
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(Fraternal Order of Police, 2004). The Police Benevolent Association began as the Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Association in New York City in 1892. The organization started existence largely as 
a social institution without collective bargaining rights. By 1914, the Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA) had evolved into a political force that successfully defeated New York 
legislation dealing with police officers’ rights to appeal dismissals (Colwell, 1994). In 1972, the 
PBA was established in Florida, and today has over 30,000 members in that state (Florida Police 
Benevolent Association, 2004). In the state of Florida, the Fraternal Order of Police reports 
having 21,000 members in 2004.6
Prior to 1958, no state had a municipal employee bargaining law, and public sentiment 
toward such employee bargaining, particularly police bargaining was hostile (Ichniowski, 
Freeman, & Lauer 1989). A number of court cases and local government policies before 1968 
actually discouraged active union representation for police officers and other public sector 
employees. For example, in a 1963 Michigan Supreme Court decision (AFSCME v. City of 
Muskegon 369 Michigan 384, 120 N.W. 2nd 197, 1963), the Court upheld the Muskegon Police 
Chief’s policy that essentially prohibited police officers from becoming members of unions 
(Morgan & Korstad, 1977: 3). This trend was reversed in 1968 when the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the 7th Circuit ruled in the case McLaughlin v. Tilendis (398 F 2d 287, 7th Cir., 1968) that 
individuals’ rights to form and join unions are protected by the First Amendment. Earlier, 
President John F. Kennedy took action that is credited with beginning the process of allowing 
public sector employees to unionize with Executive Order 10988 in 1962 (Kearney, 2001; 
Colwell, 1994; and Juris & Feuille, 1973). The Executive Order, which affected federal 
                                                 
6 Florida number of members in the Fraternal Order of Police was provided by Kenny Mack, Secretary of the 
Florida Lodge, webmaster@floridastatefop.org.  
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employees only, largely contributed to the process of state legislatures granting full union 
representation in public sector labor negotiations.   
In 1968, Florida voters expressed their approval for a proposed constitutional amendment 
that would allow state government employees the right of collective bargaining. However, 
political opposition to the amendment and other factors delayed actual enactment of the 
amendment until 1974 (Salerno, 1981: 39-41). During the intervening years between 1968 and 
1974, the political ramifications regarding the issue of public sector collective bargaining created 
confusion and inconsistencies. The Florida Supreme Court issued a decision that reaffirmed state 
government employees with the right to bargain in the 1969 case of Dade County Classroom 
Teachers’ Association v. Ryan. In 1970, however, then-Governor Claude Kirk arguing that 
public service should be above collective bargaining, issued an executive order which prohibited 
state agencies from bargaining with public sector unions. Kirk also stated that he would veto any 
legislation that permitted collective bargaining with public sector unions. In 1972, Governor 
Reuben Askew, Kirk’s successor, extended Kirk’s executive order while legislation pended in 
the legislature (Hudson, 1994).  
The Dade County Classroom Teachers’ Association filed a petition with the Florida State 
Supreme Court to order the legislature to show cause why the voter approved legislation was not 
enacted. When legislation proposals stalled and died in the House during the 1973 session, the 
Supreme Court reacted by creating a seven person commission. The Commission was charged 
with gathering information in preparation for issuing court-mandated guidelines for collective 
bargaining (Kearney, 2001). In response, the legislature enacted the 1968 voter-approved 
collective bargaining legislation in March of 1974 (Hudson, 1994). The legislation became 
known as the Public Employee Relations Act of 1974, and actually took effect December 16, 
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1974. The final version of the law can be found in Florida Statutes as Part II of Chapter 447 
(Public Employees Relations Commission, 2004).  
Prior to 1974, only five or six cities or counties in Florida participated in collective 
bargaining with employee organizations, and these were the more populous governments such as 
Miami and Dade County. When it became apparent that the Public Employee Relation Act 
would pass, other Florida cities and counties engaged in collective bargaining with their 
employees. Approximately fifteen Florida communities had negotiated contracts with their law 
enforcement officers by December 16, 1974, the date the Act became effective (Salerno, 1981: 
40). 
 
Local Government Collective Bargaining in Florida 
 
Florida statutes grant state and local government employees in Florida a number of rights 
with respect to employee organizations, including: “To form, join, and participate in employee 
organizations; To negotiate collectively about wages, hours, and terms and conditions of 
employment; To be represented in grievances; and To act together to help or protect each other 
by legal means other than a strike” (Public Employees Relations Commission, 2004: 8).  
Florida statutes designate the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) as the 
controlling body that determines the exact specifications or identification of each bargaining 
unit. Generally, these determinations are based on, but not limited to such criteria as: functional 
similarities of constituent employees; efficient administration of government; the organizational 
structure of the employer; the number of employee organizations with which the employer may 
have to negotiate; the community of interest; and other principles (Salerno, 1981). The criteria 
used by the Public Employees Relations Commission attempt to establish a bargaining unit that 
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would best serve the needs of the members of that unit without adversely affecting the efficiency 
of the governmental agency served by that unit, or render collective bargaining unwieldy for the 
involved parties. Once a bargaining unit registers with the Public Employees Relations 
Commission and is organized through certification elections, employer recognition follows, and 
the bargaining process with an employee organization begins.  
Public sector unions interact with their employers according to two basic types of issues: 
issues that primarily affect individuals separately within the bargaining unit; and issues that 
primarily impact the bargaining unit collectively. In the first instance, grievance procedures 
specified by contract deal with discipline cases and rely upon “rights arbitration” to resolve 
disputes between management and labor (Carrell & Heavrin, 2004: 501).  Since the scope of this 
study focuses upon the effects of the entire bargaining unit on local government, extensive 
discussion of grievance procedures will be omitted.7  In the second issue that necessitates 
management-labor interaction, employee organizations rely upon negotiations in labor-
management meetings, and more formally upon collective bargaining. Such issues are often 
submitted to binding interest arbitration in the event of impasse. Binding interest arbitration is 
rare in the private sector but used extensively in the public sector (Katz & Kochan, 2000: 457). 
In binding interest arbitration, an arbitrator mutually selected by the union and governmental 
agency considers the arguments presented by both parties, reviews the available facts and renders 
a decision that is binding on both parties of the dispute.  In Florida, however, grievance 
procedures mandate binding arbitration at the final step but impasse resolution is affected 
                                                 
7 For further information regarding this subject, the reader is encouraged to reference works by Kearney (2001), 
Dekker (1994), and Freeman and Medoff (1984) regarding public sector grievance procedures in general. For 
grievance handling procedures in law enforcement organizations specifically, the reader is directed to Juris & 
Feuille (1973), Salerno (1981) and numerous other sources. Specific grievance procedures for state or local 




through mediation and advisory arbitration (Salerno, 1981). Mediation and advisory arbitration 
refers to the process in which a trained negotiator attempts to elicit all pertinent arguments and 
facts from the disputing parties and attempts to forge an agreement between the parties largely 
through compromise. The mediator’s position or opinion in the dispute is not binding on either 
party.  
If mediation fails to resolve the dispute, or if either party declines mediation, the Public 
Employees Relations Commission can appoint or the parties may choose a “special master” 
(renamed “magistrate” by the 2004 Legislature, 106th Session) with expertise in labor relations. 
The Public Employee Relations Commission maintains a list of qualified special masters 
(magistrates).  If the recommended decision by the special master or magistrate is rejected by 
either party, the impasse items are submitted to the public employer’s legislative body (board of 
county commissioners, school board, etc.) for a deciding vote (Florida Public Employees 
Relations Commission, 2004). Ultimately, all collective bargaining agreements for state and 
local government employees in Florida must be approved by both the bargaining unit members 
and the public employer legislature (Florida Statutes, 2004a). In the event of rejection by either 
party, conflicting or disputed provisions of a collective bargaining agreement may not be 
enforced and are returned to further negotiations and possibly impasse procedures. The only 
provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement that will be enforced under these 
conditions are those provisions which are undisputed by the parties. 
The State of Florida permits a relatively broad scope of bargaining, or range of topics 
available for discussion at the negotiating table. An advisory legal opinion regarding authorized 
collective bargaining items issued by the Florida Attorney General on July 15, 1977 remains in 
force at the time of writing.  The opinion issued by the Florida Attorney General stated that the 
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Collective Bargaining Act, codified as Part II of Chapter 447 of the Florida Statutes, “…does not 
provide a definitive answer to what constitutes a proper subject for collective bargaining…”  
(Florida Attorney General, 2004). Section 477.309 (1) simply declares that after an employee 
organization has been certified, that organization and the appropriate public employer “…shall 
bargain collectively in the determination of the wages, hours and terms and conditions of 
employment of the public employees within the bargaining unit” (Florida Statutes, 2004a). 
The topics discussed in law enforcement collective bargaining sessions and in other labor 
management meetings comprise a broad spectrum of topics such as: financial compensation for 
off-duty court appearances (Juris & Feuille, 1973: 152); citizen review boards (Colwell, 1994: 
278); wages (Salerno, 1981: 27-30); police roles in the community (Magenau & Hunt, 1989: 
547; Magenau & Hunt, 1996: 1315); staffing (Zax, 1989: 30; Carter & Sapp, 1992: 28); 
retirement and insurance benefits (Feuille, Delaney, & Hendricks, 1985a); supplemental pay 
benefits such as shift differential pay (Zhao & Lovrich, 1997: 511); education and training 
(Carter & Sapp, 1992: 37); and various other topics. As noted previously, all of the foregoing 
topics are subject to bargaining under existing Florida State law (Florida Attorney General, 2004; 
Florida Statutes, 2004a: 447.309). Results of bargaining for these topics manifest themselves in 
local government financial records through personal services and operating expenses. 
As collective bargaining progresses over time, police unions tend to become more 
influential within the host local government. Feuille, Delaney, and Hendricks (1985: 162) 
collected 1,631 police union contracts which were in force during the years 1975 to 1981. Feuille 
et al discovered that labor contracts became more favorable to unions with the passage of time. 
The benefits won through negotiations in many cases are cumulative. Continuing negotiations 
introduce new provisions and changes in contract language which largely favors labor whether 
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arbitration is an option or not (Feuille, Delaney, & Hendricks, 1985b: 179).  While there are 
restrictions placed on union gains by fiscal adversity in communities, research has demonstrated 
that unions also have a substantial effect on nonwage bargaining outcomes over time (Lewin, 
Feuille, Kochan, & Delaney, 1988: 507 - 510).  Many of these provisions are long-lived, and 
subsequent contracts retain these clauses while adding additional clauses. As an example, one 
bargaining issue studied by Carter and Sapp (1992: 37) was education and training. Carter and 
Sapp compared the results from their survey with a survey conducted 10 years earlier and found 
that 81% of collective bargaining agreements from their current survey had provisions dealing 
with police officer education and training, the same percentage of collective bargaining 
agreements with training clauses as the earlier study. Carter and Sapp surveyed all U.S. law 
enforcement agencies serving populations of 50,000 or more, or those with more than 100 sworn 
officers for a total of 699 agencies (1992: 19).  
The researchers also found that in 1991, police union collective bargaining agreements 
exhibited more clauses dealing with staffing requirements (73%) than in 1981 (61%) (Carter and 
Sapp, 1992: 28).  Clauses dealing with staffing requirements refer to the general concern about 
the number of sworn officers in a unit. Among the conclusions that Carter and Sapp extracted 
from their study that there was “a defined trend toward delineation of review procedures (in 
disciplinary cases) in the CBA’s provisions. This is an important indicator of a reduction in 
management prerogatives” (1992: 26).  
These collective bargaining agreement provisions may have resulted from legislation by 
state and local governments. One study (Schwochau, Feuille, & Delaney, 1988) included 
research of municipal police bargaining in 449 cities for 3 different years separated by five year 
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intervals8. The focus of the study concentrated on the legal environments of collective bargaining 
agreements, particularly mandated “duty-to-bargain laws. In a cross-sectional study, Schwochau 
et al researched the police department expenditures under four different conditions: 1) 
Nonbargaining cities; 2) Collective bargaining cities without a mandate to bargain; 3) Collective 
bargaining cities with a legislative mandate to bargain but no arbitration availability; and 4) 
Collective bargaining with legislative mandate to bargain and access to arbitration. The 
researchers found that controlling for certain aspects of the economic environment, collective 
bargaining in accordance with legislated negotiation mandates resulted in significant influences 
on human and financial resource allocations in these local governments (Schwochau, Feuille, & 
Delaney, 1988: 435).  Schwochau et al determined that cities bargaining an average of eight 
years with police unions experienced approximately 7.5% greater police department 
expenditures than nonbargaining cities (Schwochau, Feuille, & Delaney, 1988: 429). Legislation 
mandating negotiations between police departments and police employee organizations, 
according to Schwochau et al., thus affects resource allocation and enhances union power as 
well. A more recent study (Gely & Chandler, 1995: 179) supported the Schwochau et al findings 
and determined that collective bargaining laws more favorable to protective services are more 
positively and significantly associated with police department expenditures. It is interesting to 
note that Schwochau, Feuille, and Delaney found that their results indicated that bargaining 
under arbitration did not influence resource allocation to police departments more than did 
legally mandated bargaining. Legally mandated bargaining influenced police department 
expenditures to a greater extent than did the availability and use of arbitration.   
 
                                                 
8 Schwochau et al selected the years 1971, 1976, and 1981 for the study because detailed budget information was 
available for these years only across all samples. 
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The Collective Bargaining Process – a Function of Voice 
 
 Public sector collective bargaining in Florida emerges from state legal mandates to 
negotiate when members of bargaining units have organized. Both Article 1, Section 6 of the 
Florida Constitution and Section 447.309 of the Florida Statutes mandate collective bargaining 
once an employee organization has been certified. Section 447.309 also requires public 
employers to bargain in good faith and that the collective bargaining agreement be reduced to 
writing. Most of Florida’s neighboring states in the South do not have such comprehensive 
statutes that give the right to bargain collectively to their employees and to the employees of 
their constituent local governments. Public sector unionism is thus greater in Florida than many 
other southern states (Cohen & Cohen, 1998: 122).  Given these observations, a discussion of the 
collective bargaining process would be appropriate.  
Specific unions, even within the law enforcement field, may differ from one another 
dramatically in the types of goals, concerns, and values held by their respective members and 
officers. Despite the variations, virtually all of the unions share at least the same primary 
objective: to negotiate with the employer a written collective bargaining agreement that 
addresses employment conditions and union-management relationships in terms that are 
acceptable to the pertinent union membership (Sloane & Witney, 2004: 177). Haber and 
Wellington (2003: 149) summarize the collective bargaining process in a more paradoxical 
context: “In each of the negotiations, each party has the incentive to cooperate with the other for 
mutual benefit, and simultaneously, the incentive to seek gain at the other’s expense.” Both 
parties in collective bargaining assemble negotiating teams to present (and maintain) their 
interests during bargaining sessions. 
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While variations occur in representative negotiating teams, a number of characteristics 
appear to be common to most local labor negotiating teams. A local union negotiating team often 
consists of ex-officio officers (such as the president and other officers), and a chief steward or 
committee member (Carrell & Heavrin, 2004: 204). Bargaining units affiliated with the Fraternal 
Order of Police (FOP) in Florida select their negotiating teams based on the status of certified 
bargaining agents. Most FOP local teams consist of the lodge president, chief steward, and shift 
representatives.9  The Florida Police Benevolent Association affiliates prefer selecting a 
bargaining team informally and using an attorney or experienced negotiator provided by the state 
or local organization as the chief labor negotiator.10
The management negotiating team varies from organization to organization as well. 
Local governments utilize the widest variety of management representatives in collective 
bargaining (Kearney, 2001: 102). Florida alone has 67 counties and approximately 300 
municipalities report expenditures for their own local law enforcement agencies (Florida 
Department of Financial Services, 2004). While a great deal of variation exists in the 
composition of negotiating teams with such a large number of local governments, some 
generalizations can be made.   Larger public employers tend to use a labor relations director, or 
management/staff personnel experienced in labor relations. Florida requires that the chief 
executive officer of the appropriate public employer or his/her representative negotiate with the 
union bargaining agent.11  Often the designated representative is an official familiar with the 
operations of the bargaining unit, such as the Police Chief in smaller communities.  Whether they 
act as chief negotiator or not, in small police departments with limited budgets and personnel, the 
                                                 
9 Information provided October 13, 2004 by George F. Hachigian, Senior Staff Representative for the Florida Lodge 
of the Fraternal Order of Police. 
10 Information provided October 13, 2004 by Hal Johnson, Florida Police Benevolent Association Legal Services. 
11 Florida Statutes, Section 447.309, Subsection 1. 
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community police chiefs take an active role in collective bargaining (Thibault, Lynch, & 
McBride, 1998: 390). Usually, in smaller communities, the central management staff of a local 
government absorbs the functions of labor relations, which includes collective bargaining 
(Unsinger & More, 1989: 6). Kearney (2001: 103) noted that larger cities (over 250,000 in 
population) relied on professional negotiators and full time labor relations staff to represent 
management at the negotiating table, while midsized cities (50,000 to 250,000 in population) 
tend to depend on the personnel director or resident labor relations professional in bargaining 
sessions.  
Depending on the jurisdiction, some local governments retain an outside consultant, or an 
attorney well versed in labor law, to serve as the chief negotiator for management, or at the very 
least to act in an advisory capacity (Kearney, 2001: 104). Some scholars (Gely & Chandler, 
1993b: 381) have observed that economic and legal environments, complexity of the bargaining, 
and certain demographic characteristics of the municipality influence the municipal 
organizational structure for collective bargaining. In some cases, the budget director and 
personnel director may join the management negotiation team (Chandler & Judge, 1993). As 
noted by Kearney (2001: 100), there is no conventional model of the collective bargaining 
management team in local government. 
Regardless of the designated chief negotiators for both sides, as discussed previously, 
Florida Statutes specify that a collective bargaining agreement signed by both the chief executive 
officer and the union bargaining agent is not binding until approved by the public employer 
(legislative body) and ratified by the public sector employees who are members of the labor 
organization.12 The final step of collective bargaining for the private sector, in contrast, usually 
                                                 
12 Florida Statutes, Section 447.309, Subsections 1, 2(a), 2(b), 3, and 4. 
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requires only ratification of the agreement by majority vote of members of the private sector 
union (Fossum, 1999: 342-343).  
The issues submitted for collective bargaining emanate from different sources. Usually, 
the rank and file membership can express their concerns to the union informally by discussing 
concerns with union officials, or more formally through union meetings (Carrell & Heavrin, 
2004: 212). However, unions and union bargaining teams also conduct surveys of their members 
prior to bargaining sessions by using questionnaires to determine which issues are most 
important to the members (Carrell & Heavrin, 2004: 212). Innovative unions will conduct 
frequent member-to-member surveys to provide maximum input from the rank and file for 
setting each union’s priorities (Rubinstein, 2001: 199) Some public sector unions will even 
survey nonunion members in their bargaining unit to consider their concerns as well for 
bargaining issues.13  These efforts ensure that employee voice is thoroughly understood by union 
officials. Once employee voice has been determined, unions attempt to codify this voice formally 
in provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 
In addition to the rank and file members generating topics for bargaining, bargaining 
issues can evolve through institutionalized venues. Fossum (1999: 228-229) differentiates 
between employee interests and union interests. As an institution, Fossum argues, a union desires 
security as the employees’ representative. As a result, the union may have to engage in trade-offs 
with management to secure their own interests. For instance, through budgetary restraints, the 
employer may be faced with cutting costs. In such a situation, Fossum uses the example of a 
union that might be willing to sacrifice some small fraction of employment in a unit to gain 
higher wages that will increase its organizing leverage in nonunion units. Clearly, such strategies 
                                                 
13 Information provided by Dawn Trouard, President of the United Faculty of Florida, University of Central Florida 
Chapter, in a February 24, 2004 interview. 
 62
 
would be counter to the benefits of individual members desiring employment security, or seeking 
additional staffing in their unit. In this situation, employee voice is modified ostensibly for the 
greater good of the collective employees, and the continued effectiveness of union voice. 
In addition to noting that a union might well emphasize union security at the expense of 
member preference, Katz and Kochan (2000: 188) suggest that other factors influence the final 
selection of union bargaining objectives. Individual union members have varying degrees of 
influence within the organization itself. Older or more skilled members, according to Katz and 
Kochan, might possess more influence within the union than other members, and as a result, the 
bargaining objectives may reflect some employees’ goals more than others. Union leaders also 
evaluate objectives according to the probabilities that they may be obtained. Finally, Katz and 
Kochan write, union leaders weigh strategic options and make decisions based on those 
evaluations. The degree of internal communications within the union usually determines the 
effectiveness, from the members’ point of view, of the union bargaining priorities in collective 
bargaining sessions.    
 Other topics for labor bargaining issues may actually originate in a totally different and 
remote local government. Before collective bargaining, public sector unions not only review 
their own prior contracts, but also examine the existing labor agreements of comparable 
occupational groups in other similar jurisdictions (Kearney, 2001: 115).  This preparatory 
analysis increases familiarity with other possible benefits, and provides justification for 
proposals submitted to local negotiations. However, both sides of the negotiating table have the 
capability to examine labor agreements of other jurisdictions, and this capability can become a 
liability for either party. Either party may examine the labor agreements of adjacent or nearby 
communities only to find that the other party is justified in making a claim for concessions. 
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Management may find that their community pays the lowest salary in the area, or the union may 
find that their members are indeed the highest paid law enforcement employees for comparable 
communities in their section of the state.  
The broad statement of Florida Statutes Section 477.309, and a subsequent Florida 
Attorney General evaluation of the section, provides wide latitude of topics for collective 
bargaining (Florida Attorney General, 2004).  Multiple issues in complex negotiations require 
structure and planning to maintain control and prevent a breakdown in good faith bargaining. 
Once negotiation teams are formed, prenegotiation conferences usually are conducted to 
establish ground rules, make initial, formal presentations of proposals and demands, set the 
bargaining agenda, and schedule negotiation sessions (Kearney, 2001: 115; Unsinger & More, 
1989: 16-19).  
After these preliminary guidelines are established, the collective bargaining sessions 
commence. The economic and noneconomic proposals are usually separated, and agreements are 
often made immediately on less important items (Carrell & Heavrin, 2004: 216-219). Major 
issues, particularly those involving salaries and benefits often take longer to resolve, and can 
result in an appeal to public sympathy to exert pressure on the negotiating parties. Public sector 
unions effectively use political and community alliances in their relations with government 
employers (Kreisberg, 2004: 228).  There is strong evidence that police union political activities 
that pressure politicians are more effective in increasing police department expenditures than are 
political activities that pressure voters (O’Brien, 1994: 342). A firefighter union in a Florida 
municipality, the Winter Springs Fire Union, resorted to distributing brochures to the general 
public during stalled contract talks. In the brochure, the Fire Union predicted that the City’s 
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“unwillingness” to respond to their demands would result in future loss of life.14 In another case, 
a police association for El Paso, Texas Deputies issued handbills that criticized a county judge 
who, as a member of the commissioner’s court charged with approving the labor agreement, 
initially opposed a settlement with the union (Burpo, DeLord, & Shannon, 1997: 231-239). Both 
of the foregoing examples illustrate the efforts of public sector unions to increase pressure on the 
bargaining process should labor contact negotiations stall.   
In the United States, union strategies include an incursion of labor into what once was 
considered strictly management’s domain (Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Kochan, 2004: 22). 
Employees and unions in the nation seek greater influence in decision making for their places of 
employment. This situation holds true especially for protective services. Modern law 
enforcement officers with greater levels of education expect to be included in decisions 
involving their on-the-job fate (Sewell, 2002: 18). Police unions, for the most part, mirror similar 
concerns of most labor organizations, that is, their focus is primarily on salaries and working 
conditions (Coulson, 1993: 119-120). As discussed previously, however, many other issues can 
be discussed in police collective bargaining sessions. Williams (1992: 299) identified twenty-
eight “police-specific contract clauses” commonly used in police union negotiations in addition 
to the numerous generic issues of public sector collective bargaining. These police-specific 
issues ranged from “officer bill of rights” provisions to such items as mandated police 
equipment. Sloane and Witney (2004: 191) report that during one collective bargaining session, 
the local police association in Rockville Centre, Long Island demanded from its employer 
municipality no fewer than 85 concessions. Excessive demands such as those submitted in 
                                                 
14 Information from February 11, 2003 interview of Ron McLemore, City of Winter Springs, FL City Manager. City 
of Winter Springs, FL Labor Attorney Jeffrey E. Mandel October 16, 2002 letter to Fire Union Attorney Richard P. 
Siwica provides documentation to the event.  
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Rockville Centre, often are intended as strategic attempts to gain concessions from management. 
Labor relations scholars label the strategy as “blue skying” (Kearney, 2001: 118).  
Public sector management negotiators, while engaging in “blue skying” strategies at 
times, are more likely to engage in a negotiation strategy called “Boulwarism.”  The term was 
derived from the collective bargaining tactics of Lemuel R. Boulware, a former GE Vice 
President of Public and Employee Relations in the 1960s. Simply defined, Boulwarism consisted 
of accumulating all available information before negotiations, communicating with the 
employees directly, and developing a negotiating posture that was largely a “take-it-or-leave-it” 
attitude. The major failing of this approach lies in the realization that very few negotiators enter 
collective bargaining sessions armed with all available facts. This collective bargaining tactic 
later resulted in an adverse decision (for GE) by the National Labor Relations Board which ruled 
the tactic as bad-faith bargaining. The ruling subsequently was upheld by federal courts, 
including the U.S. Supreme Court which refused to disturb the decision (Sloane & Witney, 2004: 
206).   
Section 447.309 of the Florida Statutes directs public sector chief executives to engage in 
“good faith bargaining,” which may discourage Boulwarism in Florida public sector collective 
bargaining.  However, Florida Statutes also specify that collective bargaining agreements are not 
binding unless approved by the pertinent legislatures,15 and Florida Statutes also state that failure 
of the legislature to appropriate funds sufficient to finance the collective bargaining agreement is 
not an unfair labor practice16 such as failure to bargain in good faith. This provision of Florida 
Statutes bestows an advantage upon the public sector employer that private sector does not 
possess. In the private sector, intervening government agencies in labor disputes perform as a 
                                                 
15 Section 447.309 Subsections 2(b), 3, and 4. 
16 Section 447.309 Subsection 2(b) 
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neutral party, however in the public sector government is not likely to be neutral to its own 
bargaining (Shafritz, Riccucci, Rosenbloom, & Hyde, 1992: 238). Collective bargaining roles are 
thus very different in the private and public sectors, and unions in the public sector, without the 
ability to cause a work stoppage in many states including Florida, must rely on different tactics 




 One of the different tactics used by the public sector unions arises from the natural 
structure of governmental functioning. In the private sector, labor-management negotiations are 
restricted to the bilateral relations between those individuals that primarily represent the interests 
of the employer, and those individuals that act as a bargaining agent for the employees. In the 
public sector, contracts are seldom negotiated by the employer and the employees’ representative 
alone. Often local government citizens, their representatives, and interest groups influence 
negotiations even those these parties never come near the negotiating table (Coleman, 1990: 102; 
Katz & Kochan, 2000: 340). Texas provides an example of interest group influences on 
bargaining through the Texas Fire and Police Employee Relations Act of 1973. According to this 
act, local referenda determine whether or not police and fire department employees in 
communities are given the right to bargain collectively. Barnum and Helburn (1982: 333) 
analyzed the results of referenda in 22 Texas cities, including Dallas, Laredo, and Texas City to 
measure the extent of union influence on the local electorates. The researchers found that when 
labor organizations endorsed the referenda, the positive vote (allowing collective bargaining) 
increased by 4.2 percent in the city with low unionization rates, to 16.8 percent in the city with 
the highest rate of unionization (Barnum & Helburn, 1982: 339). In the cases of Texas Fire and 
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Police Employees Relations Act, the employers (local governments’ chief executives and 
legislative bodies) had little voice in determining whether or not bargaining would occur in their 
communities. Organized labor, as an interest group, influences police union issues in local 
government.  
Such influences extend beyond public voting behavior, however. Public officials are 
often approached with the intent of influencing the negotiating positions of administrators who 
are ultimately responsible to these elected officials (Fossum, 1999: 534). Between 1985 and 
1989, police officers in San Antonio, Texas improved their mediocre wage and benefit package 
to one of the highest compensation plans in the nation (Burpo, DeLord, & Shannon, 1997: 209). 
This feat was accomplished through a carefully orchestrated effort on the part of the union (San 
Antonio Police Officers Association) to increase political and community influence in San 
Antonio: A Political Action Committee was inaugurated in 1986; Materials were distributed in 
political districts of elected officials opposed to increased police pay and manpower; A political 
consultant was hired; The union contributed thousands of dollars to local charities; The union 
joined the city’s four chambers of commerce; and a network of union public relations were 
established with city officials. Union officials attribute their success in San Antonio police 
collective bargaining to the foregoing actions (Burpo, DeLord, & Shannon, 1997: 211-214).  
Valletta (1989: 431) also considered multilateral bargaining as a public sector union 
advantage. Valletta described two tactics involved in multilateral bargaining: the “end run” in 
which public sector unions can appeal to a political official (such as a mayor) if they do not 
receive the desired outcome when bargaining with the executive (for instance a city manager); 
and “double-deck bargaining” in which the public sector unions first negotiate a collective 
bargaining agreement with the executive and then appeal to the legislative body of the 
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government for an improved settlement (1989: 432). Coleman (1990: 104) adds another 
dimension to multilateral bargaining by arguing that a solidarity theme may develop between 
two or more unions, for instance between police and firefighters. This relationship would 
contribute additional support to police union negotiators engaged in bargaining talks.  
Some scholars (Katz and Kochan, 2000: 340) conclude that the required approval by the 
legislative body of the collective bargaining agreement is one of the multilateral characteristics 
in the public sector bargaining process. Carrell & Heavrin (2004: 249) reason that since the 
legislative body has the authority to determine the budget, involvement at an impasse stage of 
negotiations constitutes a new level of bargaining. Since guidelines of the Public Employees 
Relations Commission require remanding impasse items to the pertinent legislative body in 
collective bargaining disputes should both sides reject the recommended decision by the special 
master or magistrate, multilateral bargaining has the potential of being a common occurrence in 
Florida police union negotiations. However, Feuille and Anderson (1980: 315) wrote that should 
multilateral bargaining occur in local government bargaining, it was more likely to be the “end 
run” variety in which the union bypasses the designated negotiators to deal with other city 
officials outside the official bargaining process. Feuille and Anderson also determined that the 
common characteristics in multilateral bargaining are “a divided management and a politically 
aggressive union” (1980: 315). The end run variety of multilateral bargaining is thus less likely 
to occur if the common council and the city manager both are committed to reducing costs and 
the union is not very active. However, if some members of the common council are sympathetic 
to the police union but are not in agreement with the manner in which a city manager is 




The subject of multilateral collective bargaining does not exact a consensus among 
scholars. Gely and Chandler (1995: 171; 1993a: 301) contend that union political activity affect 
departmental expenditures more than multilateral collective bargaining. In an attempt to 
understand the impact of unionization on local governments, Gely and Chandler (1995: 173; 
1993a: 301) segregated the effects of union bargaining power and union political power. The 
researchers found evidence that when they accounted for union political activities, a collective 
bargaining agreement between protective services unions (police and firefighters) and a 
municipality did not significantly increase departmental expenditures. However, union 
endorsements of candidates and campaign contributions resulted in significant and positive 
effects on departmental expenditures (Gely & Chandler, 1995: 178). O’Brien (1996: 99; 1994: 
322; 1992: 189) credited campaign activity with increased departmental expenditures. The Gely 
and Chandler study and the O’Brien studies demonstrate that unions advance employee voice 
beyond the confines of collective bargaining to achieve effectiveness. In the instances quoted by 
the studies, the researchers provide evidence that public sector unions deliver employee voice to 
elected officials as well as to management. The Gely and Chandler studies and those of O’Brien 
used police and fire unions for data samples. 
While the Gely and Chandler and O’Brien studies may have identified the characteristics 
of unionization that contribute to increased departmental expenditures, the information yielded 
by these studies is of greater use to public sector unions for crafting strategies of activism. The 
effects on each of the individual expenditure categories (personal services, operating 
expenditures, capital outlays) are still not fully explained. The public administrator would benefit 
more from an understanding of the effects of unionization on expenditure categories than 
realizing which political activities are of greater benefit to the union. Moreover, the overall effect 
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of unionization in a public sector organization on local government expenditures is of critical 
interest to the public administrator who is responsible for enlightening the community’s political 
officials to what degree and on the exact manner in which unionization impacts each budget 
category.  The cross sectional studies of Gely and Chandler and O’Brien may be overly sensitive 
to the political cycles of election years. A longitudinal study would assuage such conditions. 
The present study accommodates the administrator’s perspective to a greater degree than 
the Gely and Chandler and O’Brien studies by examining the specific expenditure categories 
affected by the presence of unions. This information would be useful to management 
representatives negotiating collective bargaining agreements because it would provide 
management negotiators with an understanding of the impact that specific concessions at the 
bargaining table would create in the upcoming fiscal years. In addition, the study would provide 
management representatives with information to share with bargaining agents that could assist 
both parties in reaching an accord. If the union is unconvinced that a proposal would result in 
significant hardship on the local government, it would be less likely to compromise on an issue. 
Management negotiators with a clear understanding of budgetary consequences for labor 
negotiations would be better prepared to successfully fulfill their roles and their responsibilities 




 Collective bargaining, particularly in the United States, has been characterized by 
adversarialism. Kearney and Hays (1994) argue that this situation exists as a result of the 
competitive and individualistic spirit prevailing in American society. A historical mutual 
suspicion of labor leaders and managers exist at all levels in many organizations. The scholars 
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point to the  litigious propensities prevalent in the United States, and to the fact that even the 
American education system “is premised on individual competition-not cooperation” (Kearney & 
Hays, 1994: 48). However, some scholars believe that the adversarial relations fostered by 
collective bargaining are inadequate to deal with emerging issues that require cooperation rather 
than competing bids for power (Rubin & Rubin, 2003: 92; Rubin & Rubin, 2001: 7). 
 Participative decision making might compensate for the difficulties encountered by 
collective bargaining, especially in local governments. Collective bargaining often creates an 
environment of adversarial relations in which the participants champion very different interests. 
The unions may argue for greater benefits for their members while public administrators may be 
less inclined to increase benefits because of scarce resources and subsequent tight budgets. This 
situation can result in conflict which impacts labor-management relations as well as such job 
satisfaction.  
Studies (Albright, 2004; Locke & Schweiger, 1979) indicate that participative decision 
making results in a perceptible decline of conflict, improvement in productivity, increased job 
satisfaction, and effective problem solving. Forms of participative decision making include such 
programs as: Total Quality Management (TQM); Quality Circles (QC); quality of working life 
programs (QWL); Labor-Management Committees; and related approaches (Kearney & Hays, 
1994). Participative decision making, or collaborative management, has become a major topic of 
discussion for organizational reformers 17 (Rubin & Rubin, 2003: 92). Collaborative 
management in the public sector enjoys a security in existence not available to the private sector 
because of the restrictive language of the National Labor Relations Act (Kearney, 2001: 339). 
The National Labor Relations Board determined in its 1992 Electromation and duPont decisions 
                                                 
17 However, the concept itself is not new. In the United States, government experimented with participative 
approaches such as the Labor-Management Committee as early as the 1920s (Kearney, 2001: 340). 
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that employer-employee committees formed to implement collaborative management violated 
the employer-domination provision of the National Labor Relations Act (Carrell & Heavrin, 
2004: 173). Since the National Labor Relations Act applies only to the private sector and the 
United States Postal Service, many state and local governments are free to implement 
collaborative management programs according to their labor laws. The U.S. Department of 
Transportation has aggressively pursued collaborative management under the label of the 
Department’s Partnership Council (Albright, 2004: 45). Indianapolis has used collaborative 
management in the form of Labor-Management Partnerships since the former Mayor Stephen 
Goldsmith’s administration instituted the program in 1995 (Rubin & Rubin, 2001: 12).  
 The disadvantage of collaborative management programs such as Labor-Management 
Partnerships is that their existence are often at the mercy of politics (Light, 2003: 82; Albright, 
2004: 43-44). The Clinton administration issued Executive Order 12871, which created a 
National Partnership Council and required labor-management partnerships in all government 
agencies. The Bush Administration, however, rescinded Executive Order 12871 and dissolved 
the National Partnership Council (Albright, 2004: 43-44). The Bush Administration did allow 
use of the labor-management partnerships, but left implementation of labor relations strategies 
up to the individual agencies. 
 Collaborative management relationships vary in terms of the number of participants, the 
scope of issues, and the organizational level at which collaborative recommendations can be 
implemented. While this variation occurs from organization to organization, some common 
characteristics emerge in serious attempts at collaborative management. One such characteristic 
was the proportion of labor representatives to management representatives. A survey revealed 
that Labor-Management Partnerships were usually designed with an equal number of union and 
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management representatives (Albright, 2004: 47). It appears that equal representation as 
manifested in terms of the number of participants from each party ensures, or at least 
demonstrates, the spirit of cooperation.  As far as issues included in collaborative management, 
Rubin and Rubin (2001: 17) reported that the chief operating officer of Indianapolis’ Goldsmith 
administration “preferred to involve the union in everything.” Albright (2004: 47) noted that over 
90 percent of surveyed partnerships responded that formal recommendations were submitted to 
senior management and that the recommendations were accepted and acted upon.  
 Collaborative management, regardless of its form, was not intended to replace collective 
bargaining. Kearney and Hays (1994: 48) believe that unions are necessary for participative 
decision making, and note that collaborative management programs tend to emerge from 
collective bargaining environs. Rubin and Rubin (2001: 22) link collective bargaining and 
collaborative management even more strongly: “Any reform in the delivery of public services 
must be based on the traditional collective bargaining relationship, which in turn becomes the 
infrastructure for the parallel process of collaboration.”  Stated in different terms, collaborative 
management does not supplant collective bargaining, but instead relies on collective bargaining 
for its existence. Rubin and Rubin aptly described the collective bargaining relationship as an 
“infrastructure” for collaborative management because the collective bargaining relationship 
establishes the police union as the recognized representative of the employees. But since the 
issues discussed in collaborative relationships differ from those of collective bargaining, 
collaborative management emerges as a separate entity from the process of collective bargaining. 
Collaborative management pursues goals of mutual interest, especially those related to the 
delivery of public services. Collective bargaining, on the other hand, usually deals with the 
individual and collective interests of the union and its members. Collaborative management 
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attempts to jointly resolve common problems and improve organizational functioning, while 
collective bargaining concentrates on the differences of values between management and labor, 
and devotes its energy to achieve a compromise more than a complete resolution of issues. 
 Two major obstacles retard the use of collaborative management in local governments. 
The first obstacle is legislative in nature. In all fifty states, whether or not collective bargaining 
laws exist, significant statutorial limitations exist for labor-management schemes (Dilts, 1993: 
309). These laws severely restrict management discretion to delegate or share authority. The 
state and local government legislatures have, in the process of agency codification, specified the 
authority of each constituent governmental entity in a very highly defined functional form. These 
specifications extend to the individual agency and no further. For instance, in collaborative 
management, the parties may decide to purchase more vehicles for the community which may 
require additional funding. However, according to Florida Statutes, despite any agreements 
between the chief executive (or designee) and unions, the legislative body is responsible for 
approving and appropriating funds.18 Collaborative management decisions in this and other 
respects are thus systemically and statutorily restricted. 
 The second major obstacle to collaborative government in local governments arises from 
the structural dynamics of the employee labor organizations. Internal union politics often 
challenges union participation in managerial decision making (Rubinstein, 2001: 187). Union 
members perceive participative decision making as a return to the company dominated unions of 
the 1920s (Dilts, 1993: 305). At the root of the issue is the balance of individual union member 
concerns with the collective concerns of the labor organization. Increase tension has been noted 
among the rank and file when individual representation efforts seemed to be sacrificed for the 
collective interests of the membership as expressed in the decision making process (Rubinstein, 
                                                 
18 Section 447.309 Subsections 2(b), 3, and 4. 
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2001: 175). As an example, during a collaborative management session, both union and 
management might identify a practice that may jeopardize the safety of others. A union 
employee engaged in such a practice may subsequently be disciplined by management. Since the 
union collaborated with management in implementing the safety policy, the ability of the union 
to rigorously defend the employee from disciplinary action may be compromised.   A less 
obtrusive form of labor-management cooperation stated in labor-management contract clauses 
seems to gain more acceptance from the rank and file membership. In such cases (e.g., labor 
management meetings), while the union secures a voice in the decision making process, the 
interests of the union members (primarily individual interests) will purportedly retain their 
priority status since the union decision-making participation option is voluntary while the union 
representation function is mandatory. 
 While labor-management partnerships in Florida police departments are rare, if 
nonexistent,19 a large number of police departments in Florida contain sections in collective 
bargaining agreements dealing with labor-management meetings, which discuss matters that are 
not collective bargaining issues.20 Although the labor-management meeting is not as aggressive 
in approach to collaborative management as labor-management partnerships, such participative 
decision making provides an additional venue for voice. As stated previously in the discussion of 
exit-voice, Harlos (2001: 329) found that informal systems tend to allow greater procedural 
variations because such systems tend to be poorly specified. Unions with collective bargaining 
agreements inject the essential formality into the work environment which then offers the 
                                                 
19 Hal Johnson, Florida Benevolent Police Association Legal Services, reports that he is unaware of any labor-
management partnerships in Florida law enforcement agencies.   
20 Information provided by Florida Fraternal Order of Police Senior Staff Representative George F. Hachigian. 
Hachigian explains that the labor-management meetings are held monthly or quarterly to “discuss anything that is 
not a collective bargaining issue.” 
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potential for more structure required by collaborative management programs such as Labor-
Management Partnerships.  
In Florida, a more collaborative rather than an adversarial approach appears to be 
emerging in collective bargaining relationships among the state’s public school districts. 
Research of both union and management negotiators from the 67 public school districts revealed 
that, on average, participants from both sides of the negotiating table believe that that the values, 
attitudes, mechanics, and procedures reflected a collaborative philosophy toward collective 
bargaining (Falvey, 2002: 88). Moreover, school districts that have adopted a more pronounced 
form of collaborative approach to collective bargaining experienced a significant decrease in the 
number of grievances filed within a school district (Franco, 2002: 110) and smaller union 
densities than school districts utilizing the traditional style of bargaining (Franco, 2002: 95). The 
school districts that embraced collaborative approach actually experienced lower average salaries 
when compared to demographically similar school districts using a more traditional approach to 
collective bargaining (Franco, 2002: 97). However, traditional approaches to collective 
bargaining and labor-management relations continue to impact local government decisions as 
well. These impacts can be discerned in the levels of local government expenditures.  
 
The Influence of Exit-voice within Local Governments 
 
Once the bargaining issues have been resolved, either through agreement or the impasse 
procedures previously discussed, and the collective bargaining agreement has been approved by 
the legislature and by the union members, appropriations from the legislature fund the provisions 
of the new contract. At the end of the fiscal year, the effects of the change in budget allocations 
to accommodate the collective bargaining provisions will be experienced by the local 
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government. Before examining the actual mechanics of the budgetary processes involved, a 
review of the literature will be conducted to understand the existing research of the actual impact 
law enforcement unions have on local government police expenditures.  
Public sector unions, exerting subunit power, provide labor resources to governments, 
and thus are presumed to have some influence within governments, including the budget process.  
Feuille and Delaney (1986) analyzed data on police salaries in more than 900 American cities 
during a ten year period. The researchers found evidence that supported their hypotheses that 
collective bargaining had a significant and positive effect on police salaries (Feuille & Delaney, 
1986: 233). The study’s results also yielded evidence that the availability of arbitration had a 
positive but modest effect on police salaries, but that salaries did not vary significantly between 
cities that used the arbitration option and the cities that relied on collective bargaining without 
resorting to arbitration (Feuille & Delaney, 1986: 228).  
In their 1988 study, Schwochau, Feuille, and Delaney concluded that bargaining cities (those 
with collective bargaining agreements) had greater police department expenditures than non-
bargaining cities when resources were scarce (1988: 418). Schwochau et al assembled collective 
bargaining status data for 1,071 cities that had their own police force and populations of 25,000 
or more. The researchers concluded that by gaining a collective voice through unionization in 
their employment environs, employees increase their relative power within the organization 
(Schwochau, Feuille, & Delaney, 1988: 420). Moreover, collective bargaining allowed unions to 
command greater resources within their environment (1988: 433), up to 7.5 percent higher police 
expenditures than in nonbargaining cities (1988: 429). 
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Table 2. Review of selected empirical studies regarding unionization effect on local government expenditures. 
Author/Year    Study Sample Date of
Sample 
  Methodology Results
Zhao & Lovrich (1997) Collective bargaining 





Report (LEMAS): 2,945 
law enforcement agencies 
1990 Logistic regression
analysis 
 Existence of a collective bargaining 
mechanism in large police agencies is 
significantly correlated with the presence 
of supplemental pay benefits favorable to 
officers. 
Magenau & Hunt (1996) Role content in unionized 
v. non-unionized 
departments 
830 officers from police 
departments of 15 cities 
with population> 100,000 
in various geographical 
areas of the country 
1995-
1996 
Cluster analysis, canonical 
analysis, multiple 
regression analysis 
Unionization is related to greater emphasis 
on the law enforcement component of the 
police role in a community 
Gely & Chandler (1993a) Impact of Police & 
Firefighter Unions on 
departmental expenditures 
Police & Fire Departments 




Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression 
Presence of a Collective Bargaining 
Agreement increases the overall level of 
departmental expenditures. 19% higher 
expenditures in bargaining than non-
bargaining. 
Valetta (1989) Municipal unions’ effect 
on employment levels 
Municipal departments in 
700 cities. 
1980  Descriptive Statistics.
Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression. 
Collective bargaining associated with 
greater expenditures in departments with 
collective bargaining agreement. 
Zax (1989) Longitudinal effect of 
unionization on 
employment levels. 
13,749 departments of city 
and county  
1977-
1982 
Descriptive Statistics.  
Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression. 
Higher employment per capita ratio in 
bargaining units as compared to non-
bargaining units. 
Schwochau, Feuille, & 
Delaney (1988) 
City government resource 
allocations to police 
departments 
Police Departments in 449 




Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression. 
Bargaining cities had greater police 
department expenditures than non-
bargaining cities. 
Zax (1988) Collective bargaining 
effect on municipal 
employees’ compensation 






Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression. 
Collective bargaining increases city 
expenditures as a result of negotiated 
higher salaries. Spillover effects to non-
bargaining units within the same 
organization. 
Freeman (1986) Impact of unionism on 
public sector 
Composite of various 
sources and studies. 
1970-
1985 
Comparison and discussion 
of various empirical 
studies. 
Public sector unions can influence 
employer behavior through political 
process. Public sector unions raise fringe 
benefits more than they raise wages.  
   
Feuille & Delaney (1986) Collective bargaining and 
the availability of 
arbitration 




Ordinary Least Squares 
and Generalized Least 
Squares 
Collective bargaining and the availability 
of arbitration have positive but modest 
effects on salaries 
Feuille, Delaney, & 
Hendricks (1985a) 
Collective bargaining and 
the level of fringe benefits 
Police fringe benefits in 
over 500 cities with 
populations > 25,000 
1971- 
1981 
Ordinary Least Squares Collective bargaining and regional 
location influence the level of police 
fringes more than any other variables  
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Schwochau et al did not investigate, however, whether cities shifted funds away from 
capital expenditures to pay for the higher salaries associated with collective bargaining or 
whether the bargaining units attained resources at the expense of non-bargaining units. Nor did 
their research examine whether the specific categories of operating expenses and capital outlays 
increased more in bargaining units than in non-bargaining units. The present study seeks to fill at 
least one of these information gaps by investigating whether or not public sector labor 
organizations influence operating budget decisions, including day to day operating expenditures 
and capital outlays. 
Finding support for the previous studies, Zax (1988: 301) found that not only does 
collective bargaining result in increased expenditures as a result of higher salaries in the 
bargaining unit, but that positive spillover effects were observed in nonbargaining units of the 
same organization. Zax based his study on a large pool sample of police, fire, sanitation, and 
other noneducation-related departments from International City Management Association 
compensation surveys taken in 1975, 1977, and 1979. Included in the surveys were over 1,500 
police observations, the largest of the four groups. Zax discovered that employees in unorganized 
(nonunion) departments in “bargaining cities,” that is cities that bargain with at least one of the 
departments, experienced higher wages and benefits than their counterparts in nonbargaining 
cities (1988: 302). The same study concluded that powerful unions can induce municipalities to 
either divert allocations away from other expenditure categories or to increase municipal 
budgets.  
Other studies find slightly different intramunicipal expenditure effects of unionization 
(Valetta, 1989; Freeman & Valletta, 1988; Ichniowski & Zax, 1988). Valletta (1989: 439) did not 
find that unions increased overall expenditures, but he did determine that collective bargaining 
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contracts were associated with greater expenditures in the departments covered by a contract. 
Moreover, Valletta’s study indicated that revenues did not increase significantly through either 
increased taxes or other sources as a result of unionization. Valletta concluded that while unions 
shift demand to their own departments, they do not affect the level of total municipal 
expenditures (1988: 440). These findings were consistent with the cross departmental effects 
uncovered by Freeman and Valletta (1988) and Ichniowski and Zax (1988), in which both 
studies found that union contracts increased wages but reduced employment in other departments 
in the same city. 
However, Valletta (1989: 433) also noted that smaller cities tended not to be unionized 
and tended to have greater revenues per capita and greater expenditures per capita. This situation 
may have skewed the findings regarding the effects of unionization on total expenditures for 
municipalities. This situation exists because the smaller cities, with no unions but yet larger 
expenditures per capita, present a false representative image in regression analyses that would 
suggest that the lack of unions inflates expenditures.  
While the issue of union-increased municipal total budgets appears to be unresolved, 
there does seem to be evidence from more than one study that unions have a tendency to increase 
expenditures in unionized municipal departments. These studies all utilized appropriate control 
variables in their research, and such factors as income, other unions, etc. were included in 
regressions. However, most of these studies focused upon personal services expenses and/or total 
departmental expenses while not addressing operating expenses and capital outlays. This study 
attempts to increase understanding of the impact, if any, that unionization has on operating 
expenses and capital outlays.  
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Police supplemental pay also seems to be influenced by the presence of unions. Zhao and 
Lovrich (1997) examined data from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative 
Statistics Report (LEMAS) which resulted from a survey conducted by the United States Bureau 
of Justice Statistics in 1990. The comprehensive LEMAS survey contains a vast amount of 
information about 2,945 law enforcement agencies throughout the United States (Zhao & 
Lovrich, 1997: 511). Critical to the Zhao and Lovrich study, LEMAS recorded the self-reported 
information of whether or not the agency was unionized, and also whether or not one or more 
types of supplemental pay existed in the agency. Supplemental pay includes hazardous duty pay, 
differential shift pay, education incentive pay, and merit pay. Zhao and Lovrich concentrated on 
the 727 agencies responding to the LEMAS survey which had over 100 sworn officers (1997: 
511).  Zhao and Lovrich (1997: 516) found that “the existence of a collective bargaining 
mechanism in large police agencies is significantly correlated with the presence of supplemental 
pay benefits which are favorable to officers.” 
The increases in police expenditures are not restricted to wages. A ten-year longitudinal 
study by Feuille, Delaney, & Henricks demonstrated that collective bargaining, more than any 
other factor, influences the level of police fringe benefits in a municipality (1985: 15-17). The 
researchers used the definition of “fringe benefits” provided by the International City 
Management Association (ICMA) which defines these benefits as “city contributions to all 
retirement systems and to health, hospital, disability, and life insurance” (Feuille, Delaney, & 
Henricks (1985: 2). After controlling for a number of other influencing factors in their research 
(such as crime rate, population, per capita income, value of housing, etc.), Feuille, Delaney, and 
Henricks concluded that collective bargaining significantly resulted in larger fringe benefits for 
police employees (1985: 8). 
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In addition to increasing overall departmental expenditures by increasing wages and 
benefits, public sector unions, according to one study (Zax, 1989: 30), may actually increase 
public sector employment levels. The study by Zax, which examined longitudinal effects of 
unionization on more than 13,000 public sector departments (including police departments) in 
over 5,000 city and county governments over a five year period, identified a 3.1% higher 
employment per capita ratio in bargaining units compared to nonunion units (1989: 21). Zax 
(1989:28) suggests that the greater employment rate in the unionized public sector contrasts 
sharply with comparable situation in the private sector, in which non-union employment has 
enjoyed a steady increase over unionized employment.  
Zax (1989: 23) attributes this difference to the possibility of public sector union-induced 
increases in demand. This is largely made possible, Zax (1989:30) believes, by the fact that 
public sector unions enjoy dual roles in their individual association with the employing agency.  
As employee representatives, they engage in traditional collective bargaining. In addition, unions 
act as special interest constituency groups operating in the political environment.  
 
Union Politicizing and Politics  
 
The Exit-Voice phenomenon discovers a different dimension and venue in the public 
sector. Government employee unions not only receive voice privileges in dealing with their 
employers at the negotiating table, they also experience the opportunity to exert voice at the 
policy making level with elected officials. Freeman (1986) identified this opportunity as the 
fundamental difference between public and private sector bargaining. Specifically, Freeman 
argued “that public sector unions, more so than private sector unions, can influence the employer 
behavior through the political process” (Freeman, 1986: 42). Employee voice, strengthened by 
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unionization, seeks to be effective as well as existent. The union enhances employee voice 
effectiveness by expanding the reach of voice beyond the workplace. The forum most receptive 
in many ways to employee voice is that of the political realm.   
Carter and Sapp (1992: 18) noted that police labor organizations have been able to further 
their agenda by lobbying state legislatures. The Police Benevolent Association and the Fraternal 
Order of Police lobbied the Florida legislature for a decade to secure  “disability presumption 
benefits” for law enforcement officers. Florida firefighters have enjoyed such benefits since 
1972. Legislation eventually was passed by the state legislature which accorded this benefit to 
police officers. As a result, Florida cities, counties, and other local governments are required to 
provide benefits to local government law enforcement officers of Florida who suffer from such 
illnesses as heart attacks, hypertension, and tuberculosis. Under the legislation, the covered 
illnesses are presumed to be job-related despite family medical history or lifestyles (Finotti, 
2003: 52). The effect of union encouraged legislation on local government budgets can be 
illustrated by the impact of the legislation on the budget of Green Cove Springs, FL. Green Cove 
Springs, with an 18 person police force, is a small community with a population of 5,500 on the 
banks of the St. Johns River in northeastern Florida. After the legislation took effect on July 1, 
2002, workers’ compensation premiums in Green Cove Springs increased by 50% per year to 
$180,000 (Finotti, 2003: 53).  Section 440.02(17) of the Florida Statutes requires state or local 
governments to carry workers’ compensation coverage. Through several options, the local 
government must either self-insure or secure insurance for workers’ compensation claims filed 
by their employees, which in turn requires payment of insurance premiums by the local 
government.21  
                                                 




Babcock, Engberg, and Glazer (1997) explored the political advantages of public sector 
unions.  They emphasize that a public sector union that increases its size can increase public 
support for a higher wage. Babcock, Engberg, and Glazer substantiate their argument through 
qualitative research as well as modeling. They point out that public sector employees vote at a 
greater rate than other workers, and that higher-than-average turnout rate provides greater 
influence over political conditions within government. Moreover, public sector employees’ 
relatives, friends, and acquaintances vote, and thus extend public sector union political influence. 
Chandler and Gely (1995: 295) concluded in their study of police and firefighting employees in 
614 American cities that “electoral political activities appear to be important determinants of 
protective services wages and employment.” This evidence provides further support that 
unionization impacts local government police expenditures. Exit voice appears to have become 
pronouncedly politicized in the functioning of public sector unions labor relations.  
Freeman (1986) claims that public sector unions have the potential to actually shift demand for 
labor outward through the political process, which can strain local government budgets. Not only 
are salaries and employment levels affected by unionization, but benefits are dramatically 
increased as well. Freeman (1986:59) references 11 major studies of public sector unions in the 
1970s and 1980s, and notes that in all cases except hospital workers, public sector unions raise 
fringe benefits by considerably more than they raise wages. These gains may have been the result 
of political influences since benefits are usually determined by legislative bodies.  
O’Brien (1996: 99) found that police union political activity leads to nonwage bargaining 
gains for police unions. O’Brien concluded that unlike with private sector negotiations, public 
sector bargaining demonstrates evidence of an inherently political nature. Gely & Chandler 
(1993a) utilized a national sample of 614 U.S. cities with populations of 25,000 or greater. The 




study analyzed union political activity over a three year period. The findings of the study were 
consistent with that of Valletta (1989) and Benecki (1978) and determined that: the presence of a 
collective bargaining agreement between a protective services union and a municipality 
positively affects protective service department expenditures; and the positive effects are the 
result of union political power rather than union multilateral collective bargaining power.  Gely 
and Chandler compared police expenditures in association with police union participation in 
three separate political activities:  endorsing candidates for political office; providing manpower 
or in-kind contributions to candidates for public office; and/or financial campaign contributions 
to candidates for public office. This comparison found that in cities where the police union 
engaged in all three political activities, department expenditures were 19.3 percent higher than in 
similar nonunion cities (Gely & Chandler, 1993a: 301). This suggests that the more intense the 
union activity, the greater impact unionization exerts upon local government budgets. One study 
(O’Brien, 1994: 322) corroborated this conclusion by finding that increased union political 
activity by police or fire unions resulted in greater municipal expenditures. 
The degree of union activity within a local government may depend strongly upon the 
type of legislation existing within the state of the local government.  As Carter and Sapp (1992: 
18) have pointed out, the types of legislation within the state and local government are 
susceptible to lobbying by police labor organizations. Ichniowski, Freeman, & Lauer (1989) 
compared public sector compensation levels with state bargaining laws in a sample of over 800 
police departments in the United States. They found that public-sector bargaining laws had 
significant effects on the compensation of both union and non-union employees (Ichniowski, 
Freeman, & Lauer, 1989: 205). The more compulsory state guidelines with respect to collective 
bargaining, arbitration, etc. resulted in higher compensation, and conversely, the less demanding 
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the labor laws were, the lower compensation levels were on average. State guidelines that 
mandated bargaining sessions between labor and management resulted in higher compensation 
packages, whereas incidents of state guidelines that encourage rather than require bargaining 
resulted in comparably lower compensation packages. The very existence of these guidelines 
indicates that employee voice, enhanced by unionization, has influenced state legislatures. 
 
The Right-to-Work Issue  
 
The state of Florida is a right-to-work state, that is, there is state legislation which 
prohibits any agency, organization, or employer requiring membership in a labor organization as 
a condition of employment. Florida and twenty-one other states, have such legislation (Sloane & 
Witney, 2004: 333). The topic of such legislation is critical in discussions concerning the extent 
of union influence. According to Hundley (1988), right-to-work legislation has a substantial 
impact on union membership. Studying a sample of over 12,000 state and local government 
workers, Hundley found that union membership was lowest when right-to-work laws were 
present (1988: 301). Legislation favoring unions such as dues check-off (union dues subtracted 
from pay checks), and compulsory arbitration provisions increased the probability of union 
membership (Hundley, 1988: 316-317). Higher union membership or density within an 
organization allows unions to mobilize greater resources to achieve greater effectiveness (Rose 
& Chaison, 1996: 78). Unions in Florida, including police unions, experience relatively lower 
membership rates with subsequent lower resources and funds as a result of existing right-to-work 
legislation. 
Studies conducted in the private sector found that 20 percent of private-sector employees 
in union shop states were union members, but only 8 percent of private sector employees in 
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right-to-work states were union members (Davis & Huston, 1995: 223). In another study, Davis 
and Huston (1993: 58) point out that in the private sector, only 20 percent of the American 
workforce reside in right-to-work states, yet the marginal impact of right-to work laws remains 
marginally significant (Davis & Huston, 1993: 52). In the public sector, Ichniowski and Zax 
(1991: 255) found that right-to-work laws substantially impact union membership. Union 
security policies such as union shops increase union influence by providing a higher source of 
revenue and a larger membership base (Kearney, 2001: 73). Since right-to-work laws affect not 
only union revenue and also union membership, the effect of right-to-work legislation may 
impair union functioning as an effective voice for their constituency.   
A U.S. Supreme Court decision in Retail Clerks International Association v. 
Schermerhorn, upheld Florida’s right to work law which also prohibits “agency” shops in which 
union membership is optional but compulsory union dues are deducted from nonmembers’ pay 
to share the costs of collective bargaining (Carrell & Heavrin, 2004: 146).  Right-to-work laws 
usually predominate in federal government and local government employment.22 As a result, 
union density under right to work conditions in the public sector can fluctuate greatly. According 
to the literature, dissatisfaction with one or more conditions in the workplace contributes to 
unionization. Rather than exit employment environs, employees exercises voice by unionizing 
when such an option is available. When a third option is available, as it is in right-to-work states, 
the employee not only has the opportunity to exit or participate in voice through unionization, the 
employee may now also procrastinate on the decision of whether or not to exit or join the union,  
thus saving union dues and still be employed. Unionization under right-to-work conditions could 
then be considered to serve as a proxy for the relative strength of the voice mechanism in the 
exit-voice paradigm. The more members belong to the union in a right-to-work bargaining unit, 
                                                 
22 In Florida, Article I, Section 6 of the state Constitution grants right to work provisions to employees. 
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the more likely that management will consider union voice to be credible and representative of 
the workforce.  
States with right-to-work legislation not only experience comparatively lower union 
membership, but also lower union growth (Katz & Kochan, 2000: 124). Research indicates that 
right-to-work laws reduce union membership by 5 to 8 percent (Moore, 1998: 463).  In the public 
sector, with higher relative rates of unionization, the effects may be more dramatic. Ichniowski 
and Zax (1991: 273) estimated that revocation of right-to-work laws would increase bargaining 
unions by 111% among police departments, 78% among fire departments, and 287% among 
public welfare departments. Right-to-work legislation thus tends to affect not only union 
membership, but also the overall extent of unionization in the public sector. As a result, right-to-
work legislation reduces the resources available to the union by decreasing the number of dues 
paying union members, and further limits the number of public sector unions that would require 
local governments to engage in collective bargaining. This has clear implications for Florida 
police unions. Right to work legislation, by decreasing membership levels, reduces available 
resources to the police unions as a result of relatively fewer dues paying union members. The 
effects of right-to-work legislation on union voice in the case of police employees may be a 
factor in the overall impact unionization has on public sector expenditures.  
 
Collective Bargaining v. Budget Schedules 
 
 Collective bargaining not only adds pressures by requiring additional resources, but it 
also complicates budgeting decisions because budget and bargaining schedules often do not 
coincide (Kearney, 2001: 142). Quite often collective bargaining agreements are not finalized 
until near the end of the complex budget creating process.  Kearney (2001: 142) notes that the 
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schedule conflict between collective bargaining and finalizing the budget continues to be a 
longstanding problem for both state and local governments. Budgeting timetables are, out of 
necessity, strict deadlines that must be observed while collective bargaining timetables are more 
fluid. The date for the legislature to vote on the budget is usually set by ordinance or law, while 
missed negotiations deadlines in most public sector environs do not seriously affect operations 
(Coleman, 1990: 106). 
Several attempts have been instigated by state and local governments to resolve the 
problem. For example, state legislation in Massachusetts and New Hampshire specifies that 
collective bargaining must commence a certain period of time before the budget process, while a 
number of bargaining jurisdictions declare an automatic impasse if the collective bargaining 
agreement has not been completed by a certain date (Kearney, 2001: 142).  Rhode Island 
requires bargaining agents to serve written request for collective bargaining “at least one hundred 
twenty (120) days before the last day on which money can be appropriated by the city or town to 
cover the contract period which is the subject of the collective bargaining procedure.”23 Other 
local governments specify that the bargaining process must begin as early as nine months before 
the beginning of the new fiscal year, and the Iowa Public Employee Relations Act sets a March 
15 deadline for completion of negotiations (Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 425-426).  
 However, many of these efforts have not been successful at the local level (Kearney, 
1994). Scholars (Kearney, 2001: 142) have reported that collective bargaining agreements in 
many of the municipal unions studied were settled after the budget had been finalized by the 
local government. One of the contributing factors to the situation is the ratification process of the 
collective bargaining agreement in most jurisdictions. First, the membership of the public sector 
bargaining unit must ratify the contract. Then, in most cases, the legislative body of the 
                                                 
23 Rhode Island General Laws, Title 28, Labor and Labor Relations, @ 28-9, 1-13 (1992). 
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jurisdiction must approve the collective bargaining agreement either directly or through the 
appropriation process. While the legislative body can vote directly for the provisions of the labor 
agreement, usually, the executive branch submits a budget (which includes the collective 
bargaining provisions) for approval to the legislative branch. If the legislative body does not 
appropriate enough funds to finance the budget (which includes terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement), the agreement is thus effectively not approved. Despite the fact that the 
chief executive and the police union may reach agreement in collective bargaining, if the 
agreement requires an increase in budget appropriations to the police department, and the 
legislature refuses to approve the appropriations, the collective bargaining agreement can not be 
implemented because the required funding is nonexistent. As discussed previously in this study, 
Section 447.309 of the Florida Statutes mandates that all collective bargaining agreements for 
state and local government employees must be approved by both the bargaining unit employees 
and the public employer legislature (Florida Statutes, 2004a). Continuation of bargaining 
sessions beyond the final budget date may result in shifting allocations, enacting supplementary 
appropriations, or implementing new revenue measures to finance the late settlements (Kearney, 
2001: 143).  
 
Local Government Financial Planning and Reporting in Florida 
 
 The union exerts influence in the mechanics and dynamics of local government financial 
operations through the agreement in negotiates with the local government. In this section, the 
budgetary processes are examined, and the financial structures of local government in Florida are 
discussed. A better understanding of these elements will provide the necessary tools to analyze 
the extent to which union influence occurs in local government operations. 
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Local Government Budgetary Processes 
 
 The operating or annual budget requires different planning procedures than do large 
capital assets such as land, buildings, roadways, and other acquisitions that governments 
consider nonrecurring needs. Not all capital expenditures are included in the capital budget. 
Fixed assets that recur frequently may be included in the annual or operating budget process, and 
the criteria for capital budgets may vary according to the size of government (Vogt, 2004: 5). As 
recurring expenditures, furniture, electronic equipment, machinery, and even vehicles can be 
purchased through the capital outlay expenditures category of the operating budget. Other, more 
major capital items (land, buildings, bridges, roadways) represent major investments for local 
governments, and as such require the deliberation, analysis, and consideration of alternatives that 
time usually does not permit with operating budget planning. Capital budgeting requires a 
separate legislative approval process that includes consideration not only of the amount to be 
financed, but the manner in which the project will be financed. Local governments may borrow 
funds to finance capital asset acquisitions, but balance budget mandates require that operating 
budgets be funded through current financial resources (Gianakis & McCue, 1999: 123). 
Although part of the capital improvement strategy planning may include payments from 
operating revenues to satisfy a major capital asset debt, the legal requirement that local 
government budgets be balanced is the major force in the process of budget preparation (Riley & 
Colby, 1991: 26-27).  
 Most local governments track capital expenditures separately from the operating budget 
in financial management (Forrester, 1993: 92; Coleman, 1990: 105). The actual planning 
processes involved, as well as the legislative approval processes are separate procedures for both 
types of budgeting. One scholar (Forrester, 1993: 88) explained that while operational budgeting 
 92
 
is budgeting in its strictest sense, “capital budgeting is asserted to be primarily planning but with 
a budgeting bent.”  Beckett-Camarata (1993: 35) elaborated this theme further by concluding that 
strategic planning should be linked with capital budgeting in order to positively impact financial 
performance of the local government. Local governments issue predominantly long-term debt to 
finance capital projects and acquisitions (Vogt, 2004: 247). The operating or annual budget, in 
accordance with balanced budget requirements, must be financed through current revenues 
alone. As a result, the collective bargaining process should affect a more perceptible influence on 
the operating budget processes. 
 The operating budget demonstrates a more dramatic effect because personnel services 
expenditures which include wages and benefits, are included in the operating budget, and are the 
largest single cost category of the operating budget for most local governments (Klingner, 1993: 
70).  As discussed by Coulson (1993: 119-120), police unions, like most labor organizations, are 
primarily concerned with salaries and working conditions. Working conditions, as well as 
salaries and benefits, usually are financed by a portion of the operating budget and are not 
classified as personal services expenditures. Since labor negotiations include discussions of 
working conditions, it is expected that unions affect operating expenditures and capital outlays as 
well as personal services expenditures. Thus far, most studies have focused upon the effects on 
personal services expenses (salaries and benefits) or the subsequent effects on total police 
expenditures, since salaries and benefits are included in total police expenditures. Little or no 
research has been conducted on the other two components of the operating budget, operating 
expenditures and capital outlays.  Unionization through the collective bargaining process has 
been demonstrated to impact personal services expenditures and, as a result, total police 
department expenditures. It would then seem reasonable to suspect that since working conditions 
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involve operating expenditures and capital outlays, and since working conditions are included in 
collective bargaining discussions, that unionization also impacts operating expenditures and 
capital outlays. This study seeks to bridge the gap in research and identify the extent to which 
union presence affects operating expenditures and capital outlays.  
Financial reporting differentiates between the category of capital outlays and that of 
capital projects. Capital outlays consist of expenses for items that have a useful life of more than 
one year, including equipment, furniture, and possibly vehicles. Capital assets in this category 
can be budgeted as current expenditures in the general fund (Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 134).  
On the other hand, capital projects consist of finances specifically appropriated by the legislative 
body to a designated fund through the capital budgeting process. Capital outlays usually require 
a capital equipment request to a central budget office. For an example, during collective 
bargaining it may be agreed to replace a mechanical time clock with an electronic time badge 
reader. The new time tracking system, which requires a computer and sophisticated electronic 
equipment, constitutes a capital asset.  However, rather than seek funding through the capital 
budgeting process, the department would submit an equipment request and receive approval for 
capital outlay funds to purchase the equipment. The needs for the capital equipment are more 
immediate in the foregoing example than the capital budget process would allow, and therefore 
the capital outlay would be issued from the operating budget. 
Capital improvement projects such as land purchases, building construction, and major 
infrastructure improvements would be the least likely to exhibit signs of union influence because 
of the nature of capital budgeting. Local governments usually issue long term debt to finance 
capital projects (Vogt, 2004: 247). Since this debt can extend over 20 or more years, depending 
on the useful life of the asset, the impact of collective bargaining would be mitigated by the 
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aggregation of many other factors and considerations that compel local governments to launch 
capital projects. Other factors in the capital budgeting process, such as the local government’s 
financial condition, would create a lag in union influence that would be difficult to identify and 
measure with existing financial records. For example, a certified bargaining unit may exert a 
great deal of influence in the decision to build a new facility, but the financial condition of the 
government may postpone, amend, or cancel construction plans until a later date at which time 
the union may have experienced decertification, or have engaged in concessionary bargaining to 
assist in financing the project.24   
However, capital outlays funded by the operating or annual budget are not part of the 
capital budget process. Large, expensive pieces of machinery such as vehicles in the cases of 
larger communities, and such items as computers or riding mowers in the case of practically all 
communities would fall into this category. The distinguishing characteristic of non-capital 
budget capital outlays is the method of financing the purchase of the capital assets. Capital 
budget assets are funded through capital projects funds and usually require outside, commercial 
financing. Non-capital budget capital assets are purchased directly through the operating or 
annual budget without outside commercial financing. 
Vehicle replacement policies in local government present a variety of methods to 
maintain a sufficient supply of operational patrol vehicles. A small locality, for example, might 
include vehicles as part of a capital budget, but a large city may purchase patrol cars as part of a 
regular operating budget (Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 433). One city in Florida uses a 2 year 
                                                 
24 Concessionary bargaining in this sense refers to the union agreeing to give up the rights of a higher wage or more 
expensive benefit in order to accommodate the employer’s constrained budget. This is sometimes done by unions to 
avoid reductions in force. 
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police vehicle replacement policy and funds these purchases through the operating budget.25  In 
another city, a bureau commander in charge of technical services consults with the police chief to 
fashion a replacement request, usually when the vehicles reach four years of age.  The Police 
Chief  in this city has preliminary discussions with the City Manager before submitting the 
vehicle replacement request to the city commission, who ultimately are responsible for 
approving the replacement requests.  
A large city in Florida has a variation of a six year police vehicle replacement policy and 
usually funds the purchases through the operating budget, but occasionally will fund larger 
numbers of vehicle replacements through the capital budgeting process.26 This city, like many 
municipalities throughout the country, relies on a combination of factors within computerized 
analyses for determining police vehicle replacement. The factors are: age with life expectancy 
considerations; the cost of repairs each vehicle incurs in its lifetime up to a specified point in 
time; and mileage, or the number of vehicle miles registered by the vehicle odometer. The 
factors are embedded in a software program, named FASTER by its creators, that examines 
replacement status for each vehicle.27   
In Florida, the state government  negotiates contracts with vehicle suppliers through 
which Florida local government law enforcement agencies may order replacement vehicles in 
what is known as a “piggy-back” arrangement. Many counties and municipalities with law 
enforcement agencies utilize this arrangement to purchase vehicles. Other smaller agencies that 
lack the financial wherewithal usually purchase used vehicles from the larger municipalities.28 
                                                 
25 Since some of the cities discussed are represented in Chapter V and were provided anonymity, neither the names 
of the officials nor the city will be divulged. Information was provided by the Financial Services Manager from City 
One discussed in Chapter V 
26 An official (budget manager) from City Seven in Chapter V provided this information. 
27Information provided by a fleet services official in City Seven from Chapter V. 
28 Information supplied by the Financial Services Director in City One from Chapter V. 
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The process of deciding the vehicle replacement policy and determining which capital assets to 
purchase usually follows the budgetary decision process of the annual or operating budget, and 
often is dependent on the availability of funds. As discussed previously, however a municipality 
may develop a replacement policy before the budgetary decision process commences in 
accordance with other factors, such as contingent resale policies or priorities unique to the local 
government.   
Typically, the executive branch of the government (governor, county executive or mayor) 
initializes the budgetary process by preparing a budget for submission to the legislature for 
approval. The operating budget process, depending on size of the local government, the type of 
budgeting formats, and the level of procedural formalities, begins with a “Budget Call Memo” or 
a similar memo that provides overall guidance to agency or department heads in submitting 
estimates for operational funding for an upcoming fiscal year (Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 154-
155).  In the budget call, the chief administrator or executive of the local government may issue a 
policy statement which includes the expected fiscal and operational conditions of the new year, 
and a policy which establishes a strategy of either expansion or retrenchment (Aronson & 
Schwartz, 1996: 155). In response to the budget call, the budget unit (agency/department) 
prepares estimates of required funding for the subject fiscal year. While there are a number of 
variations in the process, budget estimate procedures are often categorized as “bottom-up” or 
“top-down” approaches (Gianakis & McCue, 1999: 24).  The “bottom-up” approach is also 
called “open-ended” and entails the budget unit submitting estimates to finance operations in the 
upcoming fiscal year. The “open-ended” label refers to the fact that the budget unit is submitting 
an estimate without deference to a fixed ceiling dollar amount, but rather focuses on service 
levels instead.  In the “top-down” approach, higher level managers establish a fixed ceiling for 
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the budget unit’s estimates (Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 155). The bottom-up, or open-ended 
method accommodates union influence immediately by including changes in the budget 
estimates created by collective bargaining.  However, the top-down approach may result in 
adjustments to budget estimates, especially in cases where higher level managers have 
established the fixed ceiling before labor negotiations have been concluded and approved by the 
legislative body.  
 In the absence of unions, budget considerations such as employee compensation remain 
almost unilaterally determined by the legislative body and public sector management (Kearney, 
2001: 141). This situation becomes more complex with the presence of unionization. Once 
public sector employees organize, the bargaining and budgeting processes become interactive 
(Coleman, 1990: 106). This interaction usually becomes especially noticeable anywhere after the 
budget call in the preparation stage of the budget process or prior to the final approval by the 
legislative body. As a budget unit, a police department prepares its estimates and submits these 
estimates to the central budget office or to an authority designated by the chief executive officer 
for review (Aronson & Schwartz, 1996: 155). Changes in financial requirements wrought by 
collective bargaining and other union influences are factored into the estimates whenever the 
collective bargaining agreement is finalized. If provisions of the agreement are available at the 
time that budget estimates are being calculated, changes in wages and benefits or other changes 
may be included in the budget unit’s estimates before being reviewed by the budget staff. 
However, if contract provisions are not finalized before the budget unit submits the estimate to 
the budget office staff, the budget unit must anticipate a late settlement and submit an even more 
speculative estimate to the budget office, or the budget office or chief executive designee will be 
required to amend the estimates when settlement is reached before submitting the budget to the 
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legislative body (Kearney, 2001: 142-143). In this respect, the operating budgetary process 
generally has more of a sense of urgency than does capital budgeting. 
 In addition to increases in wages and benefits, other considerations that may be spawned 
by the bargaining process, such as increased law enforcement training, additional equipment, 
newer technologies and so forth are likely to increase departmental budget estimates by a 
perceptible amount as they are included in budget estimates for the upcoming fiscal year. The 
change in unionized departments’ budget estimates will be significant when compared with non-
unionized departments’ estimates in regression analysis. Financial data from local governments 




 Most of the studies mentioned in the literature review featured total police expenditures, 
wages, and/or benefits but did not examine operating expenses or capital outlays. The referenced 
studies relied upon financial data to measure the impact of unions on local governments. This 
data was primarily personal services expenditures such as salaries, and monetary benefits 
experienced by law enforcement members. The present study utilizes the same approach to 
detect the extent to which police unions influence local governments. However, this study 
diverges from the studies referenced in the literature by focusing on the component object classes 
of police expenditures. The following discussion of the various funds, accounts, and financial 
elements relative to this study will explain the theories, considerations, and standards necessary 
to understanding the research strategy and results of this study.  
Financial reporting procedures in many local governments are often specified by state 
legislation in a very detailed manner. The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 
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promulgates generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) that provide the authoritative 
guide to recording governmental budgeting practices and financial operations (Aaronson & 
Schwartz, 1996: 125; Freeman & Shoulders, 1999: 32-33). The GASB is responsible for 
establishing accounting procedures for state and local governments in the United States 
(Freeman & Shoulders, 1999: 14). Guided by the generally accepted accounting procedures from 
the GASB, Florida’s Department of Banking and Finance developed the Uniform Accounting 
System Chart of Accounts which specifies the standards for recording and reporting financial 
information by local governments to the State of Florida (Florida Department of Financial 
Services, 2000). Section 218.32, Florida Statutes, requires local governments to submit annual 
reports to the state, and Section 218.33 requires local governments to use the Uniform 
Accounting System Chart of Accounts as an integral part of their accounting system to ensure 




The Florida Local Government PDF Reports, which this study uses as data sources, post 
local government finances in a manner consistent with the Uniform Accounting System Chart of 
Accounts. The Florida Department of Financial Services maintains an electronic copy online of 
the Uniform Accounting System Manual which defines and classifies the types of funds or 
sources from which funding for activities originate (Florida Department of Financial Services, 
2000).  Fund accounting is probably the most distinctive feature of governmental accounting and 
is very different from the private sector business accounting (Freeman & Shoulders, 1999: 34; 
Gianakis & McCue, 1999: 40).  The diverse operations of government and the necessity for legal 
compliance preclude recording all governmental financial transactions in a single accounting 
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entity (Freeman & Shoulders, 1999: 34).  Segregating government resources into funds facilitates 
government compliance with legal restrictions placed on the use of specific resources by the 
legislative body (Gianakis & McCue, 1999: 40; Aaronson & Schwartz, 1996: 126). Fund 
accounting thus provides greater monitoring and control over government revenues and 
expenditures.  
As specified by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (1997: Section 
1100.102), fund accounting and funds are defined thus: 
“Governmental accounting systems should be organized and operated on a fund 
basis. A fund is defined as a fiscal accounting entity with a self-balancing set of 
accounts recording cash and other financial resources, together with all related 
liabilities and residual equities or balances, and changes therein, which are 
segregated for the purpose of carrying on specific activities or attaining certain 
objectives in accordance with special regulations, restrictions, or limitations.” 
 
 Funds are usually grouped into three separate categories: governmental; proprietary; and 
fiduciary. Governmental funds include the general fund, special revenue funds, capital projects 
funds, and debt service funds. The general fund is the primary operating fund of local 
government, and is considered by some to be the principle reporting entity for every local 
government (Gianakis & McCue, 1999: 40). The general fund consists of unrestricted monies 
intended to finance day to day government operations during the annual budget cycle. Many 
services usually associated with local government (e.g. police, fire, parks and recreation and so 
forth) are financed through the general fund, usually the largest and most active fund of local 
governments (excluding large government enterprises). All monies not identified by other funds 
are channeled through the general fund. Freeman and Shoulders (1999: 573) claim that “the 
financial health of the General Fund often largely determines the financial health of the unit as a 
whole.”  To support their claim, the authors cite the example of Standard and Poor’s lowering the 
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state of Illinois’ bond rating in 1992 based on the weak financial condition of the state’s General 
Fund.  
All other funds are legally restricted monies intended for specific purposes, rather than 
for the day to day operations of a local government. This includes the remaining funds in the 
governmental funds category. Special revenue funds provide resources for designated activities. 
Examples of special revenue funds include: monies from gas taxes which are earmarked 
specifically for highways; user fees for recreation facilities that in turn help finance those 
facilities; and so forth. Restricting the revenues within a specific activity area ensures continued 
financing of such activities, hence the separate funds category. Another governmental fund is the 
capital projects fund, which accounts for monies designated for the purchase of land, or the 
acquisition of buildings, infrastructures, and other long term assets. Legal segregation of such 
funds ensures the financial coordination of major construction projects over the years (Gianakis 
& McCue, 1999: 41).  The final component of governmental funds is the debt service fund which 
is used to account for monies used to pay off principal and interest on a local government’s long 
term debt, especially general obligation debt such as municipal bonds.  
Proprietary funds keep track of local government’s business like operations (Aaronson & 
Schwartz, 1999: 127). One type in this category, enterprise funds, account for such operations as 
convention centers, sewer and water utilities, electric utilities, transportation systems, etc. 
Independent accounting of such funds increase efficiency and provide a greater measure of 
control over operations of the enterprise. Similarly, the other type of proprietary funds, internal 
service funds, enhances accountability within government by separately recording services 
provided by one type of governmental department to another. Examples of such funds are data 
processing, purchasing, government printing, etc. The design of proprietary funds is such that the 
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participating entities are self-sustaining and do not require annual budget appropriations on the 
part of the legislative body to perpetuate operations. Moreover, the lack of appropriations 
requirements allows the budgets of these commercial and quasi-commercial entities to be much 
more flexible to meet the demands of its citizen-customers. 
The final category of funds, fiduciary funds, are used to account for assets held by a 
government in a trustee capacity for such parties as but not limited to: employees, another 
government, resident individuals such as inmates in a correctional facility, and other special 
purposes such as scholarship programs. GASB recognizes one encompassing type of fund in this 
category, trust and agency funds (Freeman & Shoulders, 1999: 39). Agency funds account for 
monies held by the local government for other governments. Pension trust funds, the largest local 
government trust fund (Aaronson & Schwartz, 1999: 131) contain pension contributions and the 
accrued interest on these investments. While the State of Florida complies with the GASB fund 
classifications, pension trust funds are tracked separately on the Florida Local Government PDF 
Reports (Florida Department of Financial Services, 2004).  
The funds most susceptible to law enforcement union influence would be the general 
fund since this fund finances the day to day operations of police department services. 
Agreements crafted by collective bargaining might eventually impact other funds as well, but 
usually not with the same degree of effect. An exception to this observation would be the so 
called disability presumption benefits discussed earlier in the Union Politicizing and Politics 
section of this literature review. However, legislation of this magnitude surfaces rarely in 
comparison to such matters as wages, benefits, equipment, and working conditions which are 
discussed frequently in bargaining sessions. The general fund finances most of these functional 
areas (personal services), which consume more than 70 percent of the local government’s 
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operating budget (Klingner, 1993: 70). Other funds (such as special revenue) contribute to satisfy 
the overall expenses of the police department, but to a much lesser extent. As discussed 
previously, this situation exists as a result of balanced budget requirements for all governments 
but the federal government. 
 
Organization Units and Object Classes  
 
 In order to further enhance responsible governmental accounting procedures, GASB 
specifies using organization units and object classes. GASB defines an organization unit as a 
classification corresponding with the governmental organization structure and “charged with 
carrying out one or several activities or programs” (Governmental Accounting Standards Board, 
1997: Section 1800.118). Police departments, fire departments, parks and recreation 
departments, and similar entities each usually comprise an organization unit for governmental 
accounting purposes so that funds are relegated to each unit separately in accordance with its 
specific governmental activity. Each organization unit is individually identified by name, 
designated number or both in Florida governmental financial reports (Florida Department of 
Financial Services, 2004). GASB intended the establishment of organization units in 
governmental accounting to facilitate evaluation of the economy and efficiency of operations 
(Governmental Accounting Standards Board, 1997: Section 1800.119).  
 Object class (object-of-expenditure) refers to the type of article or service obtained 
(Freeman & Shoulders, 1999: 245). The Florida Department of Banking and Finance utilize six 
categories of object classification: Personal Services (coded 10-29); Operating Expenses (coded 
30-59); Capital Outlay (coded 60-69); Debt Service (coded 70-79); Grants and Aids (coded 80-
89); and Other Uses (coded 90-99) (Florida Department of Financial Services, 2000). Each 
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category includes separate identifying codes for the component elements of that category. 
Personal Services, for instance, includes such items as: salaries (11-13); overtime (14); FICA 
Taxes (21); Life and Health Insurance (23); and other related personal services expenses. The 
Florida Local Government PDF Reports present the expenditures according to the six major 
categories of object classification.  
 The object class of capital outlays presents some confusion among governmental 
reporting units since it covers items subject to the operating budget such as computers and 
sometimes vehicles, and also subject to the capital budget which includes purchase of land, 
buildings, roads, bridges, etc. Currently, the range for determining the lower bounds of capital 
expenditure values for most cities and counties is approximately $500 to $10,000 (Vogt, 2004: 
4). Smaller entities usually use significant values at the lower end, while larger governments will 
use significant values at the higher end of the range. However, not all capital expenditures are 
included in the capital budget. Capital expenditures that fund frequently recurring fixed assets 
are included in the operating or annual budget. It is generally understood that even in large cities, 
the operating budget should separate regular operating expenses from recurring expenditures for 
small capital items (Aaronson & Schwartz, 1999: 433).  The Florida Department of Banking and 
Finance enable local governments to record these items separately by specifying that capital 
outlays from the general fund are recorded in a different category than either personal services 
expenses or operating expenses (Florida Department of Financial Services, 2000: Chapter 5, p. 1-
6). The complex and comprehensive object classification system utilized by the Florida 
Department of Banking and Finance facilitates uniform financial reporting by minimizing 
discretionary entries.  
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 The delineation of expenditures by organization unit reveals the funds utilized by police 
departments in the state of Florida. The separation of accounts by fund specification yields the 
nature of strategizing and budgeting by the local government in terms of planning horizons. 
Finally, the object class of expenditures cross-referenced with the forgoing fund and unit 
groupings matched with other variables will provide evidence of whether or not union presence 
in the organization unit influences police department expenditures. The format used by the 
Florida Department of Financial Services allows discretionary data selection by segregating the 
different fund types and by separating the expenditure categories. This data, regressed with other 
information will yield the information required to determine the impact of police unions upon 
local government expenditures. 
 
Conceptualization 
Coalescence of Theory 
 
 The phenomenon of exit-voice expands dramatically in the public sector. In the private 
sector, the presence of exit-voice provides employees with the choices of quitting the job, 
expressing grievances, and securing better working conditions, pay, and benefits through 
dialogue with the employer. In union shops, exit-voice upgrades into a unified force when 
dealing with the employer, but the focus of attention remains primarily on working conditions, 
pay, benefits, and other areas of interest that benefit the employee directly. In the public sector, 
however, exit voice becomes much more sophisticated, and actually transmogrifies union 
influence into a political entity capable of substantial results. Union members are often 
constituents of the elected officials who assume the roles of policy makers in a local government. 
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Thus, local government politicians may be even more sensitive to organized union involvement 
than nationally elected officials.  
In all levels of government, the union expresses the unified will of its members and 
influences policy outcomes. This situation may be more detectable on the local level. Evidence 
for the added dimension of public sector exit-voice through organized labor organizations can be 
discerned through comparisons of levels of pay and benefits with non-unionized local 
government departments. The so called “multilateral” negotiating tactics of unions have been 
documented by a number of studies discussed previously. However, there is a paucity of research 
dealing with unions utilizing their influence to determine levels of service in a community 
through the budget process. Public sector unions may actually affect operating expenditures and 
capital outlays, which are not always direct benefits for their members, as well as salaries and 
benefits of their members, which of course are of direct benefit. The “not direct benefits” 
experienced by public sector employees may actually be the goals created by employee values 
contained in what Thompson and Bunderson (2003: 574) identified as “ideology-infused 
contracts.” A police officer may interpret the “Protect and Serve” obligation of his or her 
department to the community as requiring additional squad cars to adequately fulfill the 
organization’s role. The police officer might not directly benefit from the acquisition of 
additional patrol cars, but the officer could perceive that the community might benefit from the 
additional equipment.  
Public sector employees inevitably become involved in policy agendas that orient their 
work, which then results in an effort to define the “public interest” (Johnston, 1994: 211). At 
least one scholar (Sewell, 2002: 18) concluded that the increased education of America’s police 
officers, along with the changing culture of the workforce tend to motivate line personnel to 
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become involved in decisions regarding their jobs and their organizations. Organized labor 
provides the formal voice mechanism that enables line personnel to participate in meaningful 
decision making.  Police unions, while representing one group of public sector employees tend to 
influence the roles these employees play in local communities (Magenau & Hunt, 1989: 547; 
Magenau & Hunt, 1996: 1315). Carter and Sapp (1992: 18) noted that police labor organizations 
have become increasingly sophisticated at the state and national levels, especially in providing 
bargaining strategies and support to local bargaining units.   
Public sector unions accomplish these effects within society by consciously exerting their 
influence within local governments through negotiations with administrators and elected officials 
of the same local government. In effect, exit-voice, formally represented by the union, acts as a 
real force operant within the local government. The public sector craft employee thus secures a 
measure of control not only over his own destiny, but also over that of the larger government of 
which he is an employee. The accuracy of this presumption can be tested by selecting a 
representative function of local government, such as police departments, and comparing 
conditions in unionized versus non-unionized agencies providing identical governmental 
services. Similar sized communities, some even adjacent to each other, presumably provide the 
same level of police services but yet experience different functional labor-management relations 
that are characterized by whether or not the workforce is organized. Therein lies the difference, 
and this difference is manifested in the level of expenditures. Few, if any studies have researched 
the possible impact of police unions and even public sector unions in general on the specific 







 While several employee organizations offer viable opportunities to examine the extent of 
union influence on local government, police unions present a particularly attractive subject for 
study: 1) There have been some studies previously conducted related to the effect of police 
unions on levels of total police expenditures and on police pay and benefits; 2) There appears to 
be a broad spectrum of union affiliation among police departments than there are in other 
departments;  and 3) Law enforcement agencies often receive a proportionately greater share of 
attention in a community than other municipal departments. Wilson (1968) noted that police 
departments are possibly the most visible of government agencies and that no other government 
agency affects the lives of as many people.  As discussed earlier, police departments, because of 
their proportionately larger budgets, serve as the selected representative local government 
agencies within which unions formalize exit-voice. 
An attempt will be made to measure the effect of unionization on local government in 
several ways. The effect of unionization upon government size should be measured by 
determining whether unionization increases local government departmental expenditures. The 
increase in expenditures should be assessed in all three categories of local government operating 
budget as well as in total expenditures: 1) Personal services, which include salaries and benefits; 
2) Operating expenses, which include the day to day expenditures of operating the department; 
and 3) Capital outlays, which would include such items as computer systems, squad cars, and 
other high priced equipment and services not included in the local government’s capital 
improvement program.  
Four different aspects of the effect of union density on local government will thus be 
studied: 1) Level of total expenditures for the agency; 2) Level of personal services expenditures; 
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3) Level of operating expenses expenditures; and 4) Level of capital outlay expenditures. This 
situation will necessitate four separate research models, each with a different dependent variable. 
The variable of interest, or independent variable, in each case would be unionization. Each 
model will attempt to determine to what extent, if any, union status affects local government 
spending, and what aspect of local government spending is affected. 
 
Controlled Extraneous Factors 
 
Other extraneous factors should be considered to improve accuracy of the models and 
prevent biased conclusions. These factors, such as crime rate and financial condition of the 
community, also affect the level of police staffing and local government spending on law 
enforcement. Including such factors, or control variables, in the models would enable the study 
of the effects of union density in the proper perspective and environment. These control variables 
emanate from a number of dimensions: Demographics; Financial Factors; and Law Enforcement 
Related Factors.  
Demographics affect local government expenditures as a result of their inherent demands 
for police services. A larger population will require more law enforcement officers, as would the 
community’s proximity to a larger city. In addition, the land area in square miles may make a 
difference in police spending, especially as residents come in closer daily contact with one and 
another. Both population and proximity to a metropolitan statistical area of a community offer 
potential explanations for police departmental expenditures because dense populations may 
contribute to the crime rate.  Several related studies (Feuille & Delaney, 1986; Gely & Chandler, 
1993a; Witt, 1990) have utilized population density as a control for community expenditures 
with varying degrees of significant results. Witt (1990: 171) concluded that population density 
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was one of the two most influential variables in his model of factors influencing police budget 
allocation among cities.  
Feuille and Delaney (1986: 231) noted that police salaries were higher in urban rather 
than rural areas, which results in higher police expenditures. Gely and Chandler (1993a: 301-
302) found that population significantly correlated to both police and firefighter expenditures and 
continued to use population as a control variable with significant results in other studies dealing 
with police union bargaining outcomes as well (Gely & Chandler, 1993b; Gely & Chandler, 
1995, Chandler & Gely, 1995). The studies concluded that population is a factor to be considered 
in explaining the levels of police department expenditures. The population variables had a 
significant positive effect on police wages, which indicates that as the population of the local 
government increases, wages also increase.  Identifying control variables such as population 
reduces the possibility of bias in the regression model by accounting for other factors that affect 
the outcomes. Omitting control variables such as population from the regression would 
artificially inflate (or deflate) selected variables remaining in the model, thus introducing bias. 
Mindful of this pitfall, the researcher attempts to (within reason) include variables that would 
also explain the variations in the levels of department expenditures. 
The average education of community residents possibly might influence police 
expenditures.  Informed and educated citizens may be more sensitive to the levels of police 
service and thus be more willing to support higher police expenditures. Chandler and Gely 
(1995: 301) used a variable that represented the percentage of the municipal population having at 
least a high school education as a control in their studies of the price of police and fire public 
services. The variable produced mixed results in their analysis. The link between education and 
the level of expenditures is plausible and should be considered. 
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Communities with a higher median income might experience less crime than lower class 
neighborhoods, or possibly the higher median income communities could afford and expect a 
higher level of police services. Income inequality has been found to contribute significantly to 
increases in crime (Hsieh & Pugh, 1993).  Gely and Chandler (1993a) used median value of 
housing in the community as a control in their study, as did Schwochau, Feuille, and Delaney 
(1988). Other demographic factors that might affect local government police expenditures would 
include relative racial proportions of the community’s residents Gely & Chandler (1995: 178), 
and maybe even their age. Witt (1990: 170) accommodated the influence of age in his model by 
using the percentage of residents 65 years and older as a control variable. The variable emerged 
consistently significant across Witt’s models, which indicated that an increase in the percentage 
of residents 65 and older had an inverse relation with crime rates.  However, Witt also used a 
percentage change in population as a control, but the variable did not exhibit significance for per 
capita expenditures (1990: 168). Witt used per cent change in population to measure the effects 
that growth had on per capita expenditures. The variable measured changes in population over 10 
year periods.  
Others (Gely & Chandler, 1993a; and Schwochau, Feuille, & Delaney, 1988) included a 
variety of variables as controls for resident income. Witt (1990) used a variable indicating the 
percentage of owner-occupied housing, with significant results. The percent of owner occupied 
housing and population density were the two most important variables influencing the percent of 
budget for police in Witt’s study (Witt, 1990: 171). A variable such as owner occupied housing 
indicates the relative level of investment residents have in the community. Demographical 
effects are expected to be substantial on local government police expenditures.  
 112
 
Financial condition would certainly impact the level of expenditures in local government. 
If debt service is high, or a community has a disproportionately high level of debt, the 
community may not be able to responsibly fund more police services. Gely and Chandler (1993a: 
300) argued that municipal per capita tax revenues significantly affects police and firefighter 
department expenditures. Multivariate regression of factors influencing police and fire 
department expenditures demonstrated that controls using proxies for the community’s ability to 
pay (such as per capita tax revenues) remained significant throughout both police and firefighter 
department expenditure models (Gely & Chandler, 1993a: 302).  The actual aggregate taxable 
value of the community determines how much revenue would be available to a local government 
to spend on police services. Higher tax bases offer the potential for greater spending than lower 
tax bases. The prevailing millage rate may make a difference as well. If a community is close to 
state mandated limits, or the citizens are extremely unreceptive to tax increases, spending levels 
tend to be lower. One example is the state of Florida which has mandated that no taxing agency 
within the state may impose a millage rate greater than 10 “mills,” or number of dollars per 
$1,000 of assessed value. Approaches in empirical studies vary considerably to control for the 
ability of the residents to fund police services.    
The final dimension of extraneous influences on police expenditures might be called law 
enforcement related factors. This dimension includes such variables as the community crime 
rate. High or increasing crime rates, particularly in areas of sprawl and deteriorating 
neighborhoods, might agitate citizen demands for increased police services. Such demands, if 
acted upon by elected officials, would elevate police services spending levels. A community 
might also prefer a greater level of police services for a variety of reasons. Law enforcement 
officers might be used in crime prevention education to a greater extent in one community than 
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in others, or the types of businesses in the community may require additional police protection. 
Such requirements would increase government spending as a result of additional police staffing 
and equipment. This factor would be considered a service preference level for the community, 
and would represent the desired level of police services unique to each community. In many 
cases, as the crime rate increases, local governments may respond to the increases by hiring more 
police officers, which in turn drives up expenditures. Again, as with other discussed dimensions, 
the literature offers examples of other similar empirical studies (Schwochau, Feulle, & Delaney, 
1988: and Witt, 1990) that use crime rate, with significant results, as a control variable.  
A related consideration may be the relative amount of effort devoted to reducing crime in 
a community. As pressure increases on local governments to reduce crime, longer hours or 
additional staffing may be utilized by communities to stem crime rates. There appears to be a 
paucity of police expenditure literature using crime reduction efforts as a control in determining 
resource allocation to police departments. Rather than use political rhetoric as a proxy for crime 
reducing efforts, using the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation) measurement “percent cases cleared” would be more appropriate since such a 
measurement represents the active commitment of a community over time to reduce crime rates. 
Cases cleared percentages could also indicate the ability of local law enforcement personnel to 
control crime in conditions prevailing in the community. Lower percentages of cases cleared 
could result in greater expenditures as the community attempts to bring crime under control. 
However, higher percentages of cases cleared would indicate that local law enforcement has 







The First Hypothesis: Total Police Expenditures 
 
 The research questions posed by this study will be presented in a format more conducive 
to statistical testing. The individual hypotheses require a separate model for each case, since each 
hypothesis tests the causal relationships between the separate dependent variables and their 
respective independent variables.  Each hypothesis retains the sequence of the previously 
discussed research questions. 
H01:  There is no difference in total police expenditures between communities with police union 
representation, and those communities without police union representation. 
 
HA1:  There are greater levels of total police expenditures in cities with police union 
representation, compared with those cities without police union representation.  
 
 A correlation test using Pearsons’ R will initially test the H01 hypothesis to determine 
relative strengths of association between the dependent variable and the independent variable of 
interest. Subsequent to positive associations being identified, a full multivariate regression model 
will test the relationship in a broader environment that controls for other intervening factors 
represented by the extraneous independent variables. It would appear highly unlikely that 
endogeneity presents a problem with the model constructed for this hypothesis. However, usual 
precautionary procedures will test for other problems such as multicollinearity, misspecification, 
and other statistical anomalies.  In all probability, the demographic independent variables, in 
comparison with all other variables,  will have a more significant effect on the dependent 
variables, expenditures and will thus exhibit greater betas. The primary intent of this research is 
to determine whether or not unionization has significant influence on the dependent variables. It 
is anticipated in the case of this hypothesis that the presence of unionization in Florida police 
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departments will result in higher overall expenditures than in offices that have not been 
unionized.   
 
The Second Hypothesis: Police Personal Services Expenditures  
 
H02:  There is no difference in levels of police expenditures for personal services between 
communities with police union representation and those communities without police union 
representation. 
 
HA2:  There are greater levels of police expenditures for personal services in cities with  police 
union representation compared with those cities without police union representation. 
 
The statistical hypothesis H02 will be tested in a manner similar to the preceding H01. 
Again, Pearsons’ R will provide the initial test for association between union density and police 
personal services expenditures, followed by the appropriate specification of a multivariate 
regression model that controls for extraneous factors. Since the dependent variable in this case, 
police personal services expenditures, is a component cost of the overall police expenditures 
discussed in H01, it is expected that the results should be similar to that of the preceding 
hypothesis. Police agencies that have been unionized should demonstrate higher expenditures for 
personal services expenses than police agencies that have not experienced unionization. This 
model should clearly demonstrate the most apparent effect of exit-voice within a government 
system since wages and benefits are particular and dominant concerns of union members. 
 
The Third Hypothesis: Police Operating Expenses Expenditures 
 
H03:  There is no difference in levels of police operating expenses expenditures between cities 
with police union representation and those cities without police union representation. 
 
HA3:  There are greater levels of police operating expenses expenditures in cities with police 




The statistical hypothesis H03 and the subsequent hypotheses diverge from previous 
studies most dramatically at this point because expenditure categories are segregated to 
determine the impact of unionization on each of the categories. Previous studies tested for the 
impact of unionization on overall expenditures or on salaries and benefits alone. This research 
will also determine whether or not union presence, makes any significant difference on the level 
of expenditures or the size of government. But perhaps most importantly to this research, test 
results of this hypothesis might demonstrate the evolution or transformation of the exit-voice 
phenomenon into policy making areas dealing with subjects not always strictly related to the 
personal benefit of union members. As always, the statistical procedures used in the preceding 
models will be repeated in this instance to determine whether or not there is a relationship 
between unionization and operating expenses expenditures. Again, it is expected that unionized 
police agencies will exhibit significantly higher expenditures for the operating expense category 
than would the non-unionized police agencies. Collective bargaining agreements often include 
provisions for additional officer training and other line items that would require additional 
funding from the sponsoring local government. 
 
 
The Fourth Hypothesis: Police Capital Outlays Expenditures  
 
H04:  There is no difference in levels of police capital outlay expenditures between cities with 
police union representation and those cities without police union representation. 
 
HA4:  There are greater levels of police capital outlay expenditures in cities with police union 
representation and those cities without police union representation. 
 
 As with hypothesis H03, answers to the statistical hypothesis H04 will reveal whether or 
not unionization impacts policies that are not directly related to union members’ personal benefit. 
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This would also demonstrate an expansion of the traditional bounds for exit-voice. In this 
instance, capital outlays receive scrutiny to determine if unionization has any effect on that 
category of expenditures. Unionization may exert influence on such things as the type and 
quantity of capital equipment purchased by local governments. Standard statistical procedures 
discussed for the preceding hypotheses will be used with H04 as well. Again, union police 
agencies should exhibit a significant difference in capital outlays of the operating budget than 
those of non-union police agencies. Collective bargaining agreements often include provisions 
for improved technology such as computerized systems, and as a result, the additional equipment 




 Public sector unions possess the potential to influence local government decision-making 
in several ways: through collective bargaining; through day-to-day labor-management relations; 
and through the political process policy making. Each is an expression of employee voice as 
formalized by the union. The union serves to amplify employee voice and to strengthen its 
influence in the work environment. This influence can most expeditiously be determined by 
appraising associations between union presence and local government spending in a department 
that hosts a public sector union. The present study, utilizing four different regression models, 
will attempt to ascertain the extent of public sector union influence on local government budgets. 
Guided by the foregoing research questions, the study seeks to identify the specific results of 





CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
 As discussed previously, the purpose of this study is to determine whether or not 
unionization in police departments impacts departmental expenditures, especially operating 
expenses and capital outlays. The research hypotheses of this study state that there will be 
variances in police department expenditures caused by union influence. The study attempts to 
understand which categories of police department expenditures are affected by unionization, and 
the extent to which union influence affects these expenditures. 
The study design is primarily explanatory research utilizing a dual methods approach 
which includes both quantitative and qualitative features.  The quantitative method employed by 
the study, using standard statistical packages, assembles and presents the data in a coherent, 
comprehensible form. These results explain the degree of impact that unionization has upon local 
government expenditures when all other influences are controlled. However, a researcher might 
argue that when an objective scientist codes social influences into operational variables, valuable 
data is lost by imposing sterile restrictions on the subjects (Marshall & Rossman, 1999: 57). The 
qualitative method, coupled with quantitative research, provides a richer understanding of the 
topic by including face-to-face interactions with individuals that have first hand experience in the 
subject area. The complexities and nuances of real-life situations are thus re-examined in the 
settings in which they occur.  
 The sections in this chapter will identify the sample, delineate the data, operationalize 
factors critical to the model, and explain the processes through which the final conclusions 
developed. Some of the control variables used by the study will undoubtedly demonstrate greater 
impact than will the independent variables, as indicated by standardized coefficients. However, 
significant results wrought by the independent variable of concern will yield a better 
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understanding of which expenditure categories that are sensitive to union influences. Moreover, 
significant impacts of the variable of concern will be readily isolated and identified by the 






 The cross sectional study will examine all cities in Florida utilizing their own police 
department. Because of the varying size of Florida municipalities, however, some consideration 
must be given to the effects of population in our analysis. In the quantitative section of the 
research, a continuous variable representing population will accommodate such considerations. 
For the qualitative portion of the research, Florida cities in the study will be categorized as small 
(Less than 25,000 in population), medium (25,000- 100,000 population), and large municipalities 
(Greater than 100,000 in population). These categories are partially consistent with the groupings 
used by the Department of Justice Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The UCR contains six 
population groups while this study collapses the groupings into three categories. UCR Groups I 
and II comprise this study’s large city category; UCR Groups III and IV form the study’s 
medium size city category; and Groups V and VI combine in the study’s small city category.29  A 
total of 284 Florida municipalities with an active police force in 2002 are reported in the 
Uniform Crime Reports (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2002: pp 341-343). The Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement presents statistics for 282 municipalities in 2002 (Florida 
                                                 
29 The Uniform Crime Report categorizes cities according to population groups: Group I consists of U.S. cities with 
populations of 250,000 and over; Group II, 100,000 to 249,999; Group III, 50,000 to 99,999; Group IV, 25,000 to 
49,999; Group V, 10,000 to 24,999; Group VI, under 10,000 population (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2002). 
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Department of Law Enforcement, 2004) and the Florida Department of Financial Services 
recorded police expenditures in 279 Florida municipalities in the 2002 Local Government PDF 
Reports (Florida Department of Financial Services, 2004).     
As discussed in Chapter I, law enforcement unions were selected because of the 
disproportionate amount of local government expenditures being spent on police services, and 
the belief that police officers appear to be more independent in terms of joining or not joining 
unions than other city employees such as firefighters because of the nature of their occupation. 
Police departments rather than sheriffs’ offices were selected as study subjects because until 
January of 2003, sheriff deputies in the state of Florida had been prohibited from negotiating 
union contracts (Schlueb, 2003). In January, 2003 a Florida Supreme Court ruling declared that 
deputy sheriffs are public employees entitled to collective bargaining. The initial collective 
bargaining agreement can require a year or more to finalize according to a Deputy County 
Administrator in Orange County, Florida (Schlueb, 2003). It thus was unlikely that many 
collective bargaining agreements for Florida Deputy Sheriffs existed for a year before the time of 
this writing, while most agreements had been well established among Florida unionized 
municipal police departments.  
 The community size was specified according to population levels because of the effects 
population exerts upon unions and local government budgets. Communities with small 
populations, and subsequently small police forces, usually do not have police unions and yet 
experience a higher proportionate level of police service expenditures (Valetta, 1989: 433). This 
situation results in the reverse economies of scale effect. Such situations would thus tend to 
overstate the impact of non-unionized departments on levels of police expenditures. 
Municipalities greater than 50,000 in population might experience greater expenditures strictly 
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because of size. Such municipalities also tend to have greater union densities, which together 
with increased size demands would overstate the impact of unionized departments on levels of 
police expenditures. 
 
Sources of Data 
 
Various sources of information will provide the actual data for research. The Florida 
Department of Financial Services provides the expenditure levels for each local government in a 
series of documents identified as Annual Financial Information Reports, specifically the Florida 
Local Government PDF Detail  Expenditure Reports.  All cities which do not exhibit complete 
information on all independent and dependent variables will be deleted from the research for the 
year in which the data is defective or missing. This practice is consistent with empirical studies 
in the literature (Schwochau, Feuille, Delaney, 1988: 424). 
Section 218.32, Florida Statutes requires counties and municipalities to submit annual 
financial information to the Department of Banking and Finance. Section 218.33, Florida 
Statutes mandates that reporting units use the Uniform Accounting System Chart of Accounts as 
the standard for recording and reporting financial information to the State of Florida so that 
annual financial reports are consistent throughout the state. This information, as presented in the 
Florida Local Government PDF Reports will provide the base data for the dependent variables, 
the various types of police expenditures. The object classes specified by the Uniform Accounting 
System Chart of Accounts to be used by this study are: Personal Services; Operating Expenses; 
and Capital Outlays. The year selected for analysis is 2002, the latest data available to the study. 
All values expressed by the dependent variables will thus be police expenditures in Florida 
reported to have occurred in the year 2002. 
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Millage rates and taxable values are listed in the State of Florida, Department of 
Revenue, Florida Property Valuation and Tax Data Book. These two variables will act as 
controls in the regression models, representing the overall ability of the municipality to finance 
varying levels of police expenditures. High taxable values within the jurisdiction have the 
potential to generate higher levels of revenue for municipalities that seek to increase police 
expenditures. On the other hand, lower taxable values indicate that the sample property tax base 
in a community has fewer resources to fund increased police expenditures. These factors would 
clearly affect bargaining outcomes because the availability of resources for police expenditures 
may be restricted.  
The U.S. Bureau of the Census provides figures for the demographical independent 
variables such as education, income, age, race, population, density, median housing values, 
owner occupied housing, and proximity to metropolitan statistical areas. The Florida Department 
of Law Enforcement (FDLE) maintains police ratios for each law enforcement agency in the 
state, and this study will utilize the FDLE ratios for observations to construct an independent 
variable related to police staffing in communities. Crime rates for each municipality can be 
found in either FDLE files or in the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports. 
These sources will be utilized in preparing the independent variable representing crime rates for 
the municipalities. Finally, the independent variable of concern, unionization, will be obtained 
from the records of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.  
 Table 3 specifies the research questions to be resolved, lists the information required to 
resolve the question, and provides the data source with which the hypotheses can be tested to 
answer the research questions. Each set of hypotheses will be tested through regression variables 
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that are formulated by the data located in the various sources. Research Question 1 will be 
resolved by testing the first set of hypotheses presented by the study: 
H01:  There is no difference in total police expenditures between communities with police union 
representation, and those communities without police union representation. 
 
HA1:  There are greater levels of total police expenditures in cities with police union 
representation, compared with those cities without police union representation.  
 
Research Question 2 will be resolved by testing the second set of hypotheses presented 
by the study: 
H02:  There is no difference in levels of police expenditures for personal services between 
communities with police union representation and those communities without police union 
representation. 
 
HA2:  There are greater levels of police expenditures for personal services in cities with  police 
union representation compared with those cities without police union representation. 
 
Research Question 3 will be answered through statistical testing of the third set of 
hypotheses: 
H03:  There is no difference in levels of police operating expenses expenditures between cities 
with police union representation and those cities without police union representation. 
 
HA3:  There are greater levels of police operating expenses expenditures in cities with police 
union representation and those cities without police union representation. 
 
Research Question 4 will be resolved by testing the fourth set of hypotheses: 
H04:  There is no difference in levels of police capital outlay expenditures between cities with 
police union representation and those cities without police union representation. 
 
HA4:  There are greater levels of police capital outlay expenditures in cities with police union 
representation and those cities without police union representation. 
 
 Since the required data involves such a broad spectrum of information to adequately 
specify the models, Table 3 utilizes various data bases from no fewer than four major 
governmental agencies: The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE); the Florida  
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Table 3. Research Questions and Data Sources. 
 
 















Florida Dept. of 
Financial Services 
 
Florida Dept. of 
Revenue 
 
U.S. Bureau of the 
Census/ Office of 
MGMT & Budget 
Overarching Issue: Do police unions influence local government police department expenditures? 
Research Question 1: Do 
police unions influence total 
police department 
expenditures? 
Dependent Variable: Total police 
department expenditures for each Florida 
municipality. 
Demographic Controls affecting 
expenditures 
Financial Controls impacting level of police 
department expenditures 
Law enforcement factors that may increase 
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Research Question 2: Do 
police unions influence 
police department personal 
services expenditures? 
Dependent Variable: Police department 
personal services expenditures for each 
Florida municipality. 
Demographic Controls affecting 
expenditures 
Financial Controls impacting level of police 
department expenditures 
Law enforcement factors that may increase 
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Research Question 3: Do 
police unions influence 
police department operating 
expenses expenditures? 
Dependent Variable: Police department 
operating expenses expenditures for each 
Florida municipality. 
Demographic Controls affecting 
expenditures 
Financial Controls impacting level of police 
department expenditures 
Law enforcement factors that may increase 
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Research Question 4: Do 
police unions influence 
police department capital 
outlays expenditures? 
Dependent Variable: Police department 
capital outlay expenditures for each Florida 
municipality. 
Demographic Controls affecting 
expenditures 
Financial Controls impacting level of police 
department expenditures 
Law enforcement factors that may increase 
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Four different hypotheses stated in the study, each with a separate dependent variable, 
will require a separate regression model for each hypothesis.  The independent variable of 
interest, and all specified control variables will be used consistently in all four models. The 
models, and the rationale and selection of each control variable will be explained in this section. 
The chosen analytical techniques will also be discussed in this section. These techniques include 
quantitative statistical methods to examine the existing data, and qualitative research to increase 
the depth of understanding for the results produced by quantitative methods. 
 
Empirical Models 
The level of police expenditures can be explained by the generic expression of each 
model which resembles: 
Y = ƒ (U, D, F, L) + Є 
Where: 
Y = The dependent variable 
U = Union presence or unionization, the independent variable of interest. 
D = A causal dimension for control which offers a number of variables and represents the  
       demographic influences upon the dependent variable(s). 
  
F = The second causal dimension of factors affecting the dependent variables relates to various  
       financial indicators of the local government. The primary variable in this dimension would  




L = The final causal dimension of factors affecting the dependent variable. The variables  
       included in the resulting dimension to be controlled are factors related to the law  
       enforcement environment specific to the local government in the observation. 
 
Most of the estimates resemble the reduced form model as follows: 
Yi = β0 + β1Χ1 + β2Χ2 + β3Χ3 + β4Χ4 + βNXN + Є 
Where: 
Yi = Dependent variables, government size as measured by: Overall police  
        expenditures; Personal services police expenditures; Police operating expenses  
        expenditures; and Police capital outlay expenditures.  
 
β0  =  The intercept for the model(s) 
βi  =  The resultant coefficients for the independent and control variables. 
Χ1 = Union presence or unionization, the independent variable of concern. This variable       
constitutes a dichotomous “dummy” variable which designates whether or not the sample 
unit is unionized (as indicated by a unitary value of 1) or nonunionized (as indicated by the 
null value, 0). Nonunionized police departments would thus be the referent base value for 
the regression model. An affirmative, unitary entry would create a value added contribution 
to the ultimate value of the dependent variable within the regression model. 
 
Χ2 = A variable drawn from a dimension of variables representing the demographic factors  
        affecting the dependent variable. The variable can be age, population, landarea, education,  
        race, and so forth. 
 
Χ3 = A variable drawn from a dimension of variables representing the financial factors  
        affecting the dependent variable. These sets of variables will model the financial influences  
        within the community. The taxable value or tax base of the community, either in whole  
        numbers or in capita terms is one possibility. The millage rate, or tax levy per each thousand  
        dollars of  value may contribute to the amount of expenditures. Both of the forgoing factors  
        may contribute influence in determining the level of police expenditures in a community. 
 
Χ4 = A variable drawn from a dimension of variables representing the law enforcement factors  
         affecting the dependent variable. Crime rate, or number of Part I crimes divided by 100,000  
         is one such variable. Another variable in this dimension would be cases cleared, which is  
         the percentage of Part I crimes solved by the police department. 
 





 As previously discussed, four separate models are required, one for each hypothesis. The 
structural form of each model will either be identical to or very similar to each other. Since the 
models utilize separate dependent variables, problems such as endogeneity may result in an 
instrument variable substituting for any variable subject to reverse causation.  The only readily 
noticeable change from model to model will be the dependent variable.  Figure 2 summarizes 





















Police Expenditures  
 








 The dependent variable for the first hypothesis, TTLPOL$, or total police operating 
budget expenditures, refers to the primary cost of providing and maintaining a police force 
within the community. These expenditures include all three categories of the police operating 
budget: personal services expenditures; operating expenses; and capital outlays. The variable will  
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TTLPOL$ – Total police operating expenditures  
POLPER$ – Police personal services expenditures  
POLOPEX$ – Police operating expenditures 
POLCAP$ – Police capital outlays 
 
Independent Variable of Concern
UNION – Whether or not police agency is unionized 
 
Control Variables - Demographic
POPULATN – Number of residents in a municipality 
LANDAREA – The amount of land within the community in  square miles 
OWNHOME – The percentage of residents owning their own home 
EDUCATN – Percent of residents having a high school education or more 
INCOME – Median level of income for the municipality 
OVER65 – Percent of citizens 65 years or older 
MAJRACE – Percent of white Americans in a community 
MSA – Whether or not community is included in an MSA, CMSA, or PMSA 
 
Control Variables – Finance Base
TAXVALUE – Amount of taxable value within the community 
MILLAGE – Current rate of taxation (property tax) within the community 
 
 
Control Variables – Law Enforcement Factors
CRIMERTE – FBI Part I crimes per 100,000 residents  








be used to test the first hypothesis to determine whether or not unionization impacts total police 
expenditures. Using police expenditure aggregate amounts for each municipality as dependent  
variables may create heteroscedasticity as a result of disproportionate scales. Large communities 
would exhibit much larger police expenditures in comparison to smaller communities because of 
large population requirements.  In the effort to maintain uniformity for the purpose of  
comparison, the dependent variable in the first model may require conversion from the total 
police expenditures stated for each city to a form which offsets data irregularities.  One 
suggested method for uniform comparisons would utilize natural logs of departmental 
expenditures (Gely & Chandler, 1995: 176; Valletta, 1989: 434-435). The latter method may 
have to be utilized if the conversion of choice (aggregate expenditure  amounts) results in 
heteroscedasticity. Schwochau, Feuille, and Delaney (1988: 424) resorted to using the log of per 
capita police expenditures.30    
 POLPER$ serves as the dependent variable for the second hypothesis, which questions 
whether or not police unionization affects police personal services expenditures in local 
government. This expenditure category encompasses salaries and wages, including sick and 
annual pay, as well as benefits such as insurance, education reimbursement programs, and so on. 
Training and other costs, however, are not included in this category. The figures selected for the 
dependent variable will relate to line items identified by the State of Florida Uniform Accounting 
System Chart of Accounts as personal services expenditures. Similar to the methodology used in 
testing the first hypothesis, data transformation of police personal services expenditures will 
yield a uniform measure for the dependent variable in this instance as well. As with the 
                                                 
30 While not explained in the Schwochau et al article, conversion of the per capita expenditures to log form was 
likely performed to correct or prevent heteroscedasticity.  
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TTLPOL$ model, the dependent variable POLPER$ may be required to be expressed in 
logarithm format for reasons previously discussed. 
 POLOPEX$, the dependent variable in the third hypothesis, emerges from the day-to-day 
operating or functioning expenses for police services. POLOPEX$ includes such items as small 
police equipment purchases, training, fuel for patrol vehicles, etc.  The variable will help 
determine if unionization has any influence on the level of spending in this category. Initially, 
the variable will be stated in an aggregated amount, but should heteroscedasticity problems arise, 
the ratio will be converted to logarithm form as noted previously in the discussion of the earlier 
dependent variables. 
 The last dependent variable, POLCAP$, is the amount of capital outlay a local 
government spends for police services. This expenditure category includes such items as 
computer networks, patrol vehicles, police technology, and other equipment that receives capital 
accounting attention rather than aggregately classified in police operating expenses. As with the 
preceding dependent variables, POLCAP$ will initially be expressed in aggregate form, and 
possibly further converted to logarithm form to avoid problems of heteroscedasticity. The 
variable will be used to resolve the issue posed by the fourth hypothesis, which questions 
whether or not unionization plays a part in influencing police capital outlay expenditures. 
 
The Independent Variable: Unionization 
 
Unionization (UNION), the independent variable of concern, indicates whether or not a 
police union exists within the sampled police department. The variable will be utilized in a 
dichotomous or “dummy” fashion in which a unitary value indicates presence of a union within 
the sampled department and the null value represents an absence of unionization. The non-
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unionized police department would thus be the reference state within the regression model, and 
the unionized police department within the model would express a value-added quantity to the 
base reference model. The selection of format for the independent variable is consistent with 
most of the studies referenced in the literature review that studied the effects of unionization 
upon police department expenditures. The fact that a union has been certified by the Florida 
Public Employees Relations Commission bestows a legal ability to collectively bargain 
regardless of other factors, such as the number of union members.31  Analysis by Masters and 
Atkin (1996: 183) argues that the number of union members may not adequately measure union 
strength. Masters and Atkin, noting that public sector unions withstood the Reagan-Bush era 
quite well (1996: 196), emphasize that even declining union membership does not necessarily 
result in a loss of influence (1996: 194). The mere presence of a union thus extends a formidable 
influence within a local government agency by virtue of its legal status as bargaining agent. 
However, as discussed previously, public sector unions, regardless of membership, also 
commands a political force with a network of support from parent and other labor organizations 
(Carter and Sapp, 1992: 18; Coleman, 1990: 104).  
The selected data year for the independent variable will be 2001 because the influence of 
the union on budget decisions is more likely to be exerted in the planning year, or the year before 
the expenditures are incurred. The information will be secured from the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement’s 2001 Criminal Justice Agency Profile (Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement, 2001) which reports police department profiles for the year 2001. 
                                                 
31 Florida Statutes Section 447.309 requires that once the employee organization is certified, the bargaining agent for 
the organization and the chief executive officer of the public employer jointly “shall bargain collectively in the 
determination of the wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment of the public employees within the 
bargaining unit.”  
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The independent variable, UNION, serves as the proxy for formalized employee voice. 
As such, the variable will serve as an indicator of whether or not focused and organized 
employee voice can make a difference in a public sector agency. UNION, then, is the 
personification of voice and the measure of its potential influence in such settings as police 
departments. If organized employee voice does exert influence within employing organizations, 
then UNION should yield significant variables within regression models, despite a large number 
of control variables within the model.  
 
Control Variables/Demographic Dimension 
 
 The dimension of variables within the demographic dimension controls for the effects of 
various influences that such factors as population, wealth, and other considerations may have 
upon the dependent variable. The variable POPULATN will represent the total number of 
individuals living in a municipality. The most current population estimates will provide the 
required data. LANDAREA, or the amount of land per square mile in a community, is one 
variable that could conceivably contribute to decisions of police staffing and budgets.  The 
variable EDUCATN, or number of high school graduates within the community, may also be an 
important factor. The number of citizens owning their own home in a community, OWNHOME, 
could also influence the amount of expenditures allotted to the police department. These 
influences should be paired with the dependent variables through measures of association to 
determine if such factors do contribute to causality. U.S. Census Bureau tables (United States 
Census Bureau, 2005) will provide LANDAREA, OWNHOME and EDUCATN data.  
 In addition, variables for age and race are other considerations that could influence the 
dependent variables. A retirement community might not require the same type of services as a 
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community comprising of young families. OVER65 will serve as the proxy for age influences on 
police expenditures by expressing the percent of citizens over 65 years of age in the 
municipality. Communities with racial diversity might demand a different level of police 
services than in communities without such diversity. The percentage of white Americans within 
the community would be represented by the variable MAJRACE. Finally, within the 
demographics dimension, the proximity of a smaller community to a large city might also be 
taken into consideration. MSA is a variable that denotes whether or not accounts a community is 
included within a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), a Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (CMSA), or a Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA). The U.S. Census Bureau 
provided data for OVER65, MAJRACE. Information for MSA data came from the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget (United States Office of Management and Budget, 2005). 
 
Control Variables/Financial Factors Dimension 
 
 The ability to pay for police services undoubtedly determines staffing levels as well as 
the amount of money spent on police services within a community. Variables from the 
dimension of financial condition represent this situation in the empirical models of the study. 
TAXVALUE is a variable which provides the level of taxable value within the local government. 
This variable indicates the potential that the community has to finance desired police services 
levels. Communities with properties at lower appraised values probably would not be able to 
fund city services at the same level as similarly sized communities containing more valuable 
property. MILLAGE is an independent variable that presents the current rate of taxes within the 
community. This variable represents the tax load shouldered by citizens of the community.  The 
data for the variables TAXVALUE and MILLAGE were secured from the Florida Department of 
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Revenue figures for 2001 (Florida Department of Revenue, 2002). The 2001 figures were used in 
the study because financing for the fiscal year 2002 was derived from 2001 revenues, and budget 
decisions for 2002 were planned in 2001. 
Control Variables/Law Enforcement Dimension 
 
 The final dimension of independent variables includes descriptives of the law 
enforcement characteristics of the community. First and foremost is the variable CRIMERT1, 
which the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) provides through the 
UCR Crime Index system. Wilson (1978: 220) noted that when crime increases, the conventional 
public response was to demand better and/or more law enforcement. This response results in 
greater expenditures to hire more police and provide them with more equipment. Witt (1990: 
169-170) used crime rate with significant results in the attempt to identify control variables for 
police expenditures. The Crime Index refers to Part I crimes per 100,000 inhabitants of a 
community. The FBI defines Part I crimes as the violent crimes of murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault and the property crimes of burglary, 
larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. The degree of crime in a community should exert some 
influence on decisions of staffing and funding police services. CRIMERT1 will control for that 
influence in the models.  
Another variable in the law enforcement dimension is CSESCLR1, a variable which 
represents the level of commitment and capability within the community to reduce crime. The 
variable is calculated by determining the ratio of the number of cases solved to the total number 
of reported crimes. A community with an aggressive program to reduce crime will direct more 
resources to law enforcement, causing police expenditures to rise.   
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Data for both law enforcement factor variables (CRIMERT1 and CSECLR1) will be 
secured from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s County and Municipal Offense Data 
(Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2002). The year selected for both law enforcement 
factor variables is 2001. Consistent with the reasoning used for UNION, TAXVALUE, and 
MILLAGE, the year 2001 was selected because budget decisions for 2002 were planned in 2001. 
Legislators are more likely to be sensitive to conditions existing at the time the budget is 
formulated. Moreover, the exact crime rate and percentage of cases cleared are not known to 




 Cross sectional data will be employed by the study. Once compiled, the data will be 
regressed in the formats discussed in the previous sections. The most recent complete financial 
data available for analysis from the Florida Department of Financial Services is that of the year 
2002. Final choice of which reported figures to use in the analysis also poses a concern. The 
Florida Local Government PDF Expenditure Detail Report presents two possibilities for use in 
financial research. The first choice is the total financial transaction in the object class, which 
Florida Financial Services labels as “Total Memo” in the report. The advantages to using this 
figure is that the number used for Total Memo represents all resources used in that object class, 
including transactions from all the various categories of funds. Arguably, this figure takes all 
influences into consideration. The disadvantage of using this figure is that funds over which 
unions have very little or no control, such as grants-in-aid and special revenue funds, are 
included in the total amounts. This situation would dampen and possibly even mask union 
influence by including large amounts of financial transactions in which the union has no voice.  
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The second set of figures presented by the Florida Local Government PDF Expenditure 
Detail Reports that could be used by the study is the amount listed as emerging from the 
“General Fund.”  The General Fund provides the financial resources through which police 
departments operate. While monies from this fund exclude the effects of long range planning, 
they are more reflective of union influence within the government decision making process. 
General Fund amounts are usually the result of short term (one year) budgeting strategies which 
are affected by the bargaining outcomes of labor relations.  While it is true that unions may 
influence decisions regarding land purchases and other major capital budget items, it is more 
likely that unions will attempt to influence short term expenditures in which they have a greater 
immediate interest. Police expenditures stated within the Total Memo column are not as sensitive 
as are the amounts stated in the General Fund in the same object class. As stated in Chapter I of 
this study, total police expenditures are 31% of the total General Fund in the year 2002 for an 
average community in the state of Florida , but only 11% of total 2002 annual municipal 
expenditures in the average Floridian community (Florida Department of Financial Services, 
2004). The General Fund also presents a more reliable picture of the use of available resources 
because financial shortcomings of a municipality are not adjusted or corrected by other funds. As 
discussed previously, “the financial health of the General Fund often largely determines the 
financial health of the unit as a whole” (Freeman & Shoulders, 1999: 573).  
A Pearson’s correlation matrix will be generated to assess the relationships between 
variables, while descriptive statistics will be computed for evaluative and comparative purposes. 
The selected instrument to test the hypotheses is ordinary least squares. Subsequent variance 
inflation factor would confirm that multicollinearity was not a factor among the variables.   
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 Since there are four separate hypotheses with four dependent variables, each hypothesis 
will be tested by multivariate regression analysis using the independent and control variables 
specified previously. The right side of the regression equations will remain the same throughout 
all the models. Only the dependent variables will change from model to model. Total 
expenditures and personal services expenditure models will provide bases for comparison with 
prior research and subsequent modeling results. The final two regressions, which use operating 
expenditures and capital outlays as dependent variables, will analyze the little understood 
relationships between unionization and operating expenses and between unionization and capital 
outlays of the operating, or annual budget. 
 
Qualitative Research: The Search for Insight 
 
 Experiential information often provides the primary source of scientific knowledge.  Such 
information often emerges during interviews of participants active in the subject studied (Mauch 
& Park, 2003). As noted by Marshall and Rossman (1999: 2), qualitative research is “pragmatic, 
interpretative, and grounded in the lived experiences of people.” Acknowledging the foregoing 
principles, this study includes qualitative research as part of its methodology to acquire an in-
depth understanding of the data examined by quantitative analysis.  In recent years, qualitative 
research has expanded into a number of fields, and many studies now combine quantitative and 
qualitative research (Goodwin, 2003). The two research designs often complement each other 
and interpret the results in different dimensional formats, thus ultimately leading to a better 
understanding of the subject.  This study, in an attempt to achieve the greatest possible 
understanding of the subject of police unions’ influences, subsequently engages both quantitative 
and qualitative methods in its research design. As discussed previously, the quantitative portion 
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of the study will use regression and other statistical techniques. The qualitative methodology of 
the study features interviews of public administrators closely associated with the primary 




Officials from seven different Florida cities were interviewed. Each municipality selected 
for interview was selected according to a number of criteria. One criterion is the location of the 
city. At least two cities from each of the three regions of the state were selected. Another 
criterion was population. One large city, four medium cities, and two small cities were selected.32  
Another aspect of location is the relationship of the city to that of other cities. Some cities 
selected were relatively remote from other cities while other cities selected were part of a larger 
urbanized area.  
Two non-unionized departments will be selected to compare labor relations with that of 
unionized departments. While there may be some differences caused by location and other 
considerations in communities of similar size, the primary differences between the police 
departments in the example cases are that one of the communities experiences collective 
bargaining with police employees while the other community does not. This condition should 
yield different perspectives on how labor relations affect police expenditures in municipalities 
according to collective bargaining status.  
Another characteristic considered in selecting the city was the demographic profile. Some 
cities have a relatively high over 65 years of age population, some have a relatively smaller over 
65 population. Most cities in Florida have the white “race” as the predominant ethnic group, but 
                                                 
32 Population determined the size of the city. The cities were grouped according to the categories discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
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a few cities have proportionately higher population of people of color.  Cities can also vary 
according to the percentage of owner-occupied housing, taxable values, education, and other 
attributes. Since each of these demographic characteristics could possibly influence community 
values that determine police expenditures, the effort was made to include a variety of these 
characteristics in the final selection of cities. The characteristics of the selected municipalities 
will be described in the chapter on qualitative perspectives. 
Babbie (2001: 240) points out that in-depth, qualitative interviewing techniques rely 
almost exclusively on open-end questions. Guided by this observation, the results of the 
quantitative portion of the study will be shared with at least one pertinent local government 
representative from each of the city categories used in the study. Each representative official will 
then be asked to comment on the results of the analysis, provide their interpretations of the 
results, and explain to what extent the results compare with their observations. The interviewees 
will also be asked to describe their personal observations of police union influences within local 
government, and the manner in which these influences operate. Interviewing “insiders” would 
ensure that possible causal factors have not been omitted from the model, and subsequently the 
study itself. In some cases, complexities and processes can only be understood or discerned 
through qualitative methodology (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). Since union influences on police 
expenditures involve complex interpersonal relations, nuances that remain hidden from statistical 
analysis could very well be revealed by local government officials aware of their existence 
through personal observations and professional experiences. While such influences may evade 




In order to determine specific causes of police expenditures in a number of cases, more 
definitive questions may be posed to the interviewed officials. Comparisons of responses and 
information acquired from the cities then can be made between unionized and non-unionized 
departments. These comparisons should provide some understanding of the quantitative results 
by identifying certain characteristics that may be present in unionized departments that are not 
present in non-unionized departments.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
 This study began the examination of the union impact on police expenditures in Florida 
by segregating police expenditures into four component categories. Total police expenditures 
data comprises the first category and provides a reference basis for the study’s first hypothesis 
that unions do impact police expenditures in Florida. Personal services expenses form the base of 
reference for the study’s second expenditure category, as well as providing the data for the 
hypothesis that unions specifically impact police personal services expenses. The study’s third 
category of expenses involves police operating expenses, the day-to-day cost of law enforcement 
excluding expenditures related to personnel or capital outlays. Included in this category are such 
items as training, small equipment purchases, utility expenses, maintenance, operating supplies, 
and similar expenses. The study’s final expenditure category is that of capital outlays, which 
includes purchases of items such as computers, vehicles, and other expenditures for capital 
equipment. 
 Using the methodology described in Chapter III, statistical analysis tested each of the 
hypotheses separately. Linear regression modeling produced varying results with the four 
models. Three of the models indicated that strong evidence existed to support the hypotheses that 
union presence influence impacted those categories of expenditures. However, the capital outlays 
model failed to suggest that unions contributed any significant impact on police expenditures in 
that category. Standardized coefficients for the union variable emerged considerably stronger 
than suspected in two of the models (total police expenditures, LTTLPOL$, and personal 
services expenses, LPER$), and exhibited a strong presence in the third model (operating 
 142
 
expenses, LOPEX$). Discussion will ensue on the merits of each of the statistical findings for 
each model and conclude with a combined evaluation of the three surviving models.  
 
Characteristics of the Data 
 
 Although Section 218.32 of the Florida Statutes requires counties and municipalities to 
submit annual financial information to the Department of Banking and Finance, a number of 
cities did not report this information or did not report the information accurately. In addition, the 
same or other municipalities failed to report data to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
as required.  In a number of cases, this information was able to be reconstructed or supplied by 
the non-reporting cities. In other cases, the missing information did not present problems to the 
regressions because the information was not required to construct the variables used in the 
regressions. Those cases in which the critical data was not reported or not reported accurately 
resulted in rejection of the data set for the non-reporting entities. This was particularly true of 
cities that did not report the expenditure information, because serving as regressands, accurate 
expenditure information was critical to the models. Altogether, the analysis included a final 
sample of 257 Floridian cities of varying sizes with usable and accurate data. 
 The data fluctuates dramatically, as might be expected in a state the size of Florida. As an 
example, Greensboro, FL spent only $57,224 to provide law enforcement services for its 627 
residents, whereas Tampa used over $95 million in total police expenditures for over 311,000 
residents. Standard deviations for the four dependent variables, as high as $12 million in the case 
of total police expenditures, underscore the very large range in values for the expenditure figures. 
257 municipalities had sufficient and accurate data to perform reliable regressions for total police 
expenditures and personal services expenditures. 257 municipalities had sufficient and accurate 
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data on operating expenses, and 257 cities had sufficient data on capital outlays. One of the 
variables (MILLAGE) had only 250 samples available as a result of non-report to the 
Department of Financial Services. However, since the variable did not later show a significant 
correlation with any of the dependent variables, no attempt was made to reconcile the missing 
data. For all the other variables, independent and control variables, sufficient data was available 
or able to be secured.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for all the variables. 
           
Descriptive Statistics
257 57224.00 9.5E+07 6213156 12428921
257 36984.00 8.5E+07 5217732 10762599
257 14073.00 1.1E+07 850977.1 1726456
257 .00 1672171 144446.4 212579.8
257 .00 1.00 .5798 .49456
257 6680544 1.6E+10 1.3E+09 2.40E+09
257 .13 112.07 10.9339 16.90417
257 14.60 99.30 78.7463 17.36929
257 3.80 62.90 21.2093 10.74813
257 29.10 95.80 69.3984 12.85742
257 29.10 98.90 79.0778 12.63688
257 320.00 364389.0 25377.77 45600.15
257 .00 1.00 .8210 .38409
257 525.76 44083.70 5884.654 4246.201
257 .00 105.26 26.3382 16.21395
























 The means for the dichotomous variables provide indication as to the relative proportions 
of both unionization and number of incorporated local governments within the state of Florida. 
The independent variable of concern (UNION), having a value of .5798, discloses that nearly 
58% of the sampled cities have unionized police departments. The control variable MSA with a 
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mean of .8210 reveals that more than 82% of the sampled cities are within a metropolitan 
statistical area. Standard deviation values for both variables are substantial, indicating a widely 
dispersed data set. 
 The variable representing the total tax value within a community (TAXVALUE) presents 
the greatest spread of values in the data with Tampa having over 2500 times the taxable value of 
small Greensboro. For this variable, the standard deviation value is over $2 billion. LANDAREA 
exhibits the smallest data spread for aggregate value-based variables. Measured in square miles, 
South Palm Beach is the smallest in area from the data set at 0.13 square miles, which belies its 
population of over 1,500 citizens. The very large Tampa, having 112.07 square miles within its 
boundaries needs the space for over 311,000 residents. Jacksonville (757.68 square miles) is not 
included in the data set because law enforcement services in that city are provided by sheriff’s 
office deputies. The demographic control variable POPULATN shows great fluctuations also and 
should provide very significant controls, along with TAXVALUE, on the very large variations of 
the dependent variables. Miami anchors the upper end of the data range with over 360,000 
people, and Manalapan is the smallest at 320.  
 One law enforcement factor control variable, CRIMERT1, measures Part 1 crimes 
committed for every 100,000 residents. This ratio should offer a leveling of proportions that 
render comparisons more equally. However, as might be expected, major crimes tend to be more 
typical of larger rather than smaller cities. Moreover, many different factors affect crime rate 
besides the size of the city. For instance, crimes in a smaller city will also inflate the relative 
proportions of crime rates as compared to a larger city. A city with 1,000 residents that 
experiences two cases of violent crime will have twice the crime rate of a city with 2,000 that 
also counted two violent crimes in a year. As a result, even though the variable is stated in 
 145
 
proportions, the range for data recording the incident of crime is noticeably broad. It is 
anticipated that the greater the crime rate, the greater police expenditures.  
 The original data representing crime rate was drawn from 2002, the same year as the 
expenditures data. However, expenditure decisions are more likely to be based on conditions 
existing at the time of the budget planning period with little variation during the year the 
expenditures are incurred. 2002 data for crime rates and cases cleared would not significantly 
contribute to the decisions of expenditures because these rates are occurring at the same time the 
expenditures are being incurred. The budgets for departments usually are decided in the year 
previous to the expenditures. Crime rates and the percentage of cases cleared would therefore be 
more likely to impact decisions of resource allocation as the information became available. 
Crime rate and cases cleared in 2002 would not be immediately known to decision makers until 
after the expenditures of 2002 had been made. Information from the previous year would be 
available to decision makers as they were contemplating budgets for the following year. The 
2001 data thus replaced the 2002 data. Crime rate is not expected to impact budget significantly 
except in those cases the crime rate rises substantially to garner the attention of municipal 
decision makers and thus becomes a political issue. If crime rate rises to the point it attracts 
public or political attention, police expenditures would in all likelihood increase to offset the 
increase in crime. More officers may be hired, or additional law enforcement hours may be used 
to decrease the rate of crime. This would require higher level of expenditures. The same rationale 
was applied to the cases cleared data. 
 MILLAGE, a finance variable, represents the current rate of taxation in a community. 
Greenville, FL has the highest millage rate at 9.85, Sneads the lowest at .611. Florida imposes a 
“10 mill” cap on local government, restricting communities to taxation limits of $10 per $1,000. 
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The average millage rate of 5.1150 is accompanied by a standard deviation of 1.958, which 
indicates that slightly more than 68% of millage rates for municipalities in Florida lie between 
3.1569 and 7.07308.  
The remainder of variables is stated in percentage formats. These include MAJRACE, 
OVER65, OWNHOME, EDUCATN, and CSECLR1. All but CSECLR1 emerge from the 
demographics dimension of variables. The demographic variables account for factors that would 
also cause police expenditures to rise and/or fall.  The mean of the data set is an average of the 
various percentages expressed for each city. This value will vary from the actual percentage 
computed on the summed aggregate figures. That is to say, the mean of the percentages for 257 
cities will be different than the percentage computed for the state as a single unit.  Thus, the 
means will not compare meaningfully with the percentages for the entire state which have been 
calculated in the aggregate. In other words, the means expressed in the SPSS Output tables are 
averages of the values expressed in the data. The state average, on the other hand, is calculated 
by actually tabulating the number of residents over 65 for the entire state and deriving the 
proportional percentage of the number of people over 65 years of age as compared to the entire 
state population. The range of values for OVER65 illustrates the spread of percentages from 
relatively young rural areas to retirement communities. The OWNHOME and EDUCATN range 
between minimum and maximum values are very similar, but subsequent correlation checks 
ruled out collinear impacts within the regression models. Usually descriptive statistic 
comparisons among percentage based variables provide little information for generalization. As 
discussed, the mean of percentages for 257 cities will be different than percentages of a 
demographic factor computed for the entire state as a single unit. However, individual 
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representation of these types of variables within regression models can be very significant, as 
will be demonstrated.  
CSECLR1 is a law enforcement factor variable, and varies from no Part 1 crimes solved 
to over 100% solved. One city actually expressed a value of cases cleared greater than 100%. 
The latter sample may have been the result of spillover calculations from the previous year. This 
anomaly occurred only once in the data and the value was recorded unchanged in the data base. 
As explained in the discussion of the CRMRTE1 variable, 2002 data was replaced by the 2001 
data. The annual number of cases cleared is not available to decision makers the year in which 
the cases are being cleared because the year has not been concluded. However, decision makers 
have some idea as to the rate of cases cleared for the previous year. Based on this information, 
that is information from the previous year, the decision makers allocate resources accordingly. 
While the decisions may not be made on knowledge of the actual numbers of cases being 
cleared, the decision makers will base their decisions upon reports from police departments 
regarding whether or not the departments are receiving adequate funding to fight crime. This 
rationale will be tested in the regression models of this research, and the CSECLR1 variable 
represents the level of effectiveness at a specific point in time for law enforcement efforts, given 
available resources. The average percentage of cases cleared for the sample set was slightly 
above 26%, but again varies by a substantial margin from community to community as 
demonstrated by the relatively large standard deviation.  In this case, the standard deviation 
indicates that 68% of Florida cities clear anywhere between 10% and 42.5% Part 1 crimes each 
year. 
As discussed in the Dependent Variables section of Chapter Three, it was anticipated that 
heteroscedasticity would exist in some of the data, particularly with the expenditure data. Gely 
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and Chandler (1995: 176) resorted to natural logs of police and firefighter expenditures while 
Valletta (1989: 434-435) and Schwochau, Feuille, and Delaney (1988: 424) also used 
logarithmic transformation as well for expenditure data. Rather than define per capita 
expenditures as the dependent variable, this study placed population on the right side of the 
equation in a manner consistent with Valetta (1989: 434) and Gely and Chandler (1995: 176).33 
In other words, population was used as a control variable along with a field of other control 
variables that determine the amount of expenditures. For ease of interpretation, every attempt 
was made to contain data transformation on the left side of the model equations. That is, every 
attempt was made to keep the control variables in unchanged form to make it easier to 
understand their effect upon the dependent variable, which is the only variable to the left of the 
equation. 
 The great variation in police expenditures from one community to another suggests that 
heteroscedasticity, or unequal variances of the error term, may pose a problem to regression 
models using expenditures data from varying sizes of cities. Heteroscedasticity tends to exist in 
this type of data because larger communities with proportionately larger tax revenues tend to 
have more discretion in their spending decisions than smaller communities (Berman, 2002: 140). 
Plotting the standardized residuals against the standardized predicted values in the Total Police 
Expenditures model confirms that heteroscedasticity is present. Figure 3 illustrates this situation. 
The error term plots for each of the models reveals that the error terms possess disproportionate 
variances that begin by clustering tightly around the center of the chart but then expanding 
dramatically to the right in the scatterplot.  Using the raw (untransformed) data for the four  
                                                 
33 Right side of the equation refers to all the control variables to the right of the equal sign, whereas the dependent 
variable is positioned to the left of the equal sign. A variable representing total population in this methodology acts 
as a controlling factor that explains changes in the dependent variable so that the dependent variable does not have 


































Figure 3 Untransformed Data Scatterplot. 
Regressions using the untransformed data for police expenditures produce the classic trumpet 
































Figure 4 Transformed Data Scatterplot. 
Transforming the same police expenditures data through natural logarithms results in more equal 




police expenditures variables would result in the statistical significance of the regression 
coefficients to be underestimated (Berman, 2002: 140).  
In order to overcome the problem of heteroscedasticity, the data should be transformed in 
a manner that the scales of differences among the data values are minimized.  Log 
transformations compress the scales by which the variables are measured so that the differences 
between two values are reduced from tenfold to twofold (Gujarati, 2003: 421). Gujarati uses the 
example of the number 80 being 10 times greater than the number 8, but that the natural log of 
80 (4.3820) is only about twice as great than the natural log of 8 (2.0794).  Logarithmic 
transformations, using natural logs were thus applied to the police expenditure data sets.  As 
demonstrated in Figure 4, the logarithmic transformation eliminated the heteroscedasticity and 
scattered the error terms in a more random distribution around the center of the chart. Using this 
transformation methodology with the dependent variables is consistent especially with the Gely 
and Chandler studies (1995: 176; 1993a: 300). 
 
Identifying the Viable Control Variables 
 
 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient measures the association between two variables in 
terms of significance, strength and direction. However, Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient does 
not demonstrate a causal relationship as does linear regression (Berman, 2002: 122). Evaluating 
bivariate relationships, particularly between the dependent variables and the independent/control 
variables, allows the researcher to quickly determine which independent variables to include in 
regression models. Tables 6 through 9 display results of the bivariate relationships in separate 
correlations matrixes that begin with each dependent variable. Each matrix presents the results of 
a dependent variable and a field of 12 independent/control variables. 
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 Since the hypotheses of the study suggest that unions impact police expenditures by 
causing an increase in the expenditures in comparison with non-union departments, one tailed 
tests of significance are used in the correlation matrixes rather than the two tailed tests.34 In the 
first three correlation matrixes, the UNION variable shows a strong associate with the dependent 
variables LTTPOL$ (natural log of total police expenditures), LPER$ (natural log of personal 
services expenditures), and LOPEX$ (natural log of operating expenses). The fourth matrix, 
which features LCAPOUT$ (natural log of capital outlays) indicates that there is an association, 
but the association is not nearly as strong as in the first three matrixes. The fourth matrix records 
that the correlation between the UNION variable and the dependent variable is significant at the 
.05 level, but the first three matrixes all indicate that the correlation between the UNION variable 
and the dependent variables are at the .01 level.  All the matrixes would suggest that the UNION 
variable should be included in the multivariate regressions proposed by the study.   
A large number of control variables emerge from the matrixes with varying degrees of 
correlation with the dependent variables. TAXVALUE, LANDAREA, and POPULATN exhibit 
very strong relationships with the dependent variables in the first three matrixes, while in the 
fourth matrix those three variables achieve only moderate strength in correlation with 
LCAPOUT$, the dependent variable in subsequent regressions. TAXVALUE, LANDAREA, 
and POPULATN should be included in regression models proposed by the study.  
The OWNHOME, MSA, and CSECLR1 variables retain moderate strength in the 
correlation with the dependent variables throughout the first three matrixes, but weaken 
                                                 
34 As presented by the literature, the assumption being made is that the presence of unions results in greater 
expenditures. The two-tailed test determines where or not the means of the populations may differ (H1: µ1 ≠ µ0), that 
is, whether or not union and non-union departments have either less than or greater than expenditures. Since the 
literature does not support this contention but instead states that unions cause increased expenditures, the study 
utilizes a one-tailed test. The one-tailed test (H1: µ1 > µ0) is used in those cases which it is to be determined whether 
or not the conclusion that is possible is that the mean of one population (unionized departments) is greater than the 
mean of another population (non-unionized departments). (Spatz, 2001: 170-171). 
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lation is significant at the 0.01 level ( ailed). 1-t
.007
              
            
           
           
            
          
         
         
           
       
            
             






































.621** .261** .629** 1.00
MAJRACE 
 
-.053 .078 .003 -.098 1.00
OVER65 
 
-.085 .015 -.034 -.171** .508** 1.00 
OWNHOME 
 
-.306** -.092 -.214** -.163** .529** .408** 1.00
EDUCATN 
 
.202** .217** .142* .083 .654** .398** .469** 1.00
POPULATN 
 
.729** .309** .856** .720** -.123* -.188** -.304** -.016 1.00
MSA 
 
.411** .281** .215** .174** .289** .057 .076 .416** .210** 1.00 
CRIMERT1 
 
.198** .121* .109* .099 -.481** -.217** -.479** -.332** .128* -.088 1.00
CSECLR1 -.310** -.265** -.186** -.106 .025 -.107* .022 -.150** -.154** -243** -.082 1.00
 
.099 .044 .048 -.492** -.301** -.294** -.472** .157** .025 .387** -.079 1.00
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.612** .261** .629** 1.00
MAJRACE 
 
-.046 .078 .003 -.098 1.00
OVER65 
 
-.078 .015 -.034 -.171** .508** 1.00 
OWNHOME 
 
-.304** -.092 -.214** -.163** .529** .408** 1.00
EDUCATN 
 
.203** .217** .142* .083 .654** .398** .469** 1.00
POPULATN 
 
.724** .309** .856** .720** -.123* -.188** -.304** -.016 1.00
MSA 
 
.414** .281** .215** .174** .289** .057 .076 .416** .210** 1.00 
CRIMERT1 
 
.197** .121* .109* .099 -.481** -.217** -.479** -.332** .128* -.088 1.00
CSECLR1 -.312** -.265** -.186** -.106 .025 -.107* .022 -.150** -.154** -243** -.082 1.00
 
.100 .044 .048 -.492** -.301** -.294** -.472** .157** .025 .387** -.079 1.00













lation is significant at the 0.01 level ( ailed). 1-t
.007
             
           
            
           
           
           
         
         
         
           
       
            
             
              
LOPEX$ UNION
 















.633** .261** .629** 1.00
MAJRACE 
 
-.109* .078 .003 -.098 1.00
OVER65 
 
-.116* .015 -.034 -.171** .508** 1.00 
OWNHOME 
 
-.321** -.092 -.214** -.163** .529** .408** 1.00
EDUCATN 
 
.155** .217** .142* .083 .654** .398** .469** 1.00
POPULATN 
 
.716** .309** .856** .720** -.123* -.188** -.304** -.016 1.00
MSA 
 
.357** .281** .215** .174** .289** .057 .076 .416** .210** 1.00 
CRIMERT1 
 
.201** .121* .109* .099 -.481** -.217** -.479** -.332** .128* -.088 1.00
CSECLR1 -.269** -.265** -.186** -.106 .025 -.107* .022 -.150** -.154** -243** -.082 1.00
 
.086 .044 .048 -.492** -.301** -.294** -.472** .157** .025 .387** -.079 1.00
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.343** .261** .629** 1.00
MAJRACE 
 
-.062 .078 .003 -.098 1.00
OVER65 
 
-.007 .015 -.034 -.171** .508** 1.00 
OWNHOME 
 
-.113* -.092 -.214** -.163** .529** .408** 1.00
EDUCATN 
 
.152** .217** .142* .083 .654** .398** .469** 1.00
POPULATN 
 
.300** .309** .856** .720** -.123* -.188** -.304** -.016 1.00
MSA 
 
.162** .281** .215** .174** .289** .057 .076 .416** .210** 1.00 
CRIMERT1 
 
.078 .121* .109* .099 -.481** -.217** -.479** -.332** .128* -.088 1.00
CSECLR1 -.124* -.265** -.186** -.106 .025 -.107* .022 -.150** -.154** -243** -.082 1.00
 
.044 .048 -.492** -.301** -.294** -.472** .157** .025 .387** -.079 1.00




considerably in the fourth matrix showing correlation with the dependent variable LCAPOUT$. 
CRIMERT1 also shows a low moderate relationship with the first three matrixes, but weakens to 
insignificance in the fourth matrix which features the natural log of capital outlays as the main 
interest in bivariate correlations. The four variables, OWNHOME, MSA, CSECLR1, and 
CRIMERT1 will therefore be utilized as control variables in the police expenditure regressions. 
Of the nine variables expressing a significant association with the dependent variables, 
EDUCATN displays a weak to moderate correlation to the dependent variables in all four 
correlation matrixes. EDUCATN approaches moderate strength (.202 & .203) in the first two 
matrixes, but downgrades (.155 & .152) somewhat in the last two matrixes. However, in all four 
sets of correlations, EDUCATN is significant. This variable will thus also be included in the 
field of control variables injected into the regression models. 
In the third correlation matrix (Table 8), two variables (MAJRACE and OVER65) attain 
a status of significance, but in none of the other correlations with the expenditure variables does 
this situation occur. However, it is suspected that this relation may be spurious and these 
variables will be tested in the models for regression significance after the models have been 
specified. Although at least one regression model in the literature (Witt, 1990: 170) found  a 
positive and significant relationship between the percent of citizens 65 and older and police 
expenditures, this study’s correlation matrixes for the most part failed to detect a significant 
relationship between police expenditures and the over 65 group of residents.  In only one set of 
correlations (between OVER65 and LOPEX$) does the age variable demonstrate any 
significance in relationship with expenditures, and even then the relationship demonstrates a low 









LTTLPOL$ – Natural Log of total police operating expenditures  
LPER$ – Natural log of police personal services expenditures  
LOPEX$ – Natural log of police operating expenditures 
LCAPOUT$ – Natural log of police capital outlays 
 
Independent Variable of Concern
UNION – Whether or not police agency is unionized 
 
Control Variables - Demographic
LANDAREA – The amount of land within the community in  square miles 
OWNHOME – The percentage of residents owning their own residence 
EDUCATN – Percent of residents having a high school education or more 
POPULATN – Number of residents in a municipality 
MSA – Whether or not community is included in a metropolitan statistical area. 
 
Control Variables – Finance Base
TAXVALUE – Amount of taxable value within the community 
 
 
Control Variables – Law Enforcement Factors
CRIMERTE – FBI Part I crimes per 100,000 residents  










in this research exhibits an inverse relationship, which possibly suggests that the results are 
spurious in light of Witt’s findings, that is, the finding is not true or genuine in this instance. Witt 
(1990: 118) used a national sample of cities in excess of 25,000. According to Bureau of Census 
figures, the average percentage of residents 65 years of age and older for the nation is 12.4%, but 
the same group of residents in Florida constitutes 17.6% of the total (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
2005).  Moreover, the fact that Witt restricted his sample to cities in excess of 25,000 likely 
changed the demographic characteristics considerably from that of this study which includes all 
cities with police departments regardless of size in Florida. The combination of these two factors 
(larger percentage of residents over 65 in Florida and varying population ranges of the samples) 
in all likelihood contributed to different results in this study as compared to that of Witt. Both 
studies are correct, but yield different results primarily because of the proportionately different 
number of residents over 65 in the respective studies. 
A final variable, MILLAGE, suggested as a possible control, failed to display 
significance in any of the correlations with the variables specified as the eventual dependent 
variables. As the rate of taxation per thousand dollars of assessed value, the level of acceptable 
taxation is not as significant in determination of expenditures as is the total tax value of the 
property within the community. For this reason, TAXVALUE, another variable from the 
financial dimension will be included in the final regression models while MILLAGE will be 
discarded as a control variable. 
A review of the correlation matrixes indicates that a degree of multicollinearity may be 
present among some of the data. Most notably, the variables TAXVALUE, and POPULATN 
show high correlation coefficients. Usually, a high value (about .8 or .9 in absolute value) in 
correlations between two independent variables may be cause for concern.  However, two points 
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merit special consideration.  First, the existence of multicollinearity does not necessarily mean 
that the coefficient estimates have unacceptably high variances (Kennedy, 1998: 187). Second, 
even in the case of near multicollinearity, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators 
(regression coefficients) are unbiased (Gujarati, 2003: 349).  
Equally important, as noted by Gujarati (2003: 370), multicollinearity may not pose a 
serious problem if the R2 of the model is high and the regression coefficients are individually 
significant as demonstrated by higher t values. Most importantly, greater harm could result by 
the usual remedy for multicollinearity of dropping a variable that is multicollinear. This action 
could result in committing a specification bias or specification error (Gujarati, 2003: 364) that 
compromises the integrity of the model.  
The classical signs of serious multicollinearity are usually the combined existence of high 
model R2s with correspondingly insignificant regression coefficients as determined by 
conventional t-tests.  With these points in mind, the study will include both variables 
(TAXVALUE, and POPULATN) in the models and test for multicollinearity within the 
regressions by using more precise diagnostics such as the variance inflation factor. Since the 
sample data includes all of Florida municipalities with police departments,  the alternative 
available to correct serious signs of multicollinearity would be to discard the POPULATN or 
TAXVALUE variables.  
 
Multicollinearity and the Variance Inflation Factor 
 
 As discussed, an examination of the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient matrixes revealed 
moderate to strong correlations between the control variables POPULATN and TAXVALUE.  
Upon further consideration, a moderate to strong correlation between these two variables  would 
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not be surprising. As the population within a city increases, it would be expected that the 
assessed value of all properties within the city would increase to accommodate the increased 
population. More housing would be required to house the additional residents, which would add 
value to the tax base.  However, this increase is neither corresponding in amount nor consistently 
related. A growing community may experience much greater growth in commercial property 
compared to residential property. The increased commercial growth may be designed to attract 
trade from surrounding communities as well. Moreover, the change in value with population may 
vary greatly according to the type of housing and recreational facilities constructed to 
accommodate the population growth. One community may construct a marina or golf course 
while another community of the same size in population may have vacant, undeveloped land. 
The resultant value of properties within the two communities, although having the same size 
population, may be very different in their assessed amounts. Both variables, POPULATN and 
TAXVALUE thus have unique contributions to the models.  
The control variable POPULATN does not represent the relative ability of the community 
to pay for greater expenditures since some communities have considerably greater resources 
available than similarly sized communities. In addition, the control variable TAXVALUE does 
not accurately indicate the number of people living within the jurisdiction, and the accompanying 
needs of a larger population. Larger populations create dynamics that generate greater need for 
increased  law enforcement that are unrelated to the combined wealth of the community. Thus, in 
the case of this study, a very real danger of misspecification exists with the common 
multicollinearity remedy of discarding a variable that exhibits a possible, approximate linear 





Table 11. Collinearity Statistics for the Significant Models* 
Coefficientsa
13.502 .439 30.789 .000
.498 .104 .178 4.780 .000 .784 1.275
1.29E-10 .000 .223 3.301 .001 .238 4.204
1.34E-02 .004 .164 3.406 .001 .468 2.135
-2.0E-02 .005 -.185 -4.327 .000 .591 1.691
1.63E-02 .005 .149 3.309 .001 .536 1.864
7.69E-06 .000 .253 3.279 .001 .182 5.481
.608 .138 .168 4.396 .000 .738 1.354
2.33E-05 .000 .071 1.844 .066 .725 1.379



















t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics




13.249 .452 29.288 .000
.550 .108 .191 5.110 .000 .784 1.275
1.29E-10 .000 .218 3.216 .001 .238 4.204
1.28E-02 .004 .152 3.139 .002 .468 2.135
-2.0E-02 .005 -.183 -4.255 .000 .591 1.691
1.65E-02 .005 .147 3.244 .001 .536 1.864
8.02E-06 .000 .257 3.315 .001 .182 5.481
.632 .143 .170 4.427 .000 .738 1.354
2.37E-05 .000 .071 1.817 .070 .725 1.379



















t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: LPER$a. 
 
Coefficientsa
11.885 .484 24.582 .000
.296 .115 .106 2.575 .011 .784 1.275
1.55E-10 .000 .269 3.618 .000 .238 4.204
1.81E-02 .004 .220 4.157 .000 .468 2.135
-2.1E-02 .005 -.195 -4.130 .000 .591 1.691
1.32E-02 .005 .120 2.427 .016 .536 1.864
5.67E-06 .000 .186 2.192 .029 .182 5.481
.522 .153 .145 3.424 .001 .738 1.354
2.18E-05 .000 .067 1.569 .118 .725 1.379



















t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics





TAXVALUE is not an exact linear relationship, being below .9 in Pearson’s correlation value. 
Linear relationships between variables are usually either approximate or exact (Kennedy, 2001:  
184). Exact refers to changes at identical rates between two variables. Approximate linear 
relationship refers to similar changes between two variables which can lead to estimating  
problems. A more detailed examination of the nature of the relationship between TAXVALUE 
and POPULATN is required. Also required is an assessment of the degree of possible 
multicollinearity and an accompanying evaluation of the effects, if any, such a relationship has  
on the entire model. The results of such an examination will determine the necessary remedial 
action, if one is necessary.  
A more precise collinearity diagnostic, the variance inflation factor test, was utilized to 
determine whether or not multicollinearity was a serious problem in the models.  The  SPSS 
statistical package provides collinearity diagnostics upon demand concurrent with the execution 
of regression analysis. These diagnostics were invoked during regressions of  the tentative 
models and the results reproduced in Table 10.  Since the fourth model, which regressed on the 
dependent variable CAPOUT$ (capital outlays), never achieved significance, the results of this 
model are discussed separately.  
 The three significant models (LTTLPOL$, LPER$, and LOPEX$) display variance 
inflation factors of 5.481 for the control variable POPULATN. The variance inflation factors for 
the control variable TAXVALUE in these models are at 4.204, which is acceptable.  As a rule of 
thumb, if the variance inflation factor of a variable exceeds 10, that variable is said to be highly 
collinear (Gujarati, 2003: 362; Kennedy, 2001: 190). Both POPULATN and TAXVALUE 
exhibit variance inflation factors below 10. However, some scholars suggest that 
multicollinearity may exist for variance inflation factor values greater than 5. The control 
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variable POPULATN is well below the common threshold of 10, and slightly above the more 
conservative threshold of 5. 
Kennedy (2001: 184) notes that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator in the 
presence of multicollinearity remains unbiased and may still be the best linear unbiased 
estimator. Kennedy also points out that the major undesirable consequence of multicollinearity is 
that the variances of the OLS estimates of the parameters of the collinear variables may be quite 
large (Kennedy, 2001: 184). In the case of both POPULATN and TAXVALUE, the variances 
are not great enough to warrant remedial action. The standard errors are extremely small for both 
variables, and result in significant t statistics greater than 2 in value. The classic results of serious 
multicollinearity are high R2 and insignificant t statistics (less than approximately 2 in numerical 
value).   Kennedy (2001: 187) quotes a rule of thumb which states that if the t statistics are 
greater than 2, multicollinearity is not a cause of concern.  
 Considerations that dismiss multicollinearity as a concern in the study’s models are: the 
variance inflation factors for all the variables are far below the usual multicollinearity threshold 
value of 10; only one variable (POPULATN) is just slightly above the most conservative 
multicollinearity threshold value of 5;  all of the variables within the models are significant 
except for CRIMERT1 in the very last regression of the last model;  the surviving models are 
significant; and there is no better linear unbiased estimator available to control for community 
wealth. Remedial transformation or omission of the POPULATN variable would be unnecessary 






Regression Results - Hypotheses Testing 
 
 Ordinary least squares (OLS) was used to test the four hypotheses of the study. This 
methodology is consistent with, and therefore comparable to the models presented in the 
literature. In addition, ordinary least squares is also a common procedure with which most 
scholars are familiar.  The four separate categories of expenditures become regressands in the 
four separate models, and as such are the dependent variables. The independent variable of 
concern, UNION, denotes the presence of unionization within each sample. As a regressor, 
UNION will provide the basis for testing each hypothesis. Significance of this variable in the 
models will provide evidence that unionization does indeed impact the dependent variable(s), 
and cause, on the average, increases in police department expenditures.   
 
The First Hypothesis 
 
The first model in the study tests to determine whether or not unionization increases total 
police expenditures. The regression results will indicate whether or not there is evidence that 
unions have the ability to increase police expenditures in general for municipalities in a right-to-
work state such as Florida.  It is expected that the statistical (or null) hypothesis will be rejected 
and evidence provided to support to research hypothesis:  
H01:  There is no difference in total police expenditures between communities with police union 
representation, and those communities without police union representation. 
 
HA1:  There are greater levels of total police expenditures in cities with police union 
representation, compared with those cities without police union representation.  
 
Table 12 presents the results of nine separate regressions that begin with a simple bivariate 
model and concludes with a multivariate model consisting of nine variables that represent the 
demographic, the finance-based, and the law enforcement factor variables entered 
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Table 12. OLS General Fund Regressions for natural log of total police expenditures in Florida municipalities  
 
 
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis 
            *      Significant at .10 
            **    Significant at .05 
            ***  Significant at .01 
 
General Fund OLS Standardized Coefficient Values for LTTLPOL$ 
            
Regression           Variables 
Standardized Coefficients 
Beta 
       9                    UNION 
                             TAXVALUE          
                             LANDAREA 
                              OWNHOME 
                             EDUCATN 
                             POPULATN 
                             MSA 
                             CRIMERT1 






















































































CRIMERT1        - - - - - - - 2.608E-05** 2.328E-05* 
(.000) (.000) 
CSECLR1          - - - - - - - - -7.856E-03***
(.003) 
Adjusted R2 .244         .597 .632 .651 .673 .688 .713 .716 .723
N  257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 
 166
 
singly to observe and test the significance of the impact the union variable has upon the 
dependent variable, total police expenditures. UNION remains consistently significant across all 
nine regressions. The final nine-variable regression model is very strong with an adjusted R2 of 
.723. In this particular model, all of the control variables are also significant. The contribution of 
each of these variables to the model will be discussed in a later section.  
The slopes of the coefficients (or unstandardized coefficients values) do not provide a 
basis with which the relative strengths of the independent or control variables can be determined 
because of the differences in the absolute values of the respective variables. To determine which 
independent/control variable has the greatest impact upon the dependent variable, standardized 
coefficients (or betas) are calculated with the sole intent to compare relative values to determine 
which independent or control variable has the greatest impact upon the dependent variable. A 
standardizing measure is used to render a statistic capable of determining the relative strengths 
among a field of independent and control variables. Standardized coefficients (or betas) are the 
measure of the change in the dependent variable by a unit of change in the independent variable 
when both are measured in terms of standard deviation units (Gujarati, 2003: 174; Berman, 2002: 
129). This process thus standardizes the measures so that coefficients for the variables can be 
compared in an identical format. Since the coefficients can have either positive or negative 
values, the absolute value of the standardized coefficients (betas) are used in comparative 
analysis so that a variable with a standardized coefficient of -6 has greater impact upon the 
dependent variable than a variable with a standardized coefficient value of +2. The greater the 




The standardized coefficients (or betas), which measure the relative “weight” or influence 
on the dependent variable in the model as compared to all other variables within the model, 
indicate that the presence of a union within the community has greater impact on police 
expenditures than all but three other variables (see inset table to Table 12). The relative values of 
the standardized coefficients suggest that unionization in a municipality has greater influence on 
police expenditures than: the size of the community in square miles; the level of education in the 
community; whether or not the city is part of an metropolitan statistical area; the crime rate in 
most situations; and the effectiveness of law enforcement in the community.  
In the semi-log model specified to test the hypothesis, the dependent variable appears in 
log form and the independent and control variables appear in linear form. This type of semi-log 
model is commonly referred to as a “log-lin” model. The appearance of this type of model would 
appear thus: lnEXP = intercept + βiΧi in which βi is the unstandardized coefficient multiplied 
times the value of the variable, Χi. lnEXP is the natural logarithmic expression of expenditures. 
Once the arithmetic functions have been performed, that is the product of βi times the variable is 
added to the intercept, the final value is converted by an antilog to its actual value. The 
coefficient βi measures the relative change in the dependent variable for an absolute change in 
the value of the variable.  
In log-lin models, the coefficients of the independent variables can be multiplied by 100 
to indicate a percentage change in the dependent variable for an absolute change in the variable.  
The slope co-efficients therefore measure the relative change in the dependent variable for an 
absolute change in the independent and control variables. The exception to this rule of log-lin 
interpretation of coefficients is that of the dichotomous, or dummy variables. Because of the 
dichotomous nature of  these types of variables, interpretations of the coefficients for dummy 
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variables are different than those for continuous variables (Kennedy, 1981: 801; Halvorsen & 
Palmquist, 1980: 474). Instead of the coefficients being converted to the percentage change value 
in the dependent variable by simply multiplying the value by 100, dummy variables first require 
a logarithmic operation to interpret the percent change in the dependent variable. Kennedy 
(2001: 108) states that percent change in Y (%∆Y)  is equal to the base of the natural log raised 
to the power of the coefficient value for the dummy variable and then subtracting the value of 1 
(eβ – 1). Thus the formula can be written out as: %∆Y = eβ – 1. Then the change in the dependent 
variable expressed in percentage form can be obtained by multiplying the result of the 
logarithmic operation (eβ – 1) by 100. 
In the first model, the percentage change in the dependent variable can be interpreted to 
be the result of e.498 – 1 or .64543 since the coefficient value for UNION in the last regression is 
.498. With the field of variables in the final regression of the first model, the coefficient for the 
variable UNION (.498) indicates that unionization in a police department of a city in Florida 
could cause a relative change (increase) in police expenditures of  64.5% using the Kennedy 
formula. This result is consistent with the findings of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2004d) 
which stated that the median weekly earnings for non-union employees in the protective services 
category is only 60% that of union employees in the same category. In addition, at least one 
study (Zax, 1989: 21) uncovered evidence that there were higher employment per capita ratios in 
bargaining units as compared to non-bargaining units. This increases costs further, as would 
supplemental pay benefits in unionized departments. Zhao and Lovrich (1997: 511) determined 
that the existence of collective bargaining in large police agencies was significantly correlated 
with the presence of supplemental pay benefits favorable to police officers. Finally, “roll-up” 
costs, or additional costs incurred by raising base compensation rates also rise with the increase 
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in wages (Carrell & Heavrin, 2004: 306). These costs include such items as the employer’s social 
security contributions, the employer’s unemployment insurance contributions, overtime pay, 
shift premiums, contribution to pension plans, and life insurance premiums in some instances. 
The first model, which features the dependent variable as the natural log of total police 
expenditures, provides evidence that unionization within a Florida municipality has a positive 
(increasing) effect on police department expenditures. The statistical or null hypothesis was thus 
rejected in the first model, and the research hypothesis received support. Cities in Florida, a 
right-to-work state, exhibit similar effects on police department expenditures as the cities in other 
states reported in the literature. 
 
The Second Hypothesis 
 
The second model in the study tests to determine whether or not unionization increases 
personal services expenses.  The first set of regressions produced evidence that overall police 
expenditures were affected by unionization. In the effort to understand which categories of 
expenditures are affected by unionization, additional models are required to test hypotheses that 
examine the three separate categories of expenditures. The first of these categories are personal 
services expenditures, which are primarily salaries. As in the case of the first hypothesis, it is 
expected that the statistical (or null) hypothesis will be rejected and evidence provided to support 
the research hypothesis:  
H02:  There is no difference in levels of police expenditures for personal services between 
communities with police union representation and those communities without police union 
representation. 
 
HA2:  There are greater levels of police expenditures for personal services in cities with  police 
union representation compared with those cities without police union representation.
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Table 13. OLS General Fund Regressions for natural log of personal services expenditures in Florida municipalities  
 
 
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis 
            *      Significant at .10 
            **    Significant at .05 
            ***  Significant at .01 
 
 
 General Fund OLS Standardized Coefficient Values for LPER$ 
 
Regression            Variables 
Standardized Coefficients 
Beta 
        9                   UNION 
                             TAXVALUE          
                             LANDAREA 
                              OWNHOME 
                             EDUCATN 
                             POPULATN 
                             MSA 
                             CRIMERT1 






















































































CRIMERT1        - - - - - - - 2.654E-05** 2.367E-05* 
(.000) (.000) 
CSECLR1          - - - - - - - - -8.061E-03**
(.003) 
Adjusted R2 .253         .597 .629 .648 .669 .685 .710 .713 .720
N  257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 
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 Table 13 displays the results of the nine regressions that test the hypothesis to determine 
whether unionization causes increased police personal services expenditures in cities with police 
union representation. As in the first model and the subsequent models, the regression sequence 
begins with a simple regression on expenditures by the independent variable of concern, 
UNION, as the regressor. A total of eight control variables, each controlling for factors that  
influence police expenditure amounts, enter the model to remove bias and test the significance of 
the independent variable of concern. The results for the second set of regressions are similar to 
those in the first model, with the variable UNION retaining significance throughout the series of 
regressions. However, the effect of UNION upon personal services expenditures is slightly 
greater than with total police expenditures.  
Table 13 reveals that the coefficient value for UNION in the final regression of the 
second model is significant with a value of .550. The percentage change in the dependent 
variable, police personal services expenditures can be determined by using the by using the 
formula for the logarithmic conversion of the coefficient of a dummy variable to percentage 
(%∆Y = eβ – 1, or e.550 – 1 = .73325).  In the final semi-log regression for the second model, the 
independent variable, UNION, is responsible for up to a 73% increase in personal services 
expenditures over police departments not unionized. The extent to which union affects personal 
services expenditures depends, of course, upon the size of the city and other factors.  
The standardized coefficient for the independent variable also gained strength relative to 
the field of variables. In the first model, the UNION standardized coefficient was fourth in 
overall strength among the nine variables. In this, the second, model the standardized coefficient 
for UNION rises to third place, and is only surpassed in relative influence by the 
disproportionately strong variables POPULATN and TAXVALUE.  
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Although the static coefficient values of both POPULATN and TAXVALUE are 
considerably less than that of UNION, statistical measurement is not based on static values but 
the combined values present across all samples in the data set. While the UNION coefficient may 
have a static value of .550 in the second model, the value is only pertinent and extant 
approximately 57.98% of the time (the value expressed as the mean of the summed values of 
either 1 or 0 for 257 cities). So while in 57.98% of the cases the UNION coefficient produces a 
real value (being multiplied by the variable value of 1), the remainder of the time it produces no 
value added amount to the dependent variable because the coefficient is multiplied by a variable 
value of 0. The POPULATN and TAXVALUE coefficients consistently yield values across the 
entire range of the samples because in no case is the variable value 0. The range of POPULATN 
variable values is between a low of 320 and a maximum of 364,389 as described in Table 5. In 
addition, the logarithmic added values for UNION never exceed .550, but the logarithmic added 
values for POPULATN can go as high as 8.018E-06 x 364,389 or 2.92167. In log terms, this 
effect of POPULATN is slightly more than 5 times as great as UNION (2.92167/0.550 = 5.31) 
on the dependent variable. Converted from natural logarithm values to whole values, however, 
the effect (contribution of the size of the population to the dependent variable) is approximately 
10 times as strong in the larger city.   
The increase in standardized coefficient values in the personal services expenditure 
model would seem appropriate since the unstandardized coefficient or slope of the UNION 
variable is greater in the second model than in the first. The explanation for this situation is that 
unions impact police personal services expenditures at a greater rate than police total 
expenditures. This intuitive conclusion is somewhat supported by the empirical evidence of the 
literature which emphatically reports that unions tend to increase wages and benefits. Zhao and 
 173
 
Lovrich (1997) found that collective bargaining in large police agencies resulted in increased 
supplemental pay. Zax (1988) attributed the increases of city expenditures to negotiated higher 
salaries. Further support for the observation emerges from subsequent models in this study.  
The final nine-variable regression model for personal services expenditures shows a very strong 
adjusted R2 value (.720) for the entire model. As with the first model, the control variables and 
the independent variable all remain significant. Again, explanations for the impact of the control 
variables will follow the discussion on the results of hypotheses testing. With UNION having a 
significant t-statistic in a model displaying a very strong adjusted R2 accompanied by significant 
control variables’ t-statistics, the statistical (null) hypothesis is rejected in this model, and the 
second research hypothesis subsequently receives support from the regression findings. The  
second model, using personal services expenditures as a dependent variable, offers strong 
evidence that unions play an important role in police personal services expenditures in Florida.  
 
The Third Hypothesis 
 
The third model in the study uses ordinary least squares procedures to determine whether 
or not unionization increases police operating expenses. The second of the three expenditure 
categories, police operating expenses accounts for such items as fuel for vehicles, utilities, 
supplies, and other purchases that support the law enforcement activities of a city. Since unions 
influence working conditions within their environs, it is anticipated that police operating 
expenses will be greater in unionized departments than in non-unionized departments. As with 
the first two hypotheses, it is expected that the statistical (or null) hypothesis will be rejected and 
evidence provided to support the research hypothesis:  
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H03:  There is no difference in levels of police operating expenses expenditures between cities 
with police union representation and those cities without police union representation. 
 
HA3:  There are greater levels of police operating expenses expenditures in cities with police 
union representation and those cities without police union representation. 
 
Table 14 presents the results of the nine regressions that culminate in the final nine-variable 
model. Once again the independent variable, UNION, exhibits significance throughout the nine 
regressions which gradually inject controls into the model one variable at a time. The third model 
uses 257 samples, the same as the previous two models, as a result of partially inaccurate 
reporting on the part of a municipality in Florida. The R2 of the third model expresses a value of 
.663, which places the third model in the very strong model (highest model category) category, 
along with the first two models. R2 values above .40 are considered strong, while R2 values 
above .65 are considered very strong (Berman, 2002: 122).  
In a manner similar to the first two models, the independent variable, UNION, remains 
statistically significant throughout all nine regressions of the third model. The natural log of 
police operating expenses acts as the dependent variable in this series. The final nine-variable 
regression model yields a UNION slope coefficient of .296, which can be interpreted to mean 
that the presence of unionization is responsible for a 34.4% increase (e.296 – 1 = .34447) in police 
operating expenditures for municipalities in Florida. Although manifesting a considerably 
smaller impact on operating expenses than on personal services expenditures, the model suggests 
that unionization causes substantial increases in police operating expenses.  
The influence of the UNION independent variable perceptively downgrades in 
comparison with the control variables. In the second model (personal services expenses as the 
dependent variable), the independent variable was third in overall influence with respect to the 
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Table 14. OLS General Fund Regressions for natural log of police operating expense expenditures in Florida municipalities  
 
 
Notes: Standard error in nthesis  pare
            *      Significant at .10 
            **    Significant at .05 
            ***  Significant at .01 
 
General Fund OLS Standardized Coefficient Values for LOPEX$ 
 
Regression            Variables 
Standardized Coefficients 
Beta 
       9                    UNION 
                             TAXVALUE          
                             LANDAREA 
                              OWNHOME 
                             EDUCATN 
                             POPULATN 
                             MSA 
                             CRIMERT1 






















































































CRIMERT1        - - - - - - - 2.416E-05* 2.184E-05 
(.000) (.000) 
CSECLR1          - - - - - - - - -6.512E-03**
(.003) 
Adjusted R2 .170         .545 .592 .617 .631 .639 .656 .659 .663
N          257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257
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eight other variables. In the third model (police operating expenses), the standardized coefficient 
for UNION drops to seventh place in the field of nine variables, surpassing only crime rate and 
cases cleared in terms of impact on the dependent variable. Although UNION’s strength of 
influence is not as great in the third model as it is in the second model (with personal services 
expenditures as the dependent variable), the independent variable’s influence on operating 
expenses is very strong.  
Since UNION manifested a significant t-statistics in a model which displayed a very 
strong R2 and significant t-statistics in the control variables, the statistical (null) hypothesis is 
rejected in this model, and the third research hypothesis receives support from the regression 
findings. The third model, using operating expenses expenditures as a dependent variable, offers 
strong evidence that unions influence police operating expenses expenditures in Florida 
municipalities. 
 
The Fourth Hypothesis 
 
The fourth and final model relies on ordinary least squares methodology to determine 
whether or not unions influence increase capital outlay expenditures in Florida cities. The third 
and last of the three police expenditure categories, capital outlays include such equipment as 
police vehicles, computers and computer systems, as well as other capital equipment usually 
costing over $1000. It was predicted that unions, having voice in expenditure decisions in 
personal services and operating expenses expenditures, would also influence capital outlay 
expenditures. Similar in fashion to the first three hypotheses, it was expected that the statistical 
(or null) hypothesis will be rejected and evidence provided to support the research hypothesis:  
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H04:  There is no difference in levels of police capital outlay expenditures between cities with 
police union representation and those cities without police union representation. 
 
HA4:  There are greater levels of police capital outlay expenditures in cities with police union 
representation and those cities without police union representation. 
 
 After conducting the bivariate correlation using Pearson’s Correlations Coefficient (see 
Table 9), it was immediately apparent that the association between unionization and police 
capital outlay expenditures was not as strong as in the other models. Subsequent multivariate 
regressions, which test for causality, did not provide evidence for a significantly strong 
relationship between unionization and capital outlay expenditures. Although in simple regression 
the independent variable UNION demonstrated a significant t-statistic (see Table 15), UNION 
failed to demonstrate a robust relationship with the dependent variable in the presence of 
numerous control variables (see Table 15 summary and Tables E1 through E10 in Appendix E). 
As strong control variables (such as TAXVALUE and POPULATN) were added to the model, 
UNION ceased to exhibit significant t-statistics. Moreover, the standardized coefficient for 
UNION dropped to second last place in influence among the field of nine variables and the 
unstandardized coefficient ultimately produced erratic values in the regression series (see inset 
table in Table 15). 
 Model 4 at no time in the nine regressions achieved an adjusted R2 greater than .140, 
even after all nine variables had been inserted into the model. The collinearity statistics produced 
no greater VIF values than in the previous three models, so the insignificant results can not be 
attributed to serious multicollinearity. The control variables that exhibited an inverse relationship 
continued that inverse relationship in the fourth model that they manifested in previous models, 
but the results for OWNHOME was not robust in the field of the nine independent/control 
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Notes: Standard error in nthesis  pare
            *      Significant at .10 
            **    Significant at .05 
            ***  Significant at .01 
 
General Fund OLS Standardized Coefficient Values for LOPEX$ 
 
Regression            Variables 
Standardized Coefficients 
Beta 
       9                    UNION 
                             TAXVALUE          
                             LANDAREA 
                              OWNHOME 
                             EDUCATN 
                             POPULATN 
                             MSA 
                             CRIMERT1 






















































































CRIMERT1        - - - - - - - 2.829E-05 2.621E-05 
(.000) (.000) 
CSECLR1          - - - - - - - - -5.952E-03***
(.006) 
Adjusted R2 .015         .060 .113 .112 .136 .140 .138 .139 .139
N  236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 
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variables.  LANDAREA, EDUCATN, and CSECLR1 were the only control variables that 
retained significant t-statistics in the final, nine variable regression model. Further testing with 
other different variables would be necessary to determine whether or not these results are 
spurious or genuine.   
  The study then conducted multivariate regression for capital outlays using a different data 
set than the General Fund Data.  The data set was that of the Total Memo values recorded by the 
Florida Department of Financial Services as the total amount spent by the city in a specific object 
class. The Total memo amounts include not only totals from the general funds but also include 
totals from all other funds such as grants-in-aid and special revenue funds. Under usual 
situations, unions would have little influence over these funds. This information not 
withstanding, multivariate regression was nonetheless performed with the Total Memo data.   
Results of the regression on Total Memo data, as expected, provided no evidence that unions had 
influence over capital outlay expenditures.  
 Variables within regression models interact with each other as well as with the intercept 
(constant) and the dependent variable. This interactive effect causes more than just the relative 
values of the dependent variable and the intercept to change as additional variables are added to 
the model. The interactive effect present in regressions occurs throughout the model so that even 
the relative values of the control and independent variables coefficients change as well. In the 
regressions portrayed by Table 15, the interactive effect of added control variables cause the 
coefficient values of the independent variable to degenerate since the independent variable’s 
strength of influence is not substantial enough to exist amidst the influences of other variables 
within the model. This not only causes the independent variable’s standardized coefficient (beta) 
to decrease, but it also causes the significance of the t-statistic to degrade. The result of this 
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effect upon the independent variable yields evidence that the independent variable, while it may 
have some relationship with the dependent variable, does not display significant causal value. 
 Since capital outlays are used to purchase expensive equipment such as computers and 
patrol vehicles, many communities have well defined purchasing policies and schedules to 
acquire this capital equipment. As discussed in the literature review, some Florida communities 
such as The City of Longwood have two year vehicle replacement policies while others such as 
The City of Orlando have a five year vehicle replacement policy. The regression results suggest 
that these policies appear to be less sensitive to union influence as compared to other 
expenditures such as staffing, salaries, supplies, and other less expensive equipment. Another 
possibility is that purchasing policies involving capital outlays are subject to union influence but 
only over a period of years rather than immediately apparent in a single fiscal year. Cross 
sectional studies such as this study would fail to capture evidence of that influence. Longitudinal 
studies are better suited to measure this type of influence over an extended period of time.  
 Based on cross sectional data, this study’s regression analysis provides no 
supporting evidence to support the rationale or theory that unions impact police capital outlay 
expenditures in Florida. The independent variable of concern, UNION, failed to generate 
significant t-statistics in the final model, and the statistical (null) hypothesis can not be rejected 
in this model. The fourth and final model, using capital outlay expenditures as a dependent 








Regression Results – Control Variables 
 
 Table 16 presents the results of each of the final significant models. In the presence of 
control variables, the independent variable of concern, UNION remained robust for three of the 
four models. However, the contribution of the control variables to the models in some cases far 
surpasses that of the independent variable. A log-lin model which states the dependent variable 
in logarithmic form and the independent/control variables in linear form presents some difficulty 
in interpretation. Generally the coefficient values are quite small in this model, especially if the 
values of the variables are very large.  However, since heteroscedasticity necessitated the use of 
logarithmic form for the dependent variable, the models’ format was inevitable. In the effort to 
simplify interpretation, however, the study endeavored to retain the independent/control variable 
data in their original, untransformed values. 
 TAXVALUE, which was understandably one of the strongest variables in the model, also 
displays the smallest coefficient values. This situation exists because the variable consists of data 
that uses the dollar as the absolute unit value. The variable represents the total assessed taxable 
value of a community. As noted in the discussion of the descriptive statistics, these values range 
up to over $15.6 billion in the taxable value of a community.  While dichotomous variables such 
as UNION lend themselves to readily understandable percentages in semi-log models, large 
quantity continuous variables such as total taxable values are not readily appreciable. In the case 
of the UNION variable, an affirmative, or unitary value for this dichotomous variable in Model 1 
indicates that the presence of unions generate up to 64.5% (e.498 – 1) of increased total police 
expenditures since the value of the coefficient in the model equals .498 (see Table 12). The same 
method of interpretation is slightly different of the large quantity continuous variables, and in the 
case of these variables, the absolute values vary much more than that of either the two values of 
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Table 16. The three surviving, significant models for police expenditures. 
 
 



















































































Adjusted R2 .723 .720 .663 
 
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
            *     Significant at .10 
            **   Significant at .05 




0 or 1 as it does in the UNION variable. As discussed, in the case of TAXVALUE, the absolute 
value is expressed in dollars. Thus for each single additional dollar of taxable property, the 
percentage change in the expenditures of the dependent variable is (in the same first model as the 
above example of UNION) 1.285E-10 percent, or the number 1285 proceeded by nine zeroes 
after a decimal point. While this may seem very small at first glance, when used in terms of total 
value, the change is very dramatic between cities such as Tampa with taxable values over $16.5 
billion as compared to much smaller cities such as Greensboro with a total taxable value of $6.6 
million or 1/2500 the taxable value of Tampa.   
TAXVALUE is the second most influential variable in the first two models with 
standardized coefficients of .223 and .218 in Models 1 and 2 respectively (see inset tables to 
Tables 12 and 13). In the third model, TAXVALUE becomes the most influential variable, 
surpassing even the impact of POPULATN on the dependent variable. As the value of property 
increases in a municipality, the need for increased police protection escalates as well. Additional 
commercial property and residential property would require additional law enforcement services 
such as surveillance on the part of the police department.  In addition, TAXVALUE represents 
the wherewithal of a municipality to fund law enforcement services. Two similarly sized cities in 
terms of populations may have differing tax bases upon which to finance law enforcement. Cities 
with relatively higher taxable value property levels have greater discretion in expenditures than 
similar sized cities with lower taxable values. Gely and Chandler (1993a: 300) used a per capita 
tax revenue based variable, TAXBASE, in a category they dubbed “ability to pay.” The variable 
exhibited significant effects upon the dependent variables in the field of other control variables 
throughout Gely and Chandler’s (1993a: 302) models. The present research, using similar 
rationale but a different data format, experienced similar results. The total taxable value of a 
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community is a major consideration in determining what levels of police expenditures are 
possible and desired.  
 An indication of the importance of TAXVALUE is evident in the relative adjusted R2 
values in the model before and after TAXVALUE is entered into the model. The adjusted R2 
values specify to what degree the combined influences of the variables in the model explains 
increases in the dependent variable. The R2 values are “adjusted” to offset the tendency of the R2 
values to increase methodically as additional variables are entered. This adjustment results in a 
more accurate assessment of the model’s explanatory value. R2 values below 0.20 are considered 
weak, between .020 and 0.40 moderate, above 0.40 are considered strong, and above 0.65 are 
considered very strong (Berman, 2002: 122). 
Between the first two regressions of Models 1 and 2, the adjusted R2 more than doubles 
in value (from .244 and .253 to .597) with the entry of TAXVALUE. Between the first and 
second regressions in the third model, the adjusted R2 more than triples in value (.170 to .545). 
The entry of the control variable TAXVALUE into the models elevates the adjusted R2 values 
into the category of strong models.  
The models indicate that total taxable property values become a more influential 
determinant than population in terms of the amounts spent on operating expenses.  This suggests 
that either quantity and/or quality of equipment, services, and supplies increase proportionate to 
increases in total taxable property values in a community. In practical terms, a city with higher 
assessed property values apparently can and does purchase better weaponry or more weaponry, 
supplies and services for their police department than a similar sized city with lower assessed 
property values.  
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LANDAREA represents the size, in square miles, of the city. The rationale for use of this 
variable is the assumption that a larger geographical area would require additional resources to 
patrol greater distances than cities of a similar size population with a smaller geographical area.  
This control variable retains significant t-statistics throughout the models. Although the 
standardized coefficient for this variable ranks sixth in relative strength in the first two models, 
the same statistic increases dramatically in the third model as indicated in Tables 12 through 14. 
In the third model (police operating expenses), the standardized coefficient for LANDAREA 
rises in relative strength rankings of the nine independent/control variables from sixth to second 
place. This is consistent with the assumptions of the variable’s role in the model. Greater 
distances within cities results in increased use of fuel and maintenance costs for patrol vehicles, 
which in turn raises police operating expenditures. Only the more influential control variable, 
TAXVALUE, displays a greater proportionate impact on police operating expenses than 
LANDAREA in the third model, which features operating expenses as the dependent variable. 
The LANDAREA variable has a regression coefficient of 1.809E-02 in the third model, which 
indicates that each additional 5 square miles causes a one percent increase in police operating 
expenses, with all other factors remaining constant. 
OWNHOME, or percentage of owner occupied housing, emerges as the first of only two 
control variables in the models that manifest an inverse relationship with the dependent 
variables. Witt (1990: 171) encountered the same inverse relationship in his research and 
concluded that homeowners were more sensitive to property tax rates than renters and would 
attempt to reduce these taxes, which would be reflected in expenditure levels. While there is 
merit to this conclusion, this study believes that the inverse relationship may also be the result of 
proportionately lower crimes in areas of high home ownership. Perceptively lower levels of 
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crime would be accompanied by relative decreases in police expenditures. A study for the 
Orange County Sheriff’s Office revealed that apartment complexes generate more than double 
the number of law enforcement calls for service than single family units which are 
predominantly owner occupied (Duncan Associates, 1998: 14). 
Regression results suggest that as the OWNHOME percentages increase, police 
expenditures decrease. The alternate inverse relationship is true as well. As the percentage of 
owner occupied housing decreases, police expenditures increase. The higher law enforcement 
calls for service in rental communities require additional staffing, equipment, and supplies. 
Increased levels of expenditures are thus needed to provide proportionately greater levels of 
service to rental communities. The OWNHOME influence on police expenditures is substantial 
as evidenced by the high standardized coefficients in all three of the models. In models one and 
three, the standardized coefficient for OWNHOME ranks third in strength among the variables, 
while in the second model OWNHOME is fourth. Since the standardized coefficients for 
OWNHOME are fairly stable in relative values throughout the models, the variation in the 
standardized beta values for OWNHOME appears to be more as a result of greater changes in the 
other control variables rather than due to a phenomenon of the OWNHOME variable. Witt 
(1990: 171) found that his variable for the percentage of owner occupied housing was one of the 
two most influential variables that impacted police budgets. Witt, however, used a different 
combination of control variables in his models, and did not study the impact of unionization 
upon the dependent variables. These variations in model specification produced only a slight 
dissimilarity from the present study for the relative weight of  the owner occupied housing in 
terms of standardized coefficients. 
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Although near the bottom of rankings among the standardized coefficients within the 
regressions, EDUCATN nonetheless displayed significant t-statistics throughout all four models. 
This observation suggests that education is a positive  factor in municipal police expenditures. 
The greater the percentage of residents with a high school education in a municipality, the more 
likely that police expenditures will be higher in that community than in cities with fewer high 
school graduates. This study is not without outside corroborating evidence regarding the effect of 
education upon police expenditures. Chandler and Gely (1995: 301) linked the percentage of 
residents with a high school education in a community with the wages of police and firefighters. 
In their studies, a variable representing the level of education was found to be a statistically 
significant contributor to the level of police and firefighter wages.  
POPULATN, the number of residents within a community, yields the most dramatic 
influence on the dependent variables in two of the three significant models. Only in the case of 
police operating expenses are other factors more influential than POPULATN in determining the 
levels of police expenditures. In the third model, POPULATN drops to fourth place after the 
control variables of TAXVALUE, LANDAREA, and OWNHOME. For total police expenditures 
and in personal services expenditures, POPULATN is unquestionably the most important factor 
determining financial outlays. An unstandardized coefficient of 7.689E-06 in the total police 
expenditures model can be interpreted to mean that each additional 10,000 people raise police 
department spending by more than 7.689%. over current levels, holding all other factors 
constant. Moreover, since the absolute value of the variable in expressed in the number of 
people, comparable present levels of police expenditures increase dramatically according to 
population.  The more people in a community, the greater the need for law enforcement 
resources in that community.  
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Most of the empirical studies examining police expenditures included a variable to 
control for the effects of population. Numerous models using a population variable demonstrated 
statistical significance by the variable (Chandler & Gely, 1995: 314-316; Gely & Chandler,  
1995: 181; Gely & Chandler, 1993a: 302; Witt, 1990: 169-170; Valletta, 1989: 435). The 
omission of such a variable would undoubtedly result in a serious specification error that would 
render the model biased, because a significantly relevant value to the regression would be 
embedded in the error term.  
MSA is the second of two dichotomous variables in the model, UNION being the first. A 
unitary value for the MSA variable indicates that the community is within a Metropolitan 
Statistical Area of one type or another. A null value (0) for the value of the variable indicates that 
the municipality is not within a metropolitan statistical area of one type or another as designated 
by the Office of Management and Budget. The coefficient for the variable acts as a “value 
added” feature of the model which increases the value of the dependent variable if the 
community is within a metropolitan statistical area. A null value in the variable does not provide 
a value added amount to the model since the coefficient in this case is multiplied times zero, 
canceling out the coefficient’s original value. While most of the referenced empirical studies in 
the literature did not use such a variable, this study utilized the MSA control to separate the 
expenditure effects of similar sized cities in different environments. The only similar variable 
used empirically in the literature was found in Feuille and Delaney (1986: 232) to control for the 
effects of urbanized areas on police salaries.  
This study suggests that MSA may account for more than just the effect of urbanization 
on police salaries. “Spillover” effects from nearby cities in urbanized areas may require 
additional finances not needed by more isolated communities. These spillover effects include 
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factors such as increased traffic through cities included in the metropolitan statistical areas as a 
result of being adjacent to large “downtown” communities. Crime patterns borne of congested 
environs could possibly spread into adjoining areas, thus creating increased police expenditures 
to contain these undesirable characteristics. The response of increased police expenditures in 
these communities adjacent to or within urbanized areas may be based more upon the 
perceptions of the possibility of crime spreading than the actual experienced level of crime. 
Support for this observation springs from both the collinearity statistics and the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients expressed within the models. The collinearity statistics illustrated in 
Table 11 show very low values for the variance inflation factors related to MSA, which indicates 
that the variable’s influence on the dependent variable are independent of other influences within 
the model. The results of the collinearity diagnostics are further supported by the very low 
correlation coefficients found in the Tables 6 through 9 for MSA and other variables.  A very 
unique dynamism unrelated to other variables exists within the MSA variable. 
In all three models, MSA remained statistically significant and similarly weighted in 
terms of standardized coefficients. In the field of the nine variables, one independent and eight 
control, MSA was fifth in overall influence on the dependent variable as compared to the other 
variables in all three models. In Models 1 and 2, the MSA results, with unstandardized 
coefficient values of .608 and .632 respectively, indicate that a Floridian municipality in a 
metropolitan statistical area will spend, on the average, at least an additional 83% (e.608 – 1 = 
.83675) in total police and police personal services expenditures than a similar sized Floridian 
city that is more isolated from other urbanized areas. This influence remained strong for the 
police operating expenses model as well, with an MSA unstandardized coefficient of .522 in the 
final regression of Model 3. MSA was found to cause more than 68% (e.522 – 1 = .68539)  higher 
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police operating expense expenditures in Floridian cities in highly urbanized areas compared to 
their more isolated counterparts. Although a strong relationship between a city’s metropolitan 
statistical area category and expenditures was expected, the study’s findings of a very high 
degree of impact of the MSA category on police expenditures were not expected.  
Although statistically significant in all regressions save the last regression in Model 3, 
CRIMERTE1 ranked at the very bottom of the of the field of nine variables with respect to the 
comparative impacts on police expenditures as demonstrated by the standardized coefficient 
values. In Tables 12 through 14 between regressions 7 and 8, the contribution of explanatory 
ability to the models by CRIMERTE1 was the smallest of all the variables. This contribution, 
however is still positive and statistically significant. Although other studies (Witt, 1990: 169-
170; Schwochau, Feuille, & Delaney, 1988: 426; Feuille & Delaney, 1986: 232) have also used 
variables representing crime rate, only the study by Witt (1990: 169-170) found comparatively 
large standardized coefficients for crime rate as well as unstandardized coefficients that were 
statistically significant. Witt used crime rate as a control variable in models for: percent (of 
resources) allocated to police in which the variable was 4th in rank of comparative weight for a 
field of 7 variables as determined by standardized coefficients; and in per capita expenditures for 
police in which crime rate was actually first in overall influence on the dependent variable, again 
in a field of 7 variables. These variations in findings are likely due to the selection of variables in 
the model. Nonetheless, crime rate does apparently have some bearing on the relative levels of 
police expenditures. However, at the present time, it is uncertain whether the influence of crime 
rate on police expenditures is continuous over time or rather due to comparatively large increases 
in crime rates which then result in crime rate becoming a political issue. The subject merits 
additional study in future research. 
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CSECLR1, another law enforcement factor control variable, represents the effectiveness 
of the municipality’s police department given the existing resources at a certain point in time. In 
all three models, CSECLR1 displays significant t-statistics in the presence of eight other 
variables. Although the variable places eighth in terms of influence on the dependent variable as 
measured by standardized coefficients, the contributions of this variable to the models are 
positive and significant. The relationship of CSECLR1 with the dependent variable is an inverse 
relationship. As the number of cases cleared decline, expenditures rise. The variable measures 
the municipality’s ability to control crime. The results of the models suggest that if the resources 
available to law enforcement are inadequate, or possibly the police department is not as effective 
as are those of other jurisdictions, more resources will be diverted to police expenditures to 
control crime.  
The influence of CSECLR1 is slightly stronger in total police expenditures and police 
personal services expenditures than it is in police operating expenses. The unstandardized 
coefficients are -7.856E-03, -8.061E-03, and -6.512E-03 respectively in Models 1, 2, and 3. 
These results suggest that communities are sensitive to levels of staffing in situations where 
cases cleared either increase or decrease. Once it becomes apparent to a community that not as 
many cases of serious crime are being solved by police, the tendency may be to hire additional 
law enforcement officers to assist in apprehending felons in the community.  
The control variables present in the models have substantially removed a large degree of 
bias from the models as evidenced by the declining unstandardized coefficient values expressed 
in the independent variable of concern for each variable entered, as evidenced by the large 
number of control variables in the models, and as emphasized by the significant t-statistics for 
the variables. Yet despite the number of control variables used in the model, the independent 
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variable of concern, UNION, retains a strong presence as a significant causal factor in the levels 
of police expenditures. Moreover, the independent variable’s consistent significance in three 
different environs (total police expenditures, police personal service expenditures, and police 
operating expenses expenditures) provide very strong evidence that unionization of police 
departments dramatically affects resource allocations by local governments in Florida. These 
effects are not restricted to costs related to staffing and personnel alone but rather impact the day 
to day operations of police departments by increasing their annual operating expenses as well. 
The statistically supported evidence that unionization impacts more than one category of police 
expenditures has implications for local government in Florida. Although the effect of 
unionization on personnel costs should be emphasized since these costs are the most sensitive to 
police unionization, discussion of the fiscal effects of unionization on operating costs should also 
be made clear to public administrators involved in police employee labor relations management 
functions. Only with a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics inherent in police 
expenditures can public administrators in local government labor relations better serve their 
constituent public through exercising fiscal responsibility by more knowledgeably controlling 
costs.  
 
The Surviving Models 
 
 In Chapter III, four models were proposed that would satisfactorily control for a number 
of factors from three different variable dimensions, and demonstrate that employee voice 
(UNION) was a significant influence on police expenditures. Three of the models survived 
hypotheses testing and provided evidence that unionization impacts police expenditures. The 
fourth model, using capital outlays as the dependent variable, failed to provide such evidence. 
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The study’s qualitative research will attempt to explain why the fourth model failed, and uncover 
more information regarding the three surviving models. Table 16 presents the results of the 
surviving models. Despite the large field of control variables, the independent variable 
representing union voice (UNION) remains significant.  
The control variables (nearly all of which remained significant in the final models) 
accounted for many of the factors that impact police expenditures. The demographic dimension 
was represented by five variables (LANDAREA, OWNHOME, EDUCATN, POPULATN, and 
MSA) in the final models. Two demographic control variables (OVER65 and MAJRACE) failed 
to show a correlation with the dependent variables and thus were eliminated from the models. 
The finance dimension of control variables was represented by the TAXVALUE variable. 
Another variable proposed (MILLAGE) also failed to show correlation with the dependent 
variables and therefore was not used in the final models. The final dimension, law enforcement 
factors, was represented by two control variables (CRIMERT1 and CSECLR1) in the final 
models. The large field of control variables provides assurance that the independent variable of 
concern does not inherently contain unacceptable levels of bias through specification errors. The 
significance of the independent variable (UNION) within these types of model provides a 
compelling argument that employee voice, formalized by unionization, clearly is a force with 
which to be reckoned. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: QUALITATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
Introduction 
 
 In order to better understand the quantitative results and provide insight into the findings 
of this study’s research, various public administrators from seven different Florida municipalities 
were interviewed. The qualitative aspect of the study is by no means a comprehensive 
investigation, but rather was intended to augment the quantitative research and provide some 
understanding in an exploratory manner. The seven cities emerge from a much larger population 
of 257 cities, and the seven selected cities may not necessarily reflect the actions or issues 
associated with the much larger population of cities in Florida. Each city included in the 
qualitative portion of the study was selected as a result of certain defining characteristics of that 
city. These characteristics will be further described as the individual cities are discussed. Table 
17 lists the criteria used as a guide in selecting the cities to be included in the qualitative study. 
In most cases the combination of characteristics, based on the selective criteria and other 
considerations, determined the cities included in the qualitative study.  
In general terms, the cities selected for qualitative research presented a mix of regional 
areas within the state, a variety of population sizes, unionization status within the cities, in some 
cases demographic makeup, and other characteristics that might yield a more assorted sampling 
of municipalities. While qualitative research may not lend itself to control variables, an effort to 
vary sample elements will result in a more comprehensive understanding of the issues. A number 
of the factors that composed the control variables in the quantitative portion of the study would 
thus guide the qualitative portion of the study as well. The interview results would then emerge 




Table 17. Selection Criteria for Qualitative Interview 
 
• State Region 
o At least two cities each from: North Florida (North of State Road 40); Central 
Florida (Between State Road 40 and State Road 70); and South Florida (South of 
State Road 70). 
• City Size 
o At least one city from Uniform Crime Report City Groups I and II 
o At least three cities from Uniform Crime Report City Groups III and IV 
o At least two cities from Uniform Crime Report City Groups V and VI 
• Proximity to other Cities 
o At least three cities 30 miles or more from nearest city of 25,000+ population 
o At least three cities adjacent to cities with 25,000+ population 
• Union Status 
o At least four unionized departments 
 At least three different unions, including the two largest police unions in 
the state, Police Benevolent Association and the Fraternal Order of Police 
o At least two non-unionized departments 
• Income Inequality – Individuals Below Poverty Level 
o At least one city with at least 50% higher than national average (12.4%) 
percentage of individuals below poverty 
o At least one city with at least 50%  lower than national average percentage of 
individuals below poverty 
o At least two cities between the 50% higher and lower than national average 
percentage of individuals below poverty 
• Income Inequality - Per Capita Income 
o At least one city with 50% or more lower percentage per capita income than 
national average ($21,587) percentage of per capita income  
o  At least one city with 25% to 50% lower per capita income than national average 
percentage of per capita income 
o At least two cities between 5% higher or 5% lower percentage per capita income 
than national average per capita income. 
o At least one city greater than 5% higher percentage per capita income than 
national average percentage of per capita income 
• Ethnicity 
o At least one city with 25% greater than national average (67.6%) percentage of  
white residents 











Table 17 (Continued). Selection Criteria for Qualitative Interview 
 
• Percent Residents over 65 years of age 
o At least one city with 25% greater than national average (12.4%)  percentage of 
residents over 65 
o At least one city with 25% less than national average percentage of residents over 
65 
• Crime Rate 
o At least one city with crime rate 25% below quantitative study sample mean 
crime rate (5884 per 100,000) 
o At least two cities with crime rates between 25% above quantitative study sample 
mean and 25% below sample mean 
o At least one city with crime rate 25% above quantitative study sample mean crime 
rate 
• Cases Cleared 
o At least one city with 25% higher percentage of cases cleared than quantitative 
study mean percentage of cases cleared (26.33%) 
o At least two cities with percentages of cases cleared between 25% above and 25% 
below quantitative study mean percentage of cases cleared 
o At least one city with 25% lower percentage of cases cleared than quantitative 
study mean percentage of cases cleared 
• Education 
o At least one city with 10% higher percentage of residents with high school 
education or more than the national average (80.4%) percentage  
o At least two cities with percentage of residents with high school education or 
more between 10% above national average percentage or 10% below national 
average percentage 
o At least one city with a 10% lower percentage of residents with high school 
education or more than the national average percentage 
• Vehicle Replacement Policies 
o At least one city with vehicle replacement policy of 2-3 years 
o At least one city with vehicle replacement policy of 3-5 years 





The selection criteria were intended to provide a variety of characteristics without relying 
too heavily upon outliers for supplying information. Although arbitrary, in most cases the chosen 
parameters for the criteria are close on either side of the mean to ensure that the qualitative 
results for the sample will resemble the population. For this reason, the most common spread of 
variation on either side of the mean for most factors was a 25% variation. For the same reason, 
an effort was made to also include samples that approximated the mean of the factors as well. A 
notable exception was for that of income inequality, which some researchers (Hsieh and Pugh, 
1993) have identified as one of the single most important causal factors in determining the level 
of crime. Higher levels of crime would demand greater police services, and thus create higher 
police expenditures. National standardization of education requirements necessitated selection of 
a smaller range of variation for the education factor. In this case, a margin slightly more than 
10% on either side of the national average was used to delineate categories. 
One such characteristic that provides variety in interview results would be the type of 
union representing the bargaining unit within the city. Different labor organizations could 
conceivably have different philosophies, different policies, and different effects from unit to unit. 
An effort was made to secure interviews in cities with no unions and in cities with different types 
of unions. One city had two different police unions, one for each of the two sworn bargaining 
units.35
Feuille and Delaney (1986: 231) concluded that police salaries were higher in urban 
rather than rural areas. In this study, three cities were selected from highly rural areas and four 
were selected from heavily urbanized areas. Population was found to have a significant impact 
on expenditures in other studies (Gely & Chandler, 1993a: 301) as well as in the quantitative 
                                                 
35 In Florida, the rank and file officers are deemed to be a different bargaining unit than lieutenants. Sergeants, 
depending on job descriptions and agreements, usually belong to one or the other units. 
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section of this study. The qualitative inquiry examined Florida cities with populations as small as 
6,000 and as large as 195,000 with a metropolitan statistical area of over a million. Different size 
cities have different needs, and these needs are reflected in their expenditure levels. The impact 
of a union in a small city may be different than that of a large city. 
Witt (1990: 170) had significant results with a variable representing residents of over 65 
in his studies, and another demographic variable which represented the percentage of  owner 
occupied homes. This study includes an interview of an official from one city that actually had 
less than the national average percentage of over 65 years of age residents, and also includes an 
official from a city with greater than the state average percentage of over 65 years of age 
residents. Although this variable did not achieve significance in this study’s statistical 
regressions, the demographic was considered to include possible different perspectives in police 
expenditures. Both the quantitative portion of this study and Witt (1990: 171) experienced 
significant results from a variable representing the percentage of owner occupied homes. In order 
to capture this dimension in the qualitative study, one city was selected for interview which had a 
large (75.6%) proportionate amount of the city’s housing that was owner-occupied. On the other 
end of the continuum, another city was selected which had a very small (40.8%) proportion of 
owner occupied homes.  
Schwochau, Feuille, & Delaney (1988: 426) used a measure of income, per capita 
income, as a control in determining the effects of collective bargaining and arbitration on police 
expenditures. Florida, however, offers extremes not found in national samples. For this reason, 
this study used not only per capita income as a measure of wealth, it also used the percentage 
below poverty level for a community. Typically, in larger national samples, per capita income 
and the individuals below poverty level rise and fall in an inverse relationship. As demonstrated 
 199
 
Table 18: Demographic characteristics of cities in qualitative inquiry. 
 
 





























































































































































































































































































in one of the cities of the qualitative portion of the study, this is not always the case in Florida. A 
large number of wealthy residents can be found living alongside residents below the poverty 
level. This may also affect police expenditures. Relative rates of income and poverty, as well as a 
variable used in the quantitative study, the taxable value of property, thus guide selection of 
interview candidates as well. As an example, a wealthier city in the qualitative portion of the 
study has the lowest (5.6%) rate of poverty, while an impoverished area has a sizable (32%) 
number of its residents living below the poverty level. The national average for the percentage of 
individuals below poverty level is 12.4% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). 
Other considerations used in determining the mix of candidates to select for interview include the 
proportionate number of people with a high school or higher education, and the percentage of 
non-Hispanic whites. The demographics of education (Chandler & Gely, 1995: 301) and race 
(Gely and Chandler, 1995: 178) merit consideration because these characteristics attained 
significance in some studies. Often these two demographics are attendants of income inequality, 
and their independent effects should be included in research. Again, a broad spectrum of 
characteristics are available among Florida cities, and  these characteristics have representation 
in the qualitative perspectives of this study. 
The final characteristics that guide selection of interview candidates entail the level of 
crime rate and the ability of the community to control crime rate. Two variables from the 
quantitative portion of the study will guide our selection in this respect. One variable is the crime 
rate per 100,000 figure, and the other is the percentages of cases cleared. Both measures are used 
by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These 
factors may contribute to decisions on resource allocation within a community. In the regression 
analysis of this study, both variables were significant in the great majority of regressions amidst 
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a large field of other control variables. Evidence exists, at least in this study,  that the two factors 
ultimately influence police expenditures. 
The final cities selected were identified in a data matrix which consisted of the 257 cities 
from the quantitative sample. The overarching criteria for qualitative selection were: region of 
the state; city size; and whether or not the police department of the city was unionized. A 
minimum of two cities were to be located in each region, North, Central and South Florida. At 
least one city from each of the Uniform Crime Report city groups, with the exception of the 
largest group, were also to be included in the final sample. At least two of the cities were to be 
non-unionized, one a small city, and the other non-union city was to be medium sized. An effort 
was also made to include different types of police unions within the sample. Finally, a variation 
of demographic, financial, and law enforcement characteristics was sought within the sample to 
provide a blended sample of Florida cities. Table 18 presents the characteristics of the cities 
selected for the qualitative sample.  
 Interviewing officials from the selected cities should provide information to better 
understand the regression results. Personal observations by the officials may yield an 
understanding of not only why unions increase police expenditures, but also why the influence of 
unions is not perceptible in capital outlay expenditures. Since anonymity ensures more candid 
observations among interviewees, specific names of cities or the administrator interviewees will 
not be provided in this study. The cities will only be identified by their broad regional groupings 
and certain individual characteristics.36  
                                                 
36 North Florida, for the purpose of this study, consists of all cities adjacent to or north of State Road 40 which 
begins at Ormond Beach just north of Daytona Beach, and travels westward across the Florida peninsula through 
Ocala and terminates just west of Inglis and Yankeetown near the Gulf Coast. South Florida, for the purpose of this 
study, includes all cities adjacent to or south of State Road 70 which begins in Fort Pierce, cuts across the state 
through Okeechobee and deadends close to the Gulf Coast near Bradenton. Central Florida includes the I-4 corridor 
between Daytona Beach and Tampa, and all points north of State Road 70 but south of State Road 40. At least two 






 City One is located in Central Florida, and with a population of approximately 14,000, is 
included in the FBI Group V City class and thus serves as a representative from the small city 
category of this study. In 2002, the research year for the study, City One had nearly 40 officers 
on its payroll. The city also has an unusual vehicle replacement policy, a city manager very 
involved in designation of individual salaries to control costs, and uses a labor attorney in 
dealing with the police union. These defining characteristics will be described further in the 
ensuing discussion of the city.  
Although the crime rate in City One may be higher than in many Florida cities of its class 
(36% above the mean for the sample), the cases cleared percentages are also quite high (115% 
above the mean), indicating that the city’s police department has the resources to keep crime 
under control. The higher crime rate may be attributable in part to the fact that the city has a 
broad spectrum of income areas within the city, including low income areas usually associated 
with higher crime rates. In addition, the city is located near a much larger city with major roads 
through City One to the much larger city. Much of the city, however, boasts planned commercial 
areas and middle to upper middle class residential areas.  
 City One spends less than average (28%) on total police expenditures per capita, but this 
cost proportion may be the result of a relatively younger community with a large number of 
children. The city has moderate per capita taxable value, and a proportionately smaller group 
(12.4%) of senior citizens (over 65 years of age) than many Florida cities. The state average is 
17.6% of its residents are over age 65. A somewhat unusual characteristic of the city is the fact 




that the police department uses the International Brotherhood of Teamsters as a bargaining agent 
rather than the Fraternal Order of Police or the Police Benevolent Association as in most nearby 
communities with police unions. The Fraternal Order of Police and the Police Benevolent 
Association were formed at about the same time as the Teamsters union, and represent many 
more law enforcement officers in the United States. The Teamsters, as their name suggests were 
originally formed to represent those employed in the transport of goods. The Teamsters, 
however, have expanded into other occupations, and now include a Public Services Division, 
which includes law enforcement officers as well as other government employees.  
 
Collective Bargaining in City One 
 
 City One has a unionized police force which unlike other cities in our sample, has the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters as their bargaining agent. The interviewed official 
explained that since the fiscal year for City One begins October 1st, collective bargaining must 
begin at least 90 days but not more than 120 days before September 30th. The contract expires 
October 1st. Thus, collective bargaining in City One begins in June or July with a contractual 
provision that states that absent a written notification of the intent to negotiate during June or 
July, the agreement is renewed for another year without modification. This provision coincides 
with the policy of City One that collective bargaining will not include any retroactivity in 
contractual provisions. According to the City One official, this eliminates the need for 
reconciliation of the city’s budget planning and the monetary impact of the collective bargaining 
agreement. If the negotiations are not completed by October 1st, the union, according to city 




The interviewed official at City One specified three cardinal rules in that city that are 
followed in contractual negotiations with the police union: 1) Contracts are for one year so that 
unions become part of the budgeting process; 2) The final decision maker does not attend labor 
negotiations; 3) The police chief also does not attend his own department’s labor negotiations. 
Partially as a result of the foregoing, the city uses a labor attorney to negotiate agreements with 
the police union. The labor attorney imparts some of the benefits of a disinterested third party to 
the proceedings by projecting an image of objectivity and low risk involvement. Since the police 
chief must often direct the employees in the performance of law enforcement services, the city 
excludes involvement by that official in negotiations to prevent animosity within the department. 
The official added that since the police chief works closely with the employees and could 
personally benefit from the negotiations because salary increases for the rank and file officers are 
usually accompanied by salary increases for supervisory officers. Thus, the policy of the chief’s 
lack of involvement in labor negotiations precludes possible conflicts of interest or the 
appearance of conflict of interest.  
The provisions related to operating expenses, such as equipment and uniforms are almost 
always negotiated exclusively during the collective bargaining period in City One. The 
Collective Bargaining Agreement has no provisions for labor-management meetings and 
contains no reference to memorandums of understanding. The interviewed official for City One 
noted that only in emergency situations would the city engage in negotiations outside the 
collective bargaining period, and then the only items discussed would be safety related. 
 The budget process in City One was also described. The department heads in City One, 
including the police chief, assemble estimates for the resources needed for the following fiscal 
year. These estimates are reviewed by other city officials and consolidated for eventual 
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presentation to the City Commission for approval. Estimates regarding personal services costs 
are based on existing contracts or modified before finalizing and submitting the proposed budget 
to the City Commission. The modifications to personal services expenditures are predicated on 
the results of local negotiations with the bargaining agents for the police union. Any adjustments 
to individual salaries are reviewed by the city manager before approval. All salaries for the rank 
and file officers in the police department, however, are determined by the collective bargaining 
agreement.  
The City One official, during police labor negotiations, augments the city’s position by 
presenting to union negotiators a detailed list that itemizes the cost required to place each law 
enforcement officer on the street. Although many of the items specified in the collective 
bargaining agreement would undoubtedly be provided to some extent with or without the 
agreement (such as uniforms), the operating expenses costs specific to each sworn employee 
equals more than $20, 000 in addition to payroll related costs. These costs do not include 
common use items and services such as grievance processing expenditures, designated parking 
places, showers and lockers, dues deduction processing, and other items specified by the 
collective bargaining agreement in City One. Such costs are often difficult to attribute to 
unionization alone, and therefore were not included in the estimates. 
The expression of union voice often depends on the makeup of the bargaining unit 
members. The City One official interviewed suggested that police employees and other 
employees in local government often find a “fit” in a specific municipality. Each community has 
a unique set of values and characteristics that either may or may not be compatible with the 
employee’s personality. For instance, a suburban community teeming with commercial retail 
property would expect their officers to have the diplomatic skills necessary to deal with visiting 
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customers in the city. A crime hardened community would expect their officers to have the 
“street smarts” to curb crime. As the employee performs his or her duties in the municipality 
over time, a decision ultimately results from the employee’s experience in the local government 
to either remain in the community or move on. An officer may be more comfortable working 
with lower income citizens than dealing with high income citizens who may be used to more 
diplomatic and even gracious treatment from their officers.  Although pay is a serious 
consideration on the part of the employee, according to the City One official, the ability of the 
employee to identify with the community is more likely a stronger determinant in the employee’s 
decision to remain.  
The official cautioned that the salaries and benefits have to be competitive, however, 
because an added incentive to remain in the community for employees is the realization that 
exiting the city will result in a pay cut by moving to a beginning pay grade. Loyalty to the 
community develops as a result of the interaction between the employee’s “fit” with the city and 
the realization that compensation is comparable to other cities. The inherent characteristics of an 
employee play a large part in the employee’s decision to remain in the employment of the city. 
The official opined that in City One, the human relations skills may be a more important asset for 
a law enforcement employee than actual crime control because of the demographic make-up of 
the city. Each city, with its own community values profile, beckons employees with the skills 
and personalities peculiar to that city’s need.  The City One official based this observation from 





Police Union Impact in City One 
 
 The interviewed official for City One noted that provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement in the city reveal a number of areas in which the police union has exerted voice in a 
manner that impacts police expenditures.  Salaries and service bonuses are specified within the 
agreement, as well as stipulations for beneficiaries to receive accrued compensatory time in the 
event of an employee’s death. Pay for court appearances or other legal processes resultant from 
performance of duties are discussed in the collective bargaining agreement and provide for 
additional pay as a result of these processes. The employees are provided paid time off for 
voting, and suffer no loss of pay while attending grievance discussions which are conducted 
during normal business hours. Other expenses related to salaries included in the provisions are 
the various types of leave, overtime, callback and standby provisions, and other situations of 
similar nature. 
The City One official explained that the city experienced private sector spillover in 
bargaining with the Teamsters. Rather than use multi-stepped pay scales, according to the city 
official, the Teamsters prefer “single-salary” terms in national contracts in which an entry level 
employee with the same skills as a more senior employee earns the same basic rate of pay.37 
Modifications such as service-bonuses are often added as incentive for more senior employees to 
remain in their present jobs. City One utilizes service-bonuses, which according to the collective 
bargaining agreement are issued to police employees on a formula basis. At three years 
employment with the city, the employees are eligible to receive $100 per each service year in the 
city as a service bonus on the anniversary of their dates of hire. Most of the other provisions 
related to salaries, benefits and working conditions in the collective bargaining agreement are 
                                                 




similar to provisions existing in other cities’ collective bargaining agreements that were 
negotiated by the more traditional bargaining agents for police employees, the Fraternal Order of 
Police and the Police Benevolent Association. 
In addition to personal services expenditure items, the interviewed official noted that the 
collective bargaining agreement has detailed provisions for the number and types of equipment 
that are to be issued to each sworn employee. An equipment and clothing list specifies the 
materials that the employees will be issued, even specifying the exact number of ammunition 
rounds that the employee will receive. One provision of the agreement requires management to 
provide an operable portable radio to each bargaining unit member prior to beginning a tour of 
duty. Lockers and showers are provided for in the labor agreement as well. All these provisions 
are contractually required of the city, and  relate to police operating expenses. Employee voice is 
thus codified in the contract through collective bargaining. 
Other items and services are provided for as well, in accordance with the collective 
bargaining agreement. K-9 officers are permitted to annually attend training relevant to their 
assignments, officers are reimbursed for tuition, books and fees for job related educational 
courses, and City One pays for annual physical examinations by a designated physician. These 
types of items and services incur operating expenses as well.  
When informed about this study’s regression results for police capital outlays, the City 
One official noted that the city used a restricted interpretation of the state constitution for what 
constituted negotiable bargaining subjects. Moreover, a policy had been introduced by the city 
official a number of years ago to guide capital outlays budgeting within the city. This policy, 
which regards vehicles and computers,  precludes discussion of capital outlays during 
negotiations because the local union appears to be content with the policy, and the city may not 
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be receptive to dealing with the issue as a bargaining subject related to wages, benefits, and 
working conditions. The capital outlays policy is based upon trade value for existing equipment 
such as computer hardware and patrol vehicles. Rather than restrict city operations with 
auctioneering requirements for used items in order to replace these items, the Number One City 
Commission has allowed the city officials to surplus high expense items in order to dispose of 
them.  
Capital equipment that has reached the city’s definition of maturation38 is marketed to 
generate additional revenues that can assist in the purchase of other items. This policy also 
minimizes storage and logistical costs. Descriptions of the equipment are posted on web sites, 
and offered to employees and others at discount. The city specifies a two to three year 
replacement policy for police vehicles and these vehicles are advertised nationwide for sale to 
smaller or bargain hunting communities to purchase as relatively new vehicles.  The two to three 
year specified period enhances the resale value over that of five year vehicles which may have a 
smaller and less lucrative market. Computers are accorded a three year lifespan with the city, and 
then replaced in a manner similar to that of vehicles. 
City One has the most proactive vehicle replacement policy of the cities interviewed. 
While the other cities interviewed rely on a combination of factors that depend on the condition 
of the vehicle, City One factors in the ability to gain the most in resale value for the vehicle. The 
factors that render a vehicle replaceable for other cities also tend to lower the resale value of the 
vehicle. City One seeks to bypass this situation by selling the vehicles nationwide while the 
vehicles still have a desirable performance level. Cities with a capital outlays policy as with City 
One would experience minimal to negligible union influence on capital outlays decisions. Once 
set in motion, purchasing policies may be difficult to change, even at the bargaining table. In 
                                                 
38 The capital equipment items most often marketed are police vehicles and computer equipment. 
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addition, if the policy is viewed a favorable by the union, as is the case in City One, there is little 
incentive to include the issue as a bargaining item.  However, as illustrated by the example of 
City One, personal services and operating expenses are very much negotiable items, and the 





 Located in rural South Florida, City Two boasts a population of approximately 6,000 
residents, a Group VI city according to Uniform Crime Report categories. In 2002, the research 
year of the study, City Two had approximately 20 full time officers. Consistent with the sample 
city definitions of the methodology chapter, City Two is categorized as a small city in this study. 
The city lies nearly 40 miles from the closest medium sized (25,000+ population) city. Extensive 
poverty plagues City Two, with nearly a third of its residents classified as below poverty levels 
by the U.S. Census Bureau. The average percentage of individuals below poverty in Florida is 
estimated to be 12.5%. City Two has 2.5 times that percentage below poverty. Per capita income 
in City Two is less than half of the state’s average, which further compounds the city’s plight. 
The percentage of residents with a high school education in City Two is only slightly more than 
half of the nation’s average. 
 Unlike much of the rest of the state, City Two is not a haven for retired persons over 65 
years of age. The city not only has less than half of the percentage of people over 65 than the 
state has, but also has a much lower percentage of citizens over 65 than the national average. 
White, non-Hispanic residents are substantially outnumbered by minorities, particularly by twice 
as many African-Americans. City Two spends less per capita on law enforcement than the 
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average Florida community with a police department. The restriction of resources results from 
the per capita taxable value of City Two being less than one-seventh of the average per capita 
taxable value of the 257 Florida cities sampled.  Despite these limited resources, the police force 
in City Two is able to maintain moderate to high percentages of Part I cases cleared.   
The unique characteristics posed by City Two for the study are the predominant number 
of residents from minority classes, its remote location, the prevailing impoverished conditions of 
the community, and the lower pay of a non-unionized police force. 
 
Unionization and City Two 
 
 The City Two official interviewed reported that unionization of the city police force was 
discussed at one time but actually never occurred. The official stated that in his opinion, the city 
could not afford a union. According to the official’s estimates on the salaries of unionized 
officers in nearby cities, City Two would have to increase the pay of its law enforcement officers 
by approximately $5,000 or at least 16% more than the current starting pay for law enforcement 
officers. This information appears to be corroborated when considering that the unionized City 
One, which is admittedly is in a more urbanized area, pays its starting officers nearly 24% more 
than does City Two. 
  The City Two official views unionization as a double edged sword for his community. 
While a union may offer some protection against capricious action on the part of elected officials 
or the public, the official argued that his 20 years of public service in other communities 
included experiences that suggest unionization makes it more difficult to correct or terminate 
recalcitrant employees. The official believed that such a situation is not in the best interest of the 
public because citizens expect a high degree of professionalism from its officers. Even the 
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manner which an officer was perceived to look upon a resident recently while issuing a traffic 
ticket to that resident elicited a complaint of racism. 
 As a smaller police force, according to the City Two official, the police chief is able to 
get personally involved with the members of his force. The chief is familiar with each officer and 
thus is able to sense when an officer may be getting disenchanted with the department. The 
police chief can then take remedial action to alleviate such a situation. In addition, the police 
chief has an open door policy and meets with the officers in a sort of “gripe session” to discuss 
common problems. These activities may develop a sense of loyalty within the officers by 
providing voice in an informal setting to identify and therefore solve problems.  
 The City Two official, however, admitted that there were drawbacks associated with the 
lower pay in non-unionized police forces. He cited the example that the employee with the 
greatest seniority on the police force had less than seven years with the department. Regarding 
the theory of the City One official believing that community “fit” and not compensation was the 
major determinant in whether or not an employee remains in the department, City Two official 
disagreed: “Not too many people are willing to put their life on the line day after day and put up 
with what these guys have to put up with for this type of salary. Would you? They move on to 
bigger and better opportunities and get paid better somewhere else. Often they have young 
families to support.” The official cited a recent case in which an officer reluctantly resigned to 
accept a better paying position in another agency. In that case, the employee cited better wages 
as the reason for leaving, and that he stated he would not be leaving except for the fact that he 
had a young family to support. The City Two official strongly believed in a law enforcement 
career path in which officers began their careers in smaller, lower paying communities and later 
leave for increased compensation. He believed that most young officers applied to positions in 
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his community to “pack their résumés with experience.” Since the resources of City Two are 
such that the “voice” of the employees is not able to increase wages, the employees accumulate 
experience for eventual exit to higher paying positions. 
 
Police Expenditures in a Non-Unionized Department 
 
 When shown a list of union demanded equipment in City One, the City Two official 
indicated that the items listed were standard equipment for officers in Florida, and that the police 
department in City Two provided their officers with approximately the same equipment, save for 
footwear which the officers in the latter city were required to furnish themselves. In some cases, 
such as the number of ammunition rounds, City Two actually supplied more ammunition. 
Lockers and showers were also provided in City Two.  However, rather than paying for annual 
physical examinations in a manner similar to City One, City Two suggests to their officers to get 
a physical examination every two years. No educational incentives were mentioned by the City 
Two official, and the nearest post secondary educational facilities were over 45 minutes away 
from the community. More importantly to operating expenses, City Two pays health insurance 
premiums for the employees, but not for the employees’ spouses and dependents. The only other 
city in the qualitative sample that did not pay and health insurance premiums for dependents was 
City Six, which also had the only other non-unionized department in the sample. This 
observation further supports the findings uncovered by this study’s regression analysis that 
unions impact policy and decision making in Florida municipalities. 
 When questioned regarding the lack of union influence in capital outlay expenditures, the 
official replied that economics more likely determines that type of policy in cities. Given the 
impoverished community, in the case of City Two, the squad cars are utilized “until they break 
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down.” There is no set proactive vehicle replacement policy in the city. One vehicle still in use 
by police in City Two has over 135,000 miles registered on the odometer.  The oldest vehicle 
was a 1999 model, more than six years old at the time of the interview.  Although the city 
commissioners, according to the City Two official, are very responsive to the department’s 
requests for equipment, the department is sensitive to the limited resources available to the city 
and therefore minimize capital outlay requests until absolutely required. Vehicle replacements 
and other capital outlays thus appear to be far more restricted in City Two as compared with City 
One. Vehicles deemed no longer fit to serve the community are auctioned off on an “as is” basis. 
Nearly all such vehicles have mileage in excess of 100,000 miles. Replacement vehicles are 
purchased new. In City Two, the voice of the individual employee is negligible with regards to 
vehicle replacement. 
 As in City One, the department heads in City Two calculate the estimated costs of 
running their departments and submit these estimates to the city manager for review and eventual 
submission to the City Two City Commission.  The budget is calculated in total, which includes 
personal services and capital outlays. As discussed earlier, however, capital outlays may be 
incurred during the year if vehicles break down and can no longer provide useful service to the 
community. The budget process is thus a modified “bottoms-up” method, with the departments 
supplying their estimates for the fiscal budget of the following year.   
 Although the budget process in both cities may be similar, discretionary spending for the 
two cities appears to be significantly different. Both cities are similarly sized in terms of land 
area, but the population of City One is slightly more than twice the size of City Two. Partially as 
a result of smaller size, but also partially as a result of prevailing conditions, City Two uses 
proportionately greater staffing (in ratios of officers to 1000 residents) than does City One. 
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Despite this situation, City One still spends $12,000 more per year per police officer than does 
City Two. As demonstrated in Table 18 in the summary discussion of this chapter, as the cities 
become larger, the difference in expenditures between union and non union cities becomes far 





 Guidelines of the Uniform Crime Report classify City Three as a Group III city with a 
population in excess of 80,000. Under this study’s classification scheme, City Three would thus 
be considered a medium sized city, although it would be approaching the large city category. In 
the year of the regression analysis (2002), City Three had approximately 270 full time officers 
employed by its police department. City Three is located in South Florida and is located in the 
highly urbanized area that sprawls between West Palm Beach and Miami. In contrast to City 
Two, City Three is surrounded by, or rather directly adjacent to, a number of other cities that 
form its borders. No farmlands, state reserves, or wild areas define any of the boundaries of City 
Three. Crime rate in City Three is considerably higher than any of the cities (97% higher than the 
sample mean), save the largest city, in the qualitative sample, which is typical of the cities in the 
West Palm to Miami crescent. The crime rate is more than double the average for the state.  
 The percent of cases cleared for City Three, again consistent with the West Palm Beach 
to Miami crescent, is considerably lower (13.9% versus 26.33%) than the state average of the 
sample. The per capita income is higher than that of the national average while paradoxically the 
percentage of individuals below the poverty level is also higher than the national average. These 
indexes serve to demonstrate the extremes in income inequality for residents of City Three, again 
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a factor common to the cities in the West Palm Beach to Miami crescent. The very rich reside in 
a community that has a disproportionate number of people living below the poverty level. 
Research (Hsieh & Pugh, 1993) has indicated that such a combination may contribute to 
comparably higher levels of crime. 
 Other demographic descriptions of the city indicate that the community has close to the 
state average for the over 65 age group, and the percentage of residents with a high school 
education level of education is approximately the same as for the state. The percentage of 
residents owning their own home is lower (52%) than that of the average for the quantitative 
sample of the state (69.39%), which partially explains the 36% higher rate than state average of 
expenditures per capita for police expenditures. The regression results of this study support 
existing evidence that lower rates of home ownership tend to correlate with higher police 
expenditures. City Three spends 36% more per capita (approximately $100) than the average per 
capita police expenditures for the 257 cities in the sample. 
 The unique characteristics of City Three that caused it to be selected for the qualitative 
portion of this study are: the city is representative of the West Palm Beach to Miami crescent 
area; income inequality of the residents; high police expenditures; and a medium city in a highly 
urbanized area. 
 
Collective Bargaining in City Three 
 
The Police Benevolent Association represents the two bargaining units of sworn police 
officers in City Three. The first bargaining unit includes the rank and file officers, the positions 
of police sergeant, and all other employees in the classifications of Crime Scene Investigator and 
Police Aide. The city has dealt with this bargaining agent for over 25 years. The second 
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bargaining unit represented by the Police Benevolent Association, represents all sworn officers 
holding the rank of Lieutenant, but excluding Police Lieutenant/Budget Officer and Police 
Lieutenant/Internal Affairs Officer. The Lieutenant bargaining unit has been organized by the 
Police Benevolent Association for slightly over 15 years. 
 When asked about labor-management partnerships or employee participation programs in 
City Three, the official replied that such devices, although they have merit in some 
organizations, are not conducive to law enforcement policy-making for communities, particularly 
in the case of union involvement: “Once you allow them (the Union) to be part of the policy 
making process, you have to continue allowing them to be part of the policy making process.” 
The City Three official believed that union participation in police policy making was tantamount 
to an abrogation of management rights in an area sensitive to both management and the public. 
However, the official also believed that in some areas of concern, such as in discipline 
procedures, the union gains voice through the grievance procedures and often cite other 
jurisdictions’ policies with respect to discipline. Ultimately, the official emphasized, police 
policy making is best left to the elected officials and management officials in the community and 
not entrusted to the union. 
 Union influence on the City Three fiscal budget is largely indirect, that is, through the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The interviewed official explained that a fiscal 
services function within the department assembles budget estimates each year and submits a 
budget package to the City Three finance department which then reviews the estimates and 
combines the budget requests with that of other city departments and submits the entire package 
to the City Three City Commission.  
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The City Three interviewed official explained that the budget process is essentially 
separated from the collective bargaining process in respect to timing considerations. Although 
the collective bargaining agreement is effective beginning October 1st, coinciding with the 
effective date of the city’s fiscal year, the agreement may not have been finalized until a few 
months later, as in the case of the current contract. The current contract, which technically begins 
October 1st, 2004 and ends September 30, 2007, was actually finalized (signed by the appropriate 
officials) in December of 2004. The official emphasized that usually there are no retroactivity 
provisions pertinent to changes in employee salaries. The effective dates of the new salary 
schedules are specified by the contract and can begin 3 to 6 months into the contract. The 
effective changed salary schedules of the current contract signed in December, 2004 were 
January 1, 2005, three months into the fiscal year. 
Similar to City One, City Three uses an attorney as the main negotiator with the union, 
with two officers from the police department serving as technical advisors on the negotiating 
team. The City Three official stated that the police chief is not directly involved in the 
negotiations.  The final signatories representing the city of the collective bargaining agreement 
are the mayor, the city administrator, and the employee relations manager.  Mid-contract year 
changes to the collective bargaining agreement, which are relatively rare, are not remedied by 
memorandums of understanding in City Three. A provision does exist in the contract allowing 
either party to request a meeting to negotiate any changes not covered by the agreement, 
however, the City Three official explained that the contract has to be amended and be subjected 
to the ratification process. The collective bargaining provision allowing either party to negotiate 
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changes not covered during the term of the contract in City Three was shared only by City Four 
of the other cities in the qualitative study.39  
 
Police Union Impact in City Three 
 
 The City Three official interviewed stated that relations with the city’s police union have 
been fairly positive, with occasional disagreements. The official added that cases appealed to 
arbitration were somewhat rare, and that most disputes were settled locally.  Grievances were 
sometimes, in the official’s opinion, “petty” and may have contributed to added expenditures for 
the department. The official illustrated this conclusion with an example of a K-9 trainer who, due 
to death of the animal, was without a police dog.  In the effort to conserve expenditures, an 
attempt was made to transfer K-9 training to the Sheriff’s office and reassign the employee. A 
section within the collective bargaining agreement, however, stipulated that “One employee with 
the proper certification shall be assigned by the Police Chief as a K-9 Trainer…” Both the city 
and the union were bound by the provision, according to the City Three official, regardless of 
whether or not the provision entailed greater expenditures for the city. The matter was partially 
resolved by reassigning the employee but continuing to pay the employee the 5% premium pay 
for the position. Employee voice, as formally represented by the union had a clear presence in 
the disposition of the K-9 trainer case. Without union presence the department would have made 
a unilateral decision regarding the assignment of the K-9 training officer. The effect of voice in 
this case was readily perceived in not only the outcome of the decision, but also in the impact on 
police expenditures. 
                                                 
39 Such provisions are often referred to as “opener clauses” in the labor relations field and generally apply to one or 
more items, usually wages (Carrell & Heavrin, 2004: 426). 
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 The interviewed official believed that the vehicle take home policy increased 
expenditures for the city as a result of less usage for individual vehicles. Prior to the take home 
policy, which was encouraged by the union, the vehicles were operated by more than one shift, 
maximizing the utility value of the vehicle and resulting in less total cost. Another provision in 
the contract calls for each patrol vehicle being thoroughly cleaned, both interior and exterior, 
each week.  The collective bargaining agreement also contained provisions that specified that an 
officer did not have to drive a vehicle more than six years old or one that has more than 120,000 
miles unless refurbished. The City Three official, however, did not believe that these vehicle 
clauses unnecessarily encumbered the city, however, because in all likelihood the vehicles would 
be replaced in those conditions. The city uses a combined factors decision model to replace 
vehicles. A combination of age, mileage, and repair history determines replacement decisions. 
Replacement status for each vehicle is determined separately according to this combined factors 
decision model. 
   Another union initiated contractual provision, according to City Three official was a 
cleaning allowance granted to sworn officers. The uniformed police officers were provided $700 
annually per uniformed officer, and $900 annually for non-uniform officers in the bargaining 
unit. Although uniforms are standard issue in all departments, shoes are often included in police 
labor contracts and City Three provides an eighty dollar per year allowance for shoes. Other 
provisions, related to police operating expenses, require that the city provides each officer with a 
two-way portable radio for use when not in the patrol vehicle. Although the portable radios are 
specified in the contract, the City Three official stated that such equipment would have been 
standard issue without a labor agreement. However, the contractual provision in the collective 
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bargaining agreement (the result of voice) provides little or no managerial flexibility in this 
regard.  
 City Three had the most complex schedule of medical examinations contractually 
required of all the cities interviewed. All City Three sworn employees are provided annual 
physical examinations that are required to be conducted during duty hours. Initially, the physical 
examinations are typical for the general populace. After age 35, however, the physical 
examinations for sworn employees become more extensive and much more sophisticated, 
including colon cancer screening, lumbar evaluation, stress echo cardiograms, etc.  All these 
medical examinations are performed at no expense to the employee.  The only other cities in the 
qualitative sample that funded comprehensive medical exams were unionized cities.   
 The City Three official believed that the pay incentives of unionized departments were 
the most responsible for increased expenditures.  Using a ten stepped payroll schedule, starting 
officers begin with salaries of slightly less than $40,000. A topped out officer (step 10) in City 
Three earns over $61,000. The official also reported that educational incentives are also available 
to sworn officers. City Three provides educational reimbursement for job related courses 
according to the rate schedule of a nearby university and an additional allowance of up to $250 
for books, materials and fees for each fiscal year. An employee leaving the employment of the 










 Located in North Florida, approximately 46,000 residents inhabit City Four.  The 
Uniform Crime Report classifies the community as a Group IV sized city, which is then 
categorized as a “medium class” city for the purpose of this study. Over 150 officers staffed the 
police department of City Four in the year of the quantitative study. The bucolic surroundings of 
City Four include large agricultural areas and even larger forested areas. The nearest city even 
comparable in size is more than 35 miles away.  As might be expected of a city of this size in a 
rural area, the percentage of cases cleared in City Four is much higher (43%) than that of the 
state average because there are little “spillover” effects from nearby cities. In addition, a stronger 
sense of community may develop in a city that is not part of a large urbanized area which 
includes many cities. The city occupies a large land area, and population density is less than half 
of the municipal average for the state. 
 City Four has an over 65 population greater than any of the cities in the study’s 
qualitative sample, and outdistances even that of the state average in the percentage of residents 
over 65 age category (20.4% versus 17.6%). As a haven for retired individuals, the city has 
nearly twice the percentage of over 65 residents than many of the 257 cities included in the 
quantitative sample. This statistic affects the per capita income of City Four, causing that figure 
to be lower than both the national and state average per capita income, because many over 65 
years of age residents are retired and receiving pension and social security funds that annually 
average less than full salaried households.  
 Demographic diversification in City Four approximates that of the rest of the state, with 
the exception that the percentage of Hispanic population (5.7%) in the city is much lower than 
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the central and southern part of the state. The percentage of Hispanic population in City Four is 
actually less than half of the national average (12.5%). African American citizens comprise the 
largest minority group in City Four, with a little more than one-fifth of the city’s residents 
heralding from that ethnic group. The unique characteristics that caused City Four to be included 
in this study’s qualitative section are: the city is a medium sized municipality situated in a rural 
area; the large over 65 population; a demographic profile typical of North Florida; and a large 
land area with a relatively low population density. 
 
Collective Bargaining in City Four 
 
The Fraternal Order of Police represents two bargaining units in City Four police 
collective bargaining: 1) police officers; and 2) police lieutenants and sergeants. The City Four 
interviewed official stated that the officers have been unionized since 1990, but the lieutenants 
and sergeants unionized just recently in 2004. Only the fire and police departments are unionized 
in the city. The official related that the Teamsters union had previously attempted to pressure the 
city into unionizing other employees but was never able to achieve certification through 
employee elections. The City Four official recalled that the Teamsters Union conducted 
informational picketing in front of city hall to gain bargaining recognition. 
 Up to and including the present collective bargaining agreement, the city used negotiating 
teams to represent its interests at the bargaining table. The City Four official had been a member 
of that team for the past three contracts. The city manager also participates in the talks as a 
member of the city team. In the past, the city manager, the interviewed official, and one or more 
city officials would constitute the negotiating team. Present plans, however, are to utilize a labor 
attorney in future negotiations with the union. The interview official stated that the philosophy of 
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dealing with the employees was based on an effort to achieve a balance between the good of the 
officers and the good of the department. An attempt has to be made to be fair to everyone. 
However, if there is an irresolvable difference in this balance, the good of the department must 
prevail over the good of the officers. The official added that this often means standing firm on 
managing the department. 
 The city agreed in the collective bargaining agreement to allow the Fraternal Order of 
Police, according to the interviewed official, to establish a time pool for conducting union 
negotiations. The bargaining unit employees may donate annual leave hours to the time pool for 
union representation. A union representative may also use the time pool to attend public budget 
hearings pertaining to the department, and impasse hearings submitted to the city council. The 
city also agreed to allow three police employees to attend collective bargaining sessions while on 
duty.  
 The official stated that the Fraternal Order of Police does not actively engage in 
multilateral bargaining, and that the council leaves negotiation responsibilities to the department. 
Although the Fraternal Order of Police has endorsed city political candidates in the past, it 
usually does not endorse candidates and it never has extensively backed candidates. The city 
council also takes a laissez faire approach toward the unions and for the most part entrusts labor 
negotiations to the city manager and the city negotiating team. 
 Collective bargaining begins with notification of intent to negotiate by the union, usually 
in March. Although the fiscal year begins October 1st, budget planning begins even earlier in the 
year. When questioned about how the city reconciles negotiated salary increases with fiscal year 
budgets when preparation periods for both occur simultaneously, the official responded that the 
city has fairly accurate estimates regarding the prospective salary increases and formulates the 
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budget based on these projections. Usually, the police department budget request is submitted to 
the mayor during the month of March.  
 The police department, according to the City Four official, has a financial services 
section that compiles and submits budget estimates to the central budget office in the middle of 
January. The bureau commanders communicate with the police chief to defend and justify their 
respective sections of the budget. The entire “back and forth” process between the city 
departments and the city manager is usually completed in July, and the budget is finalized in 
August. Once the budget is set, the departments, including the police department, are held to a 
line item budget and expenditures are issued strictly according to object and classification. City 
finance officers can and do block cross item transfers, and such deviations from the line item 
specifications only rarely are allowed. This process, the official said, ensures accountability 
within the city and its departments. 
 
Police Union Impact in City Four 
 
 The interviewed official commented that he did not think the Fraternal Order of Police 
impacted police expenditures dramatically in the city. He pointed out that many of the provisions 
in the contract would have been in effect whether or not the union was present in the community. 
The official opined that the union merely contractually formalized many items already in 
existence to maintain the security of the provisions. The union, according to the official, 
initialized minimum staffing requirements but the department schedules in a manner that 




 The official stated that he had not seen departmental operations suffer as a result of 
unionization. Although sometimes, according to the official, “we do have our streaks” in the 
processing of grievances. Most disputes have been resolved at the lowest possible levels, and the 
City Four official reported that only one or two grievance cases in the last 10 years required 
arbitration. The grievance procedures, as stipulated by the collective bargaining agreement, entail 
five steps beginning with the employee’s immediate supervisor and culminating, if necessary at 
step five with the police chief. If the dispute involves an immediate supervisor, the employee 
skips to the next step. Unresolved disputes at step five can be appealed to arbitration. Although 
the grievance procedure varies in intensity of use in City Four, the “streaks” of grievance activity 
require negotiations, research, and administrative time which contribute to the increase in both 
personal services expenditures and operating expenses. In non-unionized City Two such time is 
not required in such situations, and little additional expenses are experienced as a result. 
 The beginning pay grade for an officer in City Four is lower in comparison to most of the 
cities in the qualitative sample, and the maximum achievable salary is not as competitive with 
medium and large sized agencies. However, the maximum achievable salary is very competitive 
with the smaller municipal police departments. The City Four official reported that the 
department has lost sworn employees to the local county sheriff’s office in the past because the 
county pays its officers more and had a vehicle take home policy when City Four did not.. The 
official added that retention rates in the city’s police department was noticeably better than in 
smaller communities which tend to attract what the official called “gypsy officers”  with a 
history of transiency.  
 The official stated that the real dilemma experienced by the city was similar to that 
experienced in other cities, and that is the trend to move in the direction of seeking better 
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educated officers. The dilemma exists because cities are finding it difficult to attract better 
educated officers with rates of pay that are not commensurate with the desired level of education. 
The city does offer an educational reimbursement program which is somewhat conservative to 
similar incentives offered by other departments in this study. The city reimburses employees 
tuition and fees up to an annual maximum of $500. This stipulation is included in the collective 
bargaining agreement.  
 Other reimbursement provisions in the collective bargaining agreement include cleaning 
costs prorated at $6 weekly, payable quarterly. Departmental detectives receive $600 annually 
for purchase of clothing “to be worn in the performance of their duties” in accordance with a 
contractual provision stated in the collective bargaining agreement. There are no provisions 
related to medical examinations required of the employer. 
 According to the City Four official, the union has not raised any issues related to vehicles 
or equipment. The official said that in the 26 years he had been associated with the city, the 
department always seemed to have state of the art equipment that was well maintained. He 
elaborated the point by stating that the patrol vehicles are equipped with lap top computers, and 
the department has its own resident MIS (management information systems) employee. These 
considerations plus a responsive vehicle replacement policy, the official believes, is responsible 
for mitigating union concerns with regards to capital equipment. The official further explained 
that city fleet services maintained the equipment and that any troublesome equipment is 
earmarked for replacement when repairs or general condition warrant such action. As long as the 
vehicles are operational at fleet services’ standards, they will be utilized. When vehicle 
replacement is needed, the city utilizes the state’s piggyback contractual purchase arrangement 
previously discussed in Chapter III.  The department also uses an amortization replacement 
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scheme, referred to as a “bill back,” which accumulates funds for vehicle replacement. A 
predetermined amount from the general fund is designated for the “bill-back” account each year. 
This produces less strain on the city budget than if vehicles were purchased without incremental 
additions to the “bill back” account. An annual $250,000 is also allocated to the department for 
capital outlays other than vehicles. 
The department is required to utilize the city’s purchasing process to acquire capital 
equipment, but this step is largely procedural for administrative and accounting purposes.  The 
city had secured a management rights clause for the vehicle utilization provision in the collective 
bargaining agreement. The clause merely states that “The availability of, and employee 
eligibility for all conditions associated with Police Department vehicles are at the discretion of 
the Chief of Police.” The City Four official notes that the department has a take home vehicle 
policy because “The vehicles actually last longer in a take home policy. The officers take better 
care of the vehicles.” Shift sharing of vehicles had resulted in a detached concern for the vehicles 
that usually resulted in relatively less care. Assigning vehicles to individual officers created a 
sense of ownership that heightened the officers’ responsiveness to the condition of the 
equipment, and resulted in a sense of urgency in maintaining the vehicles. This view is decidedly 
different than that of City Three, in which the interviewed official noted that a take home policy 





Somewhat removed from other medium and larger cities in the state, City Five enjoys 
moderate growth in North Florida. Classified as a Uniform Crime Report Group III city, City 
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Five is included in the “medium city” category of this study. But only just barely. With over 
96,000 residents, City Five is at the cusp of being labeled a major city large enough to be 
considered in the Uniform Crime Report’s Group II category. Approximately 240 officers staff 
the police department of City Five. The sprawl and growth of Central and South Florida has not 
yet reached City Five, so farmlands and forests surround the city similar in fashion to City Four 
and in a manner typical of most North Florida cities.  
In stark contrast to City Four, City Five is a youth inhabited city with an over 65 
population (9.8%) not only lower than the state average (17.6%), but also notably lower than the 
national average (12.4%). However, as with City Four, some demographic vestiges of the South 
remain strong in City Five. A large African-American minority population (23.2%) dwells in the 
city alongside a very small number of Hispanic residents (6.4%). City Five has nearly twice the 
national percentage rate of  African-American residents, and just half of the national percentage 
rate for resident people of  Hispanic background.  This proportional ethnic mix appears typical to 
North Florida cities, and differs from the perceptible Latino influence on demographics in 
Central and South Florida.. 
The education level of residents in City Five (87.8% with high school or greater 
education) is higher than the average for the state (79%). As with three other North Florida cities, 
City Five hosts a large university that contributes to the higher level of education. The university 
also is responsible for reducing the proportionate number of owner-occupied dwellings in the 
city (47.7% total owner occupied). Atypical of cities with a relatively small number of owner-
occupied homes, City Five has only a slightly higher rate of crime (10% higher than average), 
and close to state average for percentage of cases cleared. This anomaly results in City Five 
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having per capita police expenditures 18.3% lower than the average for the 257 cities of the 
study’s sample.  
The unique characteristics of City Five that resulted in its inclusion in the qualitative 
study are: the relatively high level of education in the city;  the low number of owner-occupied 
housing yet low per-capita police expenditures; the influence of a major university; and the 
presence of two different major unions representing the two bargaining units in the police 
department. The majority of unionized police departments have a single union that represents 
both police bargaining units in a single police department. City Five deviates from this 
commonality by having two separate unions in a single police department. 
 
Collective Bargaining in City Five 
 
 City Five bargains with both the Police Benevolent Association and the Fraternal Order 
of Police. The Police Benevolent Association acts as bargaining agent for employees holding the 
positions of Police Lieutenant, Sergeant/Training Officer and Sergeant/Personnel Officer. The 
Fraternal Order of Police represents the bargaining unit which consists of Police Sergeants, 
Police Corporals, and Police Officers. Collective Bargaining Agreements with both organizations 
are for three years each, the two contractual periods are not concurrent but are overlapping, and 
the labor contract with the Police Benevolent Association has an effective date one year later 
than the contract with the Fraternal Order of Police. 
 The City Five interviewed official noted that recently the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters sought to replace the Fraternal Order of Police as the collective bargaining agent in 
the department. Members petitioned the Public Employee Relations Commission of Florida to 
conduct an election to determine the bargaining agent for the officers unit. The Fraternal Order 
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of Police prevailed in that election and continues to represent the police officers’ unit in City 
Five. 
 The collective bargaining process in City Five begins in April or May, and the contract 
period begins with the fiscal year, October 1st for both bargaining units. The City Five Official 
reported that the collective bargaining sessions with the Fraternal Order of Police had not been 
concluded for the year, even after eleven months of negotiations. This, according to the official, 
was unusual. Collective bargaining usually is concluded after four months or so with the 
Fraternal Order of Police.  Typically the process is quicker with the Police Benevolent 
Association, which represents a smaller workforce. The city has eight different bargaining units 
and offers standardized benefits to the bargaining units, including the police units. “The key 
issue is pay in most cases,” the City Five Official observed. The official serves on the city 
negotiating team, along with the city’s labor relations manager. 
 The City Five official interviewed shares the same concerns as the City Seven official 
interviewed regarding recent negotiations with the Fraternal Order of Police. Both officials 
acknowledged that in the past, labor negotiations proceeded much more rapidly than are current 
bargaining sessions. In both cases, the collective bargaining agreements have expired and the 
finalization date of the agreement was still uncertain at the time of the interview. In both cases, 
the primary issue was the issue of wages. 
The City Five interviewed official expressed concern that at least one of the unions, when 
engaged in negotiations, regularly attempted what some labor analyst refer to as the “cherry-
picking” approach in their wage and benefits package requests. In this approach, the union will 
review collective bargaining agreements throughout an area, usually within a single state, and 
highlight desirable clauses for eventual inclusion in their own demands. “They take the best 
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pieces from different agreements and want to present them together as a single offer,” the official 
said. Also, by making interjurisdictional comparisons, the official believed, the union negotiators 
“cast their plan in the best possible light” during contract negotiations.  
  The City Five Official stated that memorandums of understanding are “not a common 
occurrence.” A rare instance may arise in which both the department/city and the union would 
benefit from a policy change or a new program and then such a memorandum would be utilized, 
but such a situation would be very unusual. Periodically, however, the City Five Police Chief 
will consult the unions for their input on something major, such as pursuit policies, but these 
inputs are advisory in nature and not binding on the administration. There have been instances in 
which the union suggested including the new policy in the contract, but these suggestions have 
not been implemented due to an administrative preference of retaining managerial rights in 
matters sensitive to the public. 
 Labor-Management relations, the official reported, are usually quite positive between the 
department and the unions. Usually, only one or two grievances per year at the most are filed by 
the union. Arbitration, which is contractually provided, has not been invoked by either party for 
the past five years. The official attributed the low grievance activity to the attempt to resolve 
matters locally and the use of a unique disciplinary procedure in the department.  Referred to as 
the “REDII Process,” (acronym for Request for Expedited Disposition of Internal Investigation), 
the procedure is used in any discipline case that would not result in demotion or termination. 
Ready Process offers a lesser discipline in exchange for an officer admitting to an infraction. 
Examples of situations subject to the process are those involving missed court dates or 




Police Union Impact in City Five 
 
 A notable goal of the union, according to the City Five Official, is the issue of longevity. 
Prior to 1992, the city applied a premium known as longevity pay to police employees. This was 
a percentage-computed addition to regular base pay which relied on years of city employment. 
The city uses a pay-range system, with minimum, mid-point and maximum bands of wages 
rather than a multi-step schedule. Annual merit increases are added to each officer’s base rate 
within the ranges. Longevity pay was calculated using the officer’s base pay and the number of 
city service years. This premium still applies to employees hired before 1992, when the longevity 
clause was still in effect. Between 10 to 15 years of service, employees earn an additional 3% of 
base pay; between 15 to 20 years, 4%: between 20 to 25 years, 5% of base pay; and in excess of 
25 years, the employee earns an additional 6% of base pay. In 1992, the premium was 
discontinued by the city. The interviewed official said that “longevity would be expensive to 
start up again” for all police employees, so the city has not been receptive to union requests to 
reinstate the premium to the collective bargaining agreement. 
 Cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) are an ongoing feature of the collective bargaining 
agreement and are usually retroactive to the effective beginning date of the contract upon 
ratification by the members, according to the official. The previous contract was finalized in 
November, a month after the expiration date of the contract, and specified a retroactive pay 
adjustment effective the first full pay period in October. In a similar vein, the City Five Official 
stated that although the city is not contractually obligated to continue merit increases, in all 
probability the increases will continue to be issued despite expiration of the collective bargaining 
agreement. This is a different approach than that of City Seven which has discontinued a shoe 
allowance to its officers as a result of a lapsed contract. City Five will in all probability grant the 
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merit increases in the expectations of the collective bargaining agreement eventually being 
ratified. The respective values of these merit increases had been mutually set by the signatories 
of the previous collective bargaining agreement.  
 City Five has included a number of items in its collective bargaining agreement that is 
standard to police contracts in Florida. Among these provisions are clothes cleaning allowances 
($535 annually), tuition reimbursement for higher education, and a vehicle take home policy. 
These costs are reflected in departmental operating expenses.  The vehicle take home policy was 
amended in 1998 to exclude law enforcement employees not living within the city. The 
interviewed official held the belief that take home vehicles were better maintained by the 
employees than were the pool vehicles, or vehicles shared by a number of employees. The 
official stated that the life cycle of a take home vehicle was about 8 years whereas a pool vehicle 
had only a two to three year life span. The official admitted that the initial costs of take home 
policies were expensive because many more vehicles were involved under the take home policy. 
In City Five, the official estimated, 240 marked vehicles would be used in a take home policy 
while between 50 to 60 pool vehicles would be required. However, the much shorter life-span of 
pool vehicles justifies a take home policy. The Fleet Management Department determines the 
replacement schedule based on a number of factors, especially the consideration that if 
maintenance costs become too excessive, the vehicle will be replaced. This usually results is 
marked vehicles lasting eight years and the department’s “non-pursuit vehicles” lasting ten to 
eleven years. As with many communities, City Five “piggybacks” with the Florida Sheriff 
vehicle bid process in which law enforcement vehicles are purchased in the aggregate for state 
and local agencies at lower purchase costs. The official believed that the collective bargaining 
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agreement does not address vehicle replacement policies because of sound Fleet Management 
policies of vehicle replacement.  
 Regarding other capital outlays, the official explained that funding comes from two 
sources for the department. Some technological innovations for the department are financed 
through a federal law enforcement contraband forfeiture trust fund, in which the department may 
purchase equipment under federal guidelines based on confiscated contraband from criminal 
activity. This fund has accumulated substantial worth, up to $5 million, over a period of time. 
Moreover, the fund is protected by federal guidelines which prohibit supplanting city general 
fund allocations to the department with contraband fund proceeds. Florida cities that have 
confiscated contraband usually maintain such a fund. The contraband fund is to be used for law 
enforcement expenditures in addition to the normal budget allocations provided by local 
governments. In addition to this contraband fund, the bureaus share a pool of $250,000 annually 
in discretionary funds above the base allocated items of such things as normal personal services 
expenditures and normal operating expenses. Included in the discretionary fund purchases would 
be such items as furniture, and other large purchase items. Fiscal control over such items is 
maintained though a requirement that purchase items of more than $2,000 in value must be 
approved at the departmental level. The official believed the unions had little interest and little 
influence over such purchases.  This observation produced additional support for the regression 
findings of Chapter IV.  
 The interviewed official explained that a fiscal division within one of City Five’s police 
bureaus prepares budget estimates for the central city budget office.  Both the city manager and 
the city budget office review the budget requests and submit the budget to a seven member city 
commission for legislative approval. City Five has converted to a biennial budget cycle, which 
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reduces the annual stress of the budgeting process. When asked about reconciling mid-year 
changes in the budget as a result of finalized collective bargaining provisions, the official 
responded that the city budget office was experienced in anticipating these changes and 





 With over 42,000 residents, City Six ranks as a Uniform Crime Report Group IV city, 
which places it in the “medium” city category for this study. City Six employs over 100 full time 
officers in its police department. Located in Central Florida, the city combines with other 
adjacent communities to form a much larger, highly urbanized metropolitan statistical area. 
Several main thoroughfares bisect City Six and connect the community to a much larger city 
within easy commuting distance. Although largely residential, City Six contains a very large 
commercial district that draws residents from a number of nearby communities. The city also 
includes numerous office complexes and a large regional medical facility. The subsequent 
activity in the city’s business areas causes a continuous flow of traffic that results in a steady 
background of sounds heard throughout the entire city. Other than parking lots, no large, open 
expanses of land can be found in City Six. The city’s urbanized appearance is augmented by the 
fact that adjacent cities complete encircle City Six without any clear definitions of boundary 
lines.  
 Demographically, City Six approximates the national average in terms of ethnic group 
percentages. The city has a higher percentage (15.9%) than the national average of Hispanic 
residents (12.5%), which is characteristic of Central Florida. Also, the percentage of White 
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ethnicity (79.2%) is a bit higher than the national average (75.1%), and the percentage of 
African-American residents (9.7%) is a bit lower than the national average 12.3%), but in neither 
case is there a dramatic difference. A singular feature of City Six is the relative level of income 
for its residents. The city boasts a per capita income that is 7.5% higher than the national 
average, and has a smaller proportionate number (7.4%) of people living below the poverty level 
than the national average (12.4%). The level of education is also slightly higher than the national 
average. 
 The crime rate in City Six is 15% below average for the 257 cities of the regression 
analysis, and the percentage of cases cleared is above the average for the 257 cities in the 
quantitative portion of the study. The characteristics that suggest City Six as a candidate for the 
qualitative analysis in this study are: the city’s higher than average capita income; small number 
of people living below the poverty level; and the observation that City Six is one of the few 
police departments with 100 or more officers in either Central or South Florida without a 
unionized police force. 
 
Unionization and City Six 
 
 The interviewed official reported that approximately eleven years ago City Six police 
officers used the Fraternal Order of Police as a bargaining agent. However, a protracted 
bargaining session that failed to produce an agreement with the city after many months of 
negotiations caused the majority of sworn law enforcement employees to become disenchanted 
with the union. This situation eventually resulted in decertification of the union in an employee 
election. According to the City Six official, “The city operates on the assumption that we have a 
union” in determining wages, benefits, and working conditions. Such an assumption provides the 
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incentive to treat employees in a similar manner as their unionized counterparts in order to keep 
the city union-free. The police wages are higher in City Six than in most cities in the surrounding 
area, and the sworn employees have the opportunity to attain an average 4.6% of base pay merit 
increase annually.  
 Pay and benefits are not the only issue in the city’s proactive efforts to keep the union at 
bay. The labor relations philosophy in City Six, according to the interviewed official is basically 
to “treat people good.” City Six has codified its unionization policy in a document available to 
all city employees and posted on a web site. In the document, City Six itemizes its opposition to 
unionization in the city departments. One of the items listed as a point of concern is the 
observation that unionization creates an adversarial relationship between the city and the 
employees. The City Six official recalled an incident which involved a dispute about monetary 
issues between a highly unionized department and the city.  The city’s dispute with the unionized 
department contributed to the decision to contract the functions of that department out to County 
government control. 
  The city’s “Policy on Unionism” further emphasizes that “…it is the city’s sincere belief 
that unions do not work to the benefit of our employees.”  According to the city’s policy on 
unionism, the employees would no longer enjoy the access to higher level management as a 
result of unionization because a labor organization would supplant present employer-employee 
relationships with the more formal exclusive labor-management representation of a bargaining 
agent. Moreover, the document argues, unionism “…does not guarantee that any employee will 
receive better benefits or terms of employment.” The interviewed official noted that the nearby 
county fire department, which was unionized, went for years without a contract because the 
negotiating parties were unable to agree on terms. However, City Six uses other measures as well 
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to discourage unionization in the departments, including offering voice to employees through 
various opportunities for employee participation in departmental affairs.  
 Employee participation occurs on several levels in the City Six Police Department. In 
addition to maintaining an open door policy, the Police Chief has made it a practice to meet 
personally with each departmental employee, sworn or unsworn, at least once each year. 
Moreover, the employees have an opportunity to express their views in the organization structure 
through a number of formal boards which affect police operations within City Six. The Policy 
Review Committee, composed of line officers and mid-management, serves as an advisory body 
that provides input to upper management decision making processes.  
Another example of employee involvement is a Discipline Advisory Board which renders 
opinion for consideration by the Chief of Police regarding the appropriateness and extent of 
proposed discipline to be issued to police officers. The Discipline Advisory Board consists 
entirely of rank and file employees, or peers of the disciplined employees. In its capacity as a 
reviewing agency, the Disciplinary Review Board is entitled to pertinent documentation 
regarding each case, and has access to a Lieutenant from the Internal Affairs who answers any 
questions pertaining to the case. After deliberating on the assembled information, the 
Disciplinary Review Board renders a statement of opinion which declares whether or not they 
agree with the proposed discipline. This opinion or recommendation is submitted to the Police 
Chief for final consideration and judgment.  
Membership in the Police Benevolent Association or the Fraternal Order of Police is not 
restricted to bargaining unit representation. A fraternal aspect available to all law enforcement 
employees is representation in disciplinary matters. Through this aspect, police employee 
organizations have some influence, however limited, in City Six. The interviewed official 
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cautioned that while it was only a guess, he would estimate that a small percentage, maybe 
around 5% of the employees, utilized the labor representation benefits of either the Police 
Benevolent Association or the Fraternal Order of Police in disciplinary matters.  
In addition to the one-on-one meetings with the Chief, the open door policy, and the 
various participatory boards and committees, the employees may also express their opinions to 
upper management at periodic “all-hands” meetings. The City Six official suggested that in 
consideration of the wage and benefits packages offered by the city, and the manner in which the 
department is managed, the union really has little to offer the employees. With present policies, 
employees have direct influence on the organization whereas with a union, these relations would 
be funneled through a small group of union representatives. The interviewed official believes 
that the employees may not want to relinquish this influence.  
Police Expenditures in a Non-Unionized Department 
 
The per capita police expenditures for City Six are far below the state average of the 257 
cities tested in regression analysis. Moreover, compared to the cities comprising the qualitative 
sample, City Six had the lowest per capita police expenditures and the lowest millage rate. Yet, 
according to the City Six official interviewed, the city offers the highest salaries for police 
officers in the county and in much of the surrounding area. City Six is competitive in a number 
of other areas as well, the interviewed official explains. Tuition reimbursement for up to $1300 is 
available to the employees, as are some of the more traditional insurance benefits. Although the 
city does not use a stepped salary schedule, annual performance merit raises have averaged at 
about 4.6% in the recent year. All employees with a discipline free year qualify for such raises. 
Every two years, for a six year period, a career track incentive plan allows officers to participate 
in a promotional test that could net the successful applicants 7½% every two years. The 
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promotional process in the career track consists of three tiers: Police Officer 1st Class; Senior 
Patrol Officer; and Master Patrol Officer. Other amenities comparable to unionized departments 
were also available, such as take home vehicles. 
Within the last several years, City Six implemented an “assigned vehicle program,” or 
take-home vehicle plan. Pool vehicles, in which a vehicle is utilized by more than one shift, 
would have a serviceable life of two years in the city, according to the interviewed official. The 
assigned vehicle program doubled the serviceable life of the police vehicles as a result of less 
daily usage and also because officers tended to take better care of the vehicles assigned to them. 
A 30 mile limit applies to the take home policy, and officers living in the city are not charged for 
fuel. Replacement decisions for vehicles, as in most Florida municipalities are determined by a 
city fleet services department. Also consistent with other Florida municipalities, in City Six, 
vehicle replacement decisions are usually based on a combination of factors, including mileage, 
repair record and age of vehicle. Additional vehicles requests for the police department must 
originate in the department and is often justified by impact fees that are acquired from new 
development. Such requests are separate from the annual budget process.  
City Six outfits its officers with quality equipment and state of the art technology as well. 
Tasers, for instance, are shunned by some departments but are issued to officers in City Six, as 
are the standard fare of computers, radios, and other electronic devices. Even the raingear 
selected as standard issue is top of the line and pricy, Gore-Tex® products. The low per capita 
expenditures in City Six can not be attributed to the utilization of lower grade equipment.  
With the exception of pre-employment screening, medical examinations are not a 
requirement, and therefore not an expenditure, for officers employed by the City Six Police 
Department. However, the department does utilize a mandatory wellness program in which all 
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sworn personnel, including the Police Chief, must qualify every six months in a fitness 
assessment test. Failure to qualify in the program, the interviewed official explained, could and 
has resulted in discipline of officers. The wellness program, which began in 1988, was 
challenged in court by a Fraternal Order of Police attorney representing a law enforcement 
employee. The court upheld the rationale for requiring participation in the program and also 
upheld the program itself. As an added incentive for physical fitness, the department awards 
additional leave (up to two days per test) in response to positive performances in the wellness 
program. 
Another creative measure that was intended to encourage employee involvement and 
provide support for the officers in City Six, is a budget “wish list” which the employees can (in 
writing) suggest types, grades, and amount of equipment and/or supplies needed for the 
performance of their duties. Wish list items, after discussion and consideration are incorporated 
into the budget requests at the divisional or bureau level. Each employee has the opportunity to 
influence budget decisions through the budget wish list procedure. The initial budget process 
begins at the divisional and bureau levels, in which needs for the upcoming year are assessed and 
monetized. Even before the process begins, however, the central budget office of the city informs 
the department of the allowable percentage increases over the previous fiscal year. This 
information provides a guide to the city departments in the initial budget requests. The initial 
estimates are submitted to the department’s budget manager who then compiles these estimates 
into a unified document. The budget estimates then is submitted by the budget manager to the 
department’s command staff (Chief, Deputy Chiefs, and Bureau Commanders) which then 
scrutinizes and adjusts the budget document, if necessary. Upon finalization of the budget review 
by the command staff, the document is submitted to the city manager who usually makes the 
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final recommendations  and submits the budget to the legislative body. The City Six official 
stated that the police budget never had been refused by the legislative body during the current 
city manager’s term and the budget rarely was turned back by the city manager. 
The interview of the City Six official offers evidence that a factor or factors other than 
merely wages and benefits are responsible for higher expenditures in unionized cities. As 
discussed, City Six had the highest police wages in their county yet exhibited per capita police 
expenditures far lower than that of unionized departments. Many of the benefits offered by City 
Six compared favorably to those of other cities. However, benefits specified by City Six do 
include health insurance cost containment. According to the interviewed official, the city pays 
100% of health insurance for employees, but does not pay for health insurance premiums for the 
employees’ dependents. The interviewed official reported that the health insurance extension 
plan for a spouse and two children costs the employee $1,000 per month. All of the unionized 
cities in the qualitative inquiry pay at least part of dependent health care coverage.  City One 
pays 55% of health care insurance coverage for dependents, City Three pays 75% of health 
insurance coverage for dependents, and City Seven pays 73% of dependent health insurance 
coverage.   
The City Six official admitted, as did other officials in the qualitative inquiry, that 
turnover was a concern in the department: “Everything is so fluid here.” In a situation similar to 
City Four, the City Six official noted that the majority of officers leaving the department for 
other law enforcement agencies usually moved on to nearby sheriff’s offices. Otherwise, the 
official said, the city was able to compete favorably with all cities in Central Florida except for 
the central city in the metropolitan statistical area, and another medium sized city.  
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The interviewed official stated that, in his opinion, union presence in police departments 
restricts managerial flexibility. Such a restriction may impose limits on fiscal creativity which, in 
turn might result in increased expenditures.  As implied in City Six’s “Policy on Unionism,” the 
structured and adversarial relationship between unions and city departments may not benefit 
either the city or the employee in terms of labor relations related costs. None of the other cities’ 
officials interviewed reported that their cities had a policy even remotely similar to that of City 
Six. However, most of the unionized cities had indicated that their expectations of police salaries 
differed considerably than those of their union counterparts. Two of the five unionized cities 






 Current population estimates place City Seven in the study’s large city category with a 
total of nearly 195,000 residents. 670 full time officers staff the police department of City Seven. 
Located in Central Florida, City Seven lies in the I-4 corridor of Florida and forms the center of a 
large standard metropolitan statistical area that includes nearly 2 million people. Consistent with 
the patterns of large cities in Florida, crime rate is relatively high in City Seven, with Uniform 
Crime Report Part I crimes in excess of 11,000 in fiscal year 2002. Also consistent with large 
Florida cities, cases cleared in City Seven are relatively low, showing percentages of less than 
three quarters of the average cases cleared rate for municipalities in Florida. Continued growth in 
City Seven provides additional resources to fund proportionately high per capita police 
expenditures, with total taxable property value currently in excess of $12 billion. 
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 Demographically, City Seven has a very diverse population, with: 61% of the population 
being non-Hispanic white; nearly 27% African American; and the fastest growing segment of the 
population, Hispanic residents, presently at 17.5%. The education level is higher than average for 
the state, and City Seven has the lowest percentage of citizens over 65 years of age than any of 
the large cities in the peninsular part of the state.  
 The city has a much lower than average home ownership rate (40.8% versus 69.39%), 
which corresponds with the much higher than sample average (44% more) per capita police 
expenditures experienced in the community. Per capita income is approximately the same as that 
of the state and the nation averages, but the percentage of individuals below poverty level are 
several percentage points greater than both the state and national averages. The unique 
characteristics that included City Seven in the qualitative portion of this study are: the city is the 
center of a metropolitan statistical area; population diversity of the city; the relatively large tax 
base (taxable value of property); relatively high per capita police expenditures; the education 
level of the resident population; and big city crime rates. 
 
Collective Bargaining in City Seven 
 
 The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) acts as the bargaining agent for the officers and 
sergeants employed by City Seven. The city had begun its association with the Fraternal Order of 
Police in 1977 when the first collective bargaining agreement was written. The City Seven 
interviewed official had been associated with the police department for 23 years and was a 
contract-signatory member of the negotiating team for the city.  
The union in City Seven meets quarterly with department management, according to the 
interviewed official. These meetings are informal and primarily for the exchange of ideas and 
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opinions. The union also has the right of review for policy changes, but is limited to expressing 
concern through feedback. The union has no right of veto over policy changes. City Seven 
official reports that the Police Chief regularly consults with the union regarding imminent policy 
changes to “get buy-in by the union on these policy changes.”  The union is often invited to sit in 
on police board meetings to apprise the union of current events and situations affecting the 
department. One example cited by the official was the change in pursuit policy enacted by the 
city. The union was invited to provide input to the policy change. 
 The city official stated that memorandums of understanding have not been utilized in the 
city’s police department labor relations for the past 12 years because they were considered 
inappropriate by union members. Since memorandums of understanding require only agreement 
between department officials and union officials, no ratification of the agreement was possible 
by the rank and file union members. As a result, accusations of “back door deals” between union 
and management arose. Eventually memorandums of understanding were discontinued 
altogether. 
 Contract negotiations, according to the City Seven official, must begin with a written 
notice to begin negotiations not less than 90 days or more than 120 days before the expiration of 
a current contract. With the exception of the present contract negotiations, the official stated that 
in the last 17 years, no collective bargaining required more than four months to resolve. In 
addition, the city would be unlikely to approve a retroactive compensation package in cases such 
as those presently confronting the department in which the contract had not been resolved at the 
time of the interview. As with most communities in Florida, the fiscal year begins October 1st in 
City Seven. Collective bargaining in City Seven shares a similar fate as labor negotiations in City 
Five. In both cities, the primary issue is wages.  
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Teams of negotiators on both sides forge the collective bargaining agreement in City 
Seven. Employee relations specialists from a labor bureau, along with an officer acting as the 
police chief’s liaison form management’s negotiating team. A host of union officers, some of 
which act in an ex-officio capacity such as the president of the local Fraternal Order of Police 
Lodge, staff the union negotiating team. At the time of the interview, union relations with the 
mayor’s office had degenerated, and constructive communications between the union and the 
mayor had been suspended. At time of the interview, the local lodge of the Fraternal Order of 
Police was preparing a recall petition for the city electorate regarding the mayoral office. Prior to 
the rift, the mayor had an open door policy with the union.  
Each division within the police department prepares their own budgets, and the bureau 
commanders submit these budgets to the police chief who then reviews and discusses the budget 
requests with the bureau commanders. The divisional budgets are then combined by the chief’s 
office and submitted to the city’s central budget office. The central budget office reviews the 
police budget and consults with the police department if necessary to resolve financial issues. 
Each city department, including the police department, has the right of appeal should the central 
budget office disallow portions of the budget requests. Once the budget preparation process has 
been finalized, the budget with all the component sections is submitted by the central budget 
office to the city council for legislative approval. 
 
Police Union Impact in City Seven 
 
 City Seven no longer funds regular medical examinations for its police employees. The 
interviewed official explained that the required annual physical examinations were creating 
liability issues for the city. Privacy issues regarding health information standards as defined by 
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the Health Insurance and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA), were associated with the required 
annual physical examinations and raised questions related to the extent of health information to 
which the city was entitled access. As a result of lawsuits, the city therefore terminated the 
required annual medical examinations of its officers. This contrasts sharply with the situation in 
City Three in which medical examinations are required of all law enforcement employees and 
the complexity of these examinations dramatically escalate as the employee ages. 
The City Seven official stated that the Fraternal Order of Police had performed a number 
of services beneficial to its members in the city. Standardization of discipline procedures was 
one such benefit. Before the union was certified in the city, discipline of officers was not always 
consistent or equitable. Officers had experienced different types of discipline for the same 
infraction, and a perception of unfairness among the officers resulted. The unions provided voice 
that enforced due process in the discipline procedure. However, this resulted in administrative 
processing time related to processing grievances and maintaining dialogue with the union.  
Another service provided by the union that was beneficial to the officers, according to the 
official, was compensation issues. The city uses an 11 step pay schedule for its officers. 10 years 
are required to reach the top of the pay scale for an officer. City Seven ranks among the better 
paid law enforcement agencies in Florida, the official noted. As a result, the city has a decided 
advantage in recruiting new officers. There are a limited number of quality recruits available for 
law enforcement positions throughout the state, and the very competitive starting pay and 
benefits in City Seven ensures that the city will continue to attract such applicants. The official 
added that a number of communities index their officer starting pay to that of City Seven. He 
added that many aspiring officers would establish themselves in smaller departments in the area 
and beyond with the hopes of eventually getting hired by City Seven. 
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The interviewed official also stated that the union can operate to the detriment of City 
Seven. The presence of a union creates difficulty in changing discipline procedures. The nature 
of the occupation requires that the city be sensitive to domestic violence and DUI (driving under 
the influence) incidents among its employees. The union can and does by virtue of the collective 
bargaining agreement exercise its duty of fair representation to mitigate discipline resulting from 
these and other types of behavior that cause concern for the city.  The city is thus required to 
incrementalize changes on certain policies rather than make sweeping changes where necessary. 
Otherwise, arguments of past practice would tend to defeat drastic changes. This situation often 
requires more time and effort to resolve issues. In contrast, past practice is not a viable 
impediment in non-unionized cities such as City Two and City Six. 
Although the union officials draw from a Union Business Pool Time to process union 
business, the time required by management personnel in responding to the union’s concerns 
incurs additional expense for the city. The Union Business Pool Time refers to an arrangement in 
which union members can donate time from their accrued annual personal leave or compensatory 
time to a Union Business Pool Time which designated union officers can use to conduct union 
business and still get paid. Other administrative costs, such as a requirement of the city to 
reproduce the collective bargaining agreement for all covered employees also incur additional 
expense. 
   The City Seven official pointed out that when the department “costs out” (calculates 
estimates of costs for) the negotiated items of the collective bargaining agreement and provides 
copies of these calculations to the union, the union rarely challenges the estimates, which include 
roll-up costs. Roll-up costs refer to management contributions to benefit programs that require 
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percentage of wage calculations such as social security, pension plans, and life insurance. Other 
roll-up costs include holiday pay, and supplemental pay such as overtime. 
In addition to salary and benefits, other items such as educational reimbursements (up to 
$1500 annually), and court attendance costs (two and one half hour minimum pay) were union 
initiated collective bargaining issues. City Seven does not, according to the interviewed official, 
provide cleaning allowance. Two years after the union was certified in City Seven, shoe 
allowances began in the department as a result of union negotiations. Each officer received $135 
annually for shoe allowance. With lapse of the recent contract, the city has discontinued shoe 
allowance, arguing that the contract had expired and the city was no longer required to provide 
the allowance. City Five, on the other hand has continued many of the provisions in the expired 
collective bargaining agreement. The union in City Seven reacted with an objection to the city’s 
unilateral discontinuance of a previously negotiated item.  Whether or not the union prevails in 
this situation, their objection requires time and preparation on the part of management to resolve, 
which is an example of union voice impacting police expenditures even though it fails to achieve 
its objective.  
The union in City Seven also mandates certain types of training such as twice yearly 
firearm training, and 100 rounds of ammunition per month for firearm practice. The official 
pointed out that the officers rarely use those provisions. Other types of training have been 
negotiated in the past, such as water rescue training for the lakes and retention ponds in the city, 
but these types of training, the official explained, have since been abandoned by the city as 
unjustifiable expenditures for the city.  The city has made a “good faith” commitment to the 
union to provide driver training to the officers. In comparison to the other cities in the sample, all 
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of which were considerably smaller, City Seven seemed to experience the most union attention 
on training. The only exception was City Three and the issue of K-9 training. 
The Fraternal Order of Police voiced concerns regarding a safety issue, the City Seven 
official reports, that may ultimately prove quite costly to the city. The union had asked for and 
received an air standards quality test of the police headquarters. Results of the test were not good 
for the 30 year old building. Asbestos had been removed at least once from the building, and 
remodeling has occurred a number of times in sections of the building. As a result, the city 
currently is taking steps to correct the situation, possibly even constructing a new police 
headquarters building. The official also said that similar requests regarding safety issues had 
been made in the past by the union, such as a safety study of the Crown Victoria patrol vehicles. 
Although the patrol vehicle study did not require outlays for equipment, costs were incurred for 
the study itself. Another incident involved a union demand for the city to show safe working 
conditions in an area which experienced intermittent radio coverage by a repeater tower that 
serviced portable radios for the officers. The city was able to demonstrate that the coverage was 
adequate in that case.  
The City Seven official, commenting on the union’s lack of influence on capital outlays, doubted 
that union members would find the issue of vehicle replacement of great importance, given the 
department’s vehicle replacement policy. Vehicles are amortized over a five year period and 
replaced according to a formula that includes consideration of repair history, mileage, and age of 
vehicle. There had been a brief period of concern for the union in a situation that requires the 
department to provide law enforcement services to a local regional authority facility. The 
regional authority was responsible for providing the vehicles and the department was responsible 
for providing the officers. The vehicles had accumulated, in some cases, mileage in 
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excess of 150,000. However, the situation has been resolved with the regional authority 
replacing the vehicles. No real capital outlays concerns have been expressed by the police unions 




 The foregoing qualitative research provides some explanation to the manner in which 
additional costs are incurred by unionized police departments. Often the additional costs are  
subtle and not readily perceived. The administrative time required to process grievances and 
process even routine union requests add to the burden of managerial personnel in terms of both 
time and effort. This is especially evidenced by the negotiation team structuring and preparations 
in the case of the interviewed unionized cities. The costs of labor or city attorneys and their staff 
are reflected in operating expenses, and thus are clearly some of the expenditures incurred as a 
result of unionization. Many economists believe that unions exert a negative impact on resource 
allocation and economic efficiency (Kaufman, 2004: 378). Much of this negative impact is the 
result of voice influencing the allocation of resources to resolve disputes. 
The concept of “double-deck bargaining” or multilateral bargaining did not receive much 
supporting evidence of a noticeable existence among the officials interviewed. The City Four 
official stated that there was not much lobbying-type activity of the city council by the Fraternal 
Order of Police in that city. None of the cities in the inquiry expressed an affirmative answer 
when questioned about the possibility of police union multilateral bargaining. The City One 
official recalled of an incident of firefighters in a nearby city engaging in possible multilateral 
bargaining, but reported that the police union in his city did not engage in such practices to his 
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knowledge. The City Seven official noted that the police union was engaged in political activity 
in opposition to the current mayor, but that there was little interaction between the police union 
and the city commissioners.  
 Settlements of contractual disputes usually encumber management in a different manner 
than labor.  Should management prevail and labor lose (or concedes) in a contractual dispute, the 
resultant cost usually is not borne in a monetary fashion by labor. However, usually when 
management loses and labor prevails in a contractual dispute, management often experiences a 
monetary setback. Moreover, realizing the impact on departmental operations, management will 
often compromise in disputes that result in a monetary settlement. One example of this situation 
is the case of City Three and K-9 training assignment. The interviewed official in City Three 
realized that by using the K-9 training of a larger agency, the City Three police department could 
save expenditures. However, the union in this case, emboldened by a contractual clause in the 
collective bargaining agreement, was able to force the city to adhere to a different policy that 
was more favorable to the union and its members. This resulted in the city continuing to pay the 
K-9 employee the 5% premium, despite the fact that the services were not being utilized from the 
employee. Moreover, although temporarily using the cheaper sheriff’s K-9 training in the 
interim, the city still was required to seek a replacement within its ranks to promote to a K-9 
training position. This resulted in additional personal services costs beyond that which also was 
incurred. 
 Results of the interviews suggest that well defined policies regarding expenditures are the 
least influenced by unionization or employee voice. Vehicle replacement policies were one such 
example of well defined policies. Quantitative analysis failed to demonstrate a significant union 
effect on capital outlays, and qualitative results reported that unions and employees had little 
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influence on such policies. One non-unionized city (City Six) with a well defined policy 
regarding unions had the lowest per capita police expenditures of the seven cities in the 
qualitative inquiry.  Cities with well defined policies regarding other phases of operations might 
benefit from such polices even though the department is unionized.   
A statement from the City Two official merits special consideration. The official had 
opined that his city could not afford a union. A number of cities, relying on economies of scale, 
contract the services of Florida Sheriff’s Offices to provide community protection rather than 
create their own law enforcement agency.  Consider the comparison between unionized City 
Three and non-unionized City Six. City Six has a per capita police expenditure of less than half 
that of City Three (Table 18). This observation would appear to support the regression findings. 
A non-unionized city from an adjacent region to City Three spent 44% less per capita for police 
services than City Three, even though the city was nearly identical in size. Some considerations 
of the underlying costs differences between the two cities are that City Three has 16% more 
officers to protect the same number of residents, and City Three spends 25% more per officer 
than the same size non-unionized city in Central Florida.  Zax (1989: 21) found that the 
longitudinal effects of unionization on public sector departments resulted in higher employment 
per capita ratios in bargaining units as compared to non-unionized units.  
Interviews of the various city officials indicate that there is a tendency to include pre-
existing policies in contractual provisions. This practice may not only increase expenditures over 
time, it appears to lock in informal policies and extend contractual provisions beyond expiration 
dates. Consider the case of City Five and its policy to continue merit increases to bargaining unit 
employees despite non-agreement on an expired collective bargaining agreement. Further 
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research is necessary to determine whether or not a sense of moral obligation to bargaining unit 
employees results from provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. 
One of the major differences in employee benefits between unionized and non-unionized 
departments often may be the issue of health care coverage for dependents. Since employers pay 
nearly half the nation’s health care bills, provisions designed to lower the cost of health care are 
included in more than 95% of 2002 collective bargaining agreements in this country (Carrell & 
Heavrin, 2004: 345). Health care insurance premiums have risen at a rate nearly quintupled that 
of inflation in the last few years. In 2002, health insurance premium costs increased by 12.9%, 
increased by 13.9% in 2003, and in 2004, the increase was 11.2% (Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2005a). In 2004, the average family plan health insurance coverage cost $9,950 (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2005b). While Cities Three and Seven pay 75% and 73% respectively for dependent 
health care insurance, City One pays only 55%, but still pays a larger portion of the costs than 
does the employee. All three of these cities are unionized. However, City Six, which is non-
unionized, pays nothing toward health care coverage for employees’ dependents. The only other 
city which did not offer paid premiums for dependents in the qualitative inquiry was City Two, 
which also had a non-unionized department. Employee voice, as personified by the union, has a 
dramatic impact on expenditures in this instance. In City Three and City Seven, this impact adds 
more than $7,300 annually to police expenditures per each employee with spouse and/or 
dependents.  
The responses by the interviewees regarding the procedures involved in capital outlays 
also seem to support the evidence from regression analysis that unions have little influence over 
capital outlay expenditures. While the individual cities may have different vehicle replacement 
schedules, these procedures are well entrenched and are usually defined by city rather than 
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departmental policies. Moreover, these policies appear to be established according to rigid 
utilitarian values that emphasize practical and justifiable guidelines. Although resources may be 
restricted and purchase policies reflect that restriction, effort is made to ensure that public safety 
is not compromised. As a result, vehicle replacement policies are more inflexible and less likely 
to be influenced by the interests espoused by unionization. 
Similar dynamisms found in the vehicle replacement policies may be at work in all of the 
expenditure categories for non-unionized departments, such as Cities Two and Six, which 
purport to have “open door policies” which are intended to provide employees voice. As noted in 
the discussion of exit-voice in Chapter II, these open door policies may serve to allow employees 
to vent their frustrations, but do not permit this voice to substantially alter departmental policy. 
Harlos (2001: 329) noted that the protocols of the informal complaint systems are poorly 
specified, and thus permit greater procedural variations. This would make such systems far less 
influential in decision-making than in the more formalized and procedurally specified 
mechanisms found in unionized organizations. Since employee voice in non-unionized 
departments does not perceptively influence predetermined policies, which are not negotiable in 
non-unionized settings, informal employee voice would not impact expenditures in the same 
manner as would employee voice formalized by unionization. 
Union voice, on the other hand, is empowered and well defined by state statute in the 
case of police employees.  Management has no option but to negotiate with the union. In turn, 
the union then exerts pressure on management to change policy. Employee voice acquires a full 
measure of influence under unionized conditions, and impacts police expenditures as a result. 
This influence, as we have seen, is not restricted to the bounds of labor contracts. In the case of 
City Five, there was a sense of moral obligation to continue the merit increases despite an 
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expired contract. City Seven, on the other hand, discontinued their shoe allowances to 
employees, and justified the action by stating that the contract was expired and the city was no 
longer obligated to fulfill the terms of that provision.  
The effects of unionization affect other agencies as well. As noted by Zax (1988: 301), 
spillover effects on wages and benefits affect other departments. All of the officials interviewed 
were keenly aware of the comparative status of their city’s police wages in respect to other 
jurisdictions. As evidenced in the case of City Six, this awareness clearly had an influence on the 
city’s wage policies. Several of the officials interviewed commented that the unions regularly 
compare wages prevailing in their communities to those of other communities and subsequently 
request parity with the other communities. The effects of union voice impact the expenditures of 
more than the host community. 
According to Hirschman (1970), Voice and Exit work in concert and compliment each 
other while Loyalty acts as an intervening factor. In City Two, the interviewed official believed 
that many of the officers remained in the department because of the police chief who listened to 
their concerns. However, the official admitted, sometimes the requirements of personal life, such 
as family needs and promotional opportunities became so strong that the employee felt that the 
employee’s requests (voice) could not improve his or her situation and felt compelled to seek 
employment in a different agency (exit). While turnover seemed to be a topic of concern for 
several of the departments in the qualitative inquiry, it seemed more evident in the interviews 
with the non-unionized departments. Voice could not successfully advance employee concerns in 
the non-unionized departments, so exit may have been perceived as the only course of action in 
these situations.  
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In the unionized departments, voice has much more influence, and as evidenced in the 
statistical regressions, impacts police expenditures perceptively. The qualitative results of this 
study support the findings of the quantitative portion of the study. In the personal services 
expense category, the comments by the City Five official most appropriately demonstrate the 
influence of union voice. As noted by the official, the unions routinely examined collective 
bargaining agreements of other agencies and would refer to the provisions of these agreements 
while negotiating salary and benefits packages for police employees in City Five. The organized 
effort of the union to negotiate economic gains often results in success, whereas the absence of 
unions has not been shown to be as effective. The high rate of turnover in City Two was directly 
attributable to the lower salaries. Employee voice was amplified by the union in the case of City 
Five, but failed to be heard in City Two, and the employees seeking better pay were forced to 
exit the department and look for better paying positions. 
In another example of union escalated personal services expenditures, the grievance 
procedure required management personnel time to process disputes. As noted by the official 
interviewed in City Four, “We have our streaks,” in the number of grievances that require time to 
resolve. The grievance resolving activity is a personal service expense directly related to 
responding to employee voice as expressed in a unionized environment. Each interviewed 
official from a unionized city indicated that during labor talks, at least one member from the 
department serves at least as a departmental representative to provide technical assistance to city 
attorneys or labor relations specialists. Moreover, additional personal services time is spent 
accumulating information in preparation for collective bargaining sessions. Collective bargaining 
in its various aspects requires many hours of clerical, research, and administrative time, all of 
which increase expenditures. 
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In the case of operating expenses, the qualitative results supported the quantitative 
findings by demonstrating that operating expenses such as labor attorney fees were not needed 
for non-union departments but were needed for union departments. Medical exams appeared 
only in bargaining cities, and dependent health insurance premiums were paid only by unionized 
departments in the qualitative sample.  In the non-unionized departments interviewed, dependent 
health insurance was available as extension of existing health care plans, but the employee had to 
pay the entire premium for spouse and/or dependent coverage. In departments that contribute 
75% of total health insurance premium at a starting salary of $33,500, these employers paid 
dependent health insurance premiums equate to a 22% salary increase for a newly hired 
employee. 
Law enforcement provides a rich sample base to measure the effects of employee voice. 
A large number of law enforcement agencies exist as potential employers for professional law 
enforcement employees. Exit thus is a viable alternative to the employee in cases where 
employee voice is so ineffective, the bonds of loyalty are weakened and exit becomes a more 
attractive response to existing conditions. Employee voice is weakest in non-unionized 
organizations. The qualitative inquiry demonstrates this situation with its descriptions of 
increased turnover in non-unionized environments. The most extreme case was the example of 
non-union City Two in which the most senior employee had less than seven years with the 
department. Benefits, such as paid dependent health insurance premiums tend to increase loyalty 
among employees because the reasons for exiting become a less attractive alternative.  
Benefits such as dependent health care premiums are more likely to be found in 
unionized departments than in non-unionized departments. Employee voice, as strengthened by 
unionization, secures such types of benefits and provides additional incentive for police 
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employees to remain in their current employment because it offers the opportunity to the 
employee to have some control over his/her destiny. However, unionization comes with a price. 




Information revealed in the qualitative inquiry appears to support the quantitative 
findings. The results of the inquiry indicated that each of the seven cities included in the sample 
performed consistently with the predictions of the models discussed in Chapter IV, the Results 
and Findings chapter. The unionized departments exhibited proportionately greater expenditures 
than did the non-unionized departments. In the cases of the non-unionized departments, one city 
had a proactive program to exclude unions from the city which included offering their employees 
competitive wage packages. Despite the wage packages, the non-unionized city was still able to 
control costs to a greater extent than unionized departments.  
The qualitative inquiry broadened understanding of the information provided by 
statistical regression in this study. Although the quantitative analysis uncovered the extent of  
union influence on police expenditures, the qualitative inquiry identified some of the primary 
contributors to union influence.  In both the quantitative portion of the study and in the 
qualitative portion, however, the conclusions were identical: Employee voice, as amplified by 
unionization, substantially impacts police expenditures. The final chapter of this study 
summarizes these conclusions and discusses the implications of these conclusions.    
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
 The focus of the dissertation was to determine whether or not unions increase police 
expenditures, and if there was such an impact, to determine the extent of the impact on each of 
the expenditure categories. Regression analysis of police expenditures for 257 Florida cities 
provided evidence that unions do influence police expenditures and influence these expenditures 
to a substantial degree. A limited qualitative inquiry supported the quantitative findings and 
suggested that certain collective bargaining provisions may be responsible for the union 
increased police expenditures. 
Although the literature in Chapter II discussed the impact of unionization upon total 
police expenditures and police personal expenditures across a wide geographic area, the effects 
of unionization upon police operating expenses and capital outlays remained relatively 
unexamined. Moreover, there was a paucity of research in the literature regarding the impact of 
unionization on police expenditures within a single state, a right-to-work state. This study 
attempts to advance understanding of union influence on not only total police expenditures but 
also on the three separate categories of police expenditures, and to determine the impact that 
unionization may exert on these expenditures in a right-to-work state such as Florida.  
 Unions provide voice to their members, allowing the individual employees an 
opportunity to influence their employers’ decisions and policies.  This voice is most apparent in 
the manner of resource allocation in an organization. By understanding the effects of union voice 
on resource allocation in organizations, administrators are better equipped to control costs by 
dealing knowledgeably with union negotiators and officials. The qualitative inquiry identified 
some areas of concern that impact police expenditures. Most research for union-influenced 
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expenditures in the literature primarily focused upon the more immediate concerns of unions, 
such as salaries, benefits, and supplemental pay. This study has extended that research by 
measuring the union impact on these expenditures in a single right-to-work state. However, 
additional expenditures in operating expenses and capital outlays have evaded this focus and 
therefore little attention has been accorded these relatively large expense categories. Union voice 
is present in at least one of these cost categories as well, and the effects of union voice in these 
categories should be studied to provide a more comprehensive knowledge of union impact on 
organizational decision making. 
 A review of empirical studies in the literature, especially those of Gely and Chandler 
(1993a; 1995), and Witt (1990), provided much of the pioneering studies that guided selection of 
control variables. The intent of this study was to rely on statistical techniques common in the 
literature and comparable to other empirical studies. However, this study specified control 
variables from three different dimensions of factors that would influence police expenditures. 
The intent was to render the model comparable in some aspects to other empirical studies 
without compromising structural integrity. Since the sample selection was confined to a single 
state (Florida) certain defining characteristics would provide additional explanatory information 
not present in studies using samples from a larger geographical area. These defining 
characteristics included the urban versus rural environs of the communities, and the relative 
indication of service efficiency. As a result, certain control variables such as metropolitan 
statistical areas and cases cleared were utilized to represent influential factors not present in other 
studies.  Moreover, the three expenditures categories serving as dependent variables are 
considerably different than the aggregate police expenditures used by most studies. Comparisons 
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with other studies referenced in this study should then be restricted to overall conclusions rather 
than to specific relative values.   
 
Summary of Major Findings 
Research Questions 
 
 Four questions emerged from the original discussion of literature, and these questions 
guide the research presented in this study. The first research question posed in this study was: 
Does unionization influence the level of total police expenditures? Both the quantitative and the 
qualitative studies provided evidence that unionization influences the level of total police 
expenditures. The first question for research was to determine whether or not unions influenced 
total police expenditures in a right-to-work state such as Florida. Specifically, the question 
formulated a hypothesis that examines whether or not unions actually increase police 
expenditures in total. Once the study investigated the issue and produced evidence that unions 
influence total police expenditures, it attempted to identify which categorical expenses are 
susceptible to union influence. Regression analysis of the hypothesis related to this question 
produced strong evidence that even in a right-to-work environment such as Florida, unions 
significantly impacted total police expenditures. A strong model was identified with eight control 
variables from three different dimensions (demographic, finance, law enforcement) that would 
affect police expenditures.  All of the control variables were significant in the model and yet the 
independent variable of concern, which represented unionization, exhibited a robust existence 
throughout the modeling. Specification bias was thus minimized in the model, and the regression 
results strongly supported the research hypothesis that the presence of unions tends to increase 
police expenditures.    
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The second research question began a focused attempt to identify which police 
expenditure categories are influenced by unionization.  To accomplish this task, ordinary least 
squares regression was used to test a hypothesis which supposed that union presence would 
cause increases in police personal services expenditures. The primary concern of employees 
would presumably be for decisions regarding wages and benefits. Employees that are unionized 
have additional means to influence their organizations in these decisions through the mechanism 
of union voice.  The second question formulates a hypothesis which examines whether or not 
unions affect their members’ compensation packages, which include wages and supplemental 
pay. These compensatory items are included in the local government cost category defined as 
personal services expenditures.  
The second research question subsequently allowed the study to determine the extent of 
union influence on personal services expenditures, or the manner in which expenditures in a 
unionized environment differs from that of a non-union environment. The second research 
question posed was: Does unionization impact the level of personal services expenditures? The 
quantitative portion of the study uncovered evidence that indicates that unionization increases 
police personal services expenditures. Ordinary least squares statistically rejected the null 
hypothesis that unionized departments did not present evidence that police personal services 
expenditures were any greater in their departments than in non-unionized departments. Actually, 
these expenditures were considerably higher (nearly three-quarters again as great) in unionized 
departments than non-unionized. The expenditures in this category appeared to be the most 
sensitive to unionization than in any of the categories tested. Union voice was thus most 
influential in the area of greatest interest to the members. The independent variable of concern, 
representing the presence of unions, again was very robust in significance amidst a field of eight 
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control variables from three different dimensions of factors that would influence levels of police 
expenditures.  
  The third research question continues the study by examining whether or not unions 
influence operating expenses expenditures in a manner separate from personal services 
expenditures or capital outlays expenditures. The third research question presented was: Does 
unionization affect the level of police operating expenses expenditures? The quantitative study 
produced evidence that unionization increase operating expenses expenditures, and the 
qualitative study identified a few of the types of expenditures that contribute to the increases in 
police operating expenses. The influence of unions on operating expenses is not as well 
understood as that on personal services expenditures because the issue was not as intensely 
investigated. As a result of this situation, the study attempts to bridge the paucity of research in 
the literature regarding union influence on police operating expenses. Regression results supplied 
evidence that unions influence operating expenses expenditures in a manner different than 
personal services or capital outlays. Although the independent variable of concern, unionization, 
did not produce as dramatic an effect on operating expenses as it did on personal services 
expenditures, the impact was substantial and merits further attention. Unionization increases 
operating expenses by more than a quarter more than those experienced in a non-union 
environment. The independent variable of concern possessed very robust characteristics in this 
model as well, despite eight control variables representing other factors impacting operating 
expenses. These results provide evidence that union voice expresses the values of its members in 
areas other than just the immediate concerns such as wages and supplemental pay.   
The fourth and final research question attempted to determine whether or not unions 
influence capital outlay expenditures. The research question was posed: Does unionization 
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influence the level of capital outlay expenditures? Multivariate regression failed to produce 
evidence that unionization impacted capital outlays. The qualitative inquiry identified 
predetermined existing policies as a possible reason that unionization does not influence capital 
outlays. Featured in this question is the issue of whether or not union voice participates in critical 
decision-making related to acquiring expensive equipment such as vehicle replacement policies, 
or computer system purchases.  Again, the literature exhibits a paucity of research in this area. 
Using the stated methodology of the study, regression analysis failed to provide evidence that 
unions influence capital outlays expenditures. The independent variable of concern, although it 
displayed significant statistics with the initial, single entry of the variable into the fourth model, 
failed to demonstrate the robust significance that it exhibited in the other three models.  As the 
control variables entered the model, statistical significance of the independent variable 
degenerated. Thus, no evidence was provided to indicate that the presence of unions affected 
capital outlays expenditures. Union voice may not play an active part in decisions regarding the 
purchase of expensive police equipment such as vehicles and computer systems.  
By answering the foregoing research questions, this study has emphasized a number of 
issues and has revealed important concerns for local government administrators. First, even in a 
right-to-work state such as Florida, unionization is a formidable influence that affects total police 
expenditures. By virtue of presence, unions can influence police expenditures regardless of union 
density and the subsequent support of the membership.  As long as the union is the certified 
bargaining agent within the local government, that union has the potential to impact public 
policy as represented by government expenditures.  
Answers to the second research question demonstrate that the relative affect of 
unionization on personal services expenditures is greater than in any other category of 
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expenditures. This category of expenditures, then require the most attention on the part of public 
administrators. It should also be noted that this category of expenditures may include hidden 
costs of doing business with the union because many non-union departments have competitive 
wages and supplemental pay provisions as their policies, and yet unionized departments still 
demonstrate significantly higher expenditures than the non-unionized departments. These hidden 
costs include such items as: administrative time required to negotiate and interact with unions; 
clerical time to accumulate requested information; time to prepare reports for use in negotiations; 
legal consulting fees; and costs related to grievance settlements.  Since many of the personal 
services expenditures are similar in union and non-union departments, other factors, such as 
grievance processing, are causing expenditures to increase in unionized departments. 
Research of the third research question regarding operating expenses indicates that 
unionized departments incur additional expenditures beyond the standardized expenses required 
to outfit employees for law enforcement services. Some of these expenditures were identified in 
the qualitative portion of the study by discussing some of the services and supplies specified in 
collective bargaining agreements that were absent in non-union departments. Although there are 
many similarities in equipment and services provided unionized and non-unionized departments, 
the regression results of this study demonstrate that there probably are significant differences as 
well. 
The final research question regarding to capital outlays was not resolved by multivariate 
regression in this study. Set policies, such as vehicle replacement policies, may dampen the 
effect unions have upon these types of expenditures. However, studies that focus upon total 
police expenditures may be inadvertently undermining the results of their research. Research that 
uses total police expenditures underestimates the effect unions have upon the expenditures 
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because capital outlays are often included in these computations, thus providing evidence for a 
lower effect on expenditures because in this study no evidence was produced to indicate that 
unions have any effect on capital outlays. A more precise study would exclude capital outlays 
and instead focus upon personal services and operating expenses for which this study produced 




 In all cases, save for one variable in the last regression of Model 3, the independent 
variable of concern shared significant t-statistics with the eight control variables during 
regressions for three of the four models. This observation, along with the consideration that three 
of the four models displayed very strong adjusted R2 values, provides evidence that the models 
not only have strong explanatory abilities, but that most bias has been credibly removed from the 
models to present credible support for three of the four research hypotheses. The variables 
TAXVALUE and POPULATN emerged as the strongest influences on police expenditures, and 
yet their presence did not compromise the significance of the UNION variable, which indicates 
that unionization is a clear factor in deciding how resource allocations will occur in a 
municipality. Union voice asserts itself in the functioning of a local government agency  as well 
as in the political world and that voice is clearly heard.  
Each control variable in the models contributes a noticeable impact on resource allocation 
in local government. TAXVALUE, representing the ability of a community to provide law 
enforcement services is clearly the most influential, followed by POPULATN, which represents 
the actual level of law enforcement services needed in the community. LANDAREA is another 
representation of the level of law enforcement services needed because the variable demonstrates 
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that larger areas require additional funds to serve the larger areas. LANDAREA suggests that 
additional resources such as fuel and man-hours are needed furnish appropriate levels of service 
even in more remote areas of a city. Significant results for the MSA variable provides evidence 
that high concentrations of urbanization results in increased expenditures for communities that 
have to deal with increased traffic and crime spillover effects from adjacent cities. EDUCATN 
serves an important function as a determinant because the variable’s prolonged significance in 
the models suggests that the amount of average education in a community influences decisions of 
resource allocation regardless of the level of income associated with increased education.  
The OWNHOME variable deserves additional future examination as a result of the 
various interpretations accorded the variable’s influence. While Witt (1990: 171) suggested that 
the influence of OWNHOME may be the result of homeowners being more sensitive than renters 
to property tax burdens. This study finds merit in that position, but suggests that events requiring 
law enforcement intervention are considerably less in communities with a high degree of 
homeownership as compared to communities primarily composed of rental properties.  Finally, 
the law enforcement factor variables CRIMERT1 and CSECLR1 provide unique contributions to 
the model as well. While the significance of crime rate variables differ from model to model, the 
incidence of crime usually is very much a concern of local governments. But the level of crime, 
according to the study’s results does not appear to be as influential as a determinant of police 
expenditures as is the ability to contain crime within the limits defined by the community. In the 






 The interview results presented in Chapter V described some of the differentiating 
characteristics of union and non-union departments in the state of Florida. There is some 
evidence that unionized departments experience higher expenses as a result of the increased 
administrative costs associated with unionization. The services of labor attorneys are often 
utilized during negotiations with unions, and must be compensated as operating expenses. 
Managerial personnel spend additional time in grievance procedures that do not exist in non-
union departments. Often the grievance procedures result in compromises that  incur additional 
expenses. But a strong probable reason unions impact police expenditures is the observation that 
unions fortify employee voice and require management to deal with the demands associated with 
employee voice.  
The issues of main concern for the employees are of course wages and benefits. As 
pointed out by one of the officials interviewed, “They’re always asking for more money.” But 
personal services expenses are impacted by the union in other ways as well. “Roll-up costs,” 
such as social security benefits, contributions to pension funds, and other similar benefits are 
impacted because these costs rise proportionately with wages. Employees may request additional 
staffing to provide better services to the community, which in turn requires more compensatory 
payments. Settlements from grievance procedures often result in additional funds being paid to 
employees. Finally, the administrative costs of processing grievances, complying with 
contractual provisions, and supplying managerial employees for contract negotiations further 
inflate costs related to unionization. 
Information emerged from the interviews that may provide an explanation for the 
quantitative finding that unions may not impact capital outlay expenditures. In most cases, the 
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decision-making processes for capital outlays are slightly different than for personal services 
expenditures or operating expenses. In the case of vehicles, the largest component of capital 
outlays expenditures, vehicle replacement decisions are often removed from the police 
departments. A separate fleet services department makes vehicle replacement policies based 
upon a predetermined formula which the community can afford. Since the locus of decision-
making is more remote to the union, the union’s influence is less effective. A strong, 
predetermined policy not subject to negotiations, such as a vehicle replacement policy, would be 
less likely to be influenced by union voice.  Moreover, as noted by some of the interviewed 
officials, union interest in vehicle condition may not be as intense as in other issues, such as 
wages and benefits. Knowing that resources are limited, the union may focus more upon 
compensation issues because in some communities, it may be an “either or” choice in negotiation 
posturing. Wages and benefits would obviously be of greater interest in those situations.  
Voice for non-union employees does not attain the same level of effectiveness as that of 
unionized employees with respect to police expenditures. Predetermined policies regarding 
wages, benefits, and operating expenses are not as susceptible to the influence of the unorganized 
voice expressed by non-union employees as these same policies are to the influence of the more 
potent voice expressed by union employees. In the case of non-union employees, some concern 
may be shared with management, but as noted by Krefting and Powers (1998: 274), these 
employees must weigh the possibilities of attaining the purpose of voice against the possibility of 
reprisals. Freeman and Medhoff (1979: 73) argue that unionized workers are less reluctant to 
express discontent than non-union workers under similar circumstances. Bowmen and Blackmon 
(2003: 1394) attribute this lack of reluctance to the co-worker support that unionization provides. 
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 One factor that should be considered when evaluating the impact unions have upon police 
expenditures is the possibility that unions reduce turnover by enhancing voice. As discussed in 
the cases of Cities Two and Six, while turnover appears to plague law enforcement agencies in 
general, city officials in the non-unionized cities expressed the most concern regarding turnover. 
While these observations are not conclusive by any means, they do lend support to research that 
found evidence to indicate that unionization does tend to decrease exit in organizations. 
Empirical studies (Freeman & Medoff, 1984: 1984: 95; Miller & Mulvey, 1991; and Rees (1991: 
31) indicate that unions reduce turnover by offering a stronger voice in the organization.40
  
Implications for Local Government 
 
 As discussed in the introduction and in the literature review, police expenditures in the 
state of Florida are a sizable portion of General Fund outlays. The average Florida municipality 
spends nearly a third of its general fund on police services alone (Florida Department of 
Financial Services, 2004). The impact of any determinant on such a large portion of a city’s 
budget should be carefully monitored and controlled. One such determinant is unionization of 
municipal police departments. Research previously referenced in the literature and subsequently 
conducted in this study described double digit percentage increases that results from 
unionization. Unionization impacts budgets in many different ways, some of which are subject to 
the public administrator’s ability to control. A labor climate which fuels dissent and 
dissatisfaction is particularly influential in the incurrence of expenditures. Such environs require 
additional workhours on the part of management employees and bargaining employees to resolve 
                                                 




disputes. Often the solutions are created during normal working hours. These situations increase 
personal services expenditures, the most expensive of the three police expenditure categories.  
 Other factors, such as supplemental pay and benefits also contribute to increased police 
expenditures. Usually these cost factors are routinely identified and included in the annual 
budget. However, unions’ requests for additional training or other concerns may not be included 
in fiscal budget planning sessions and thus may result in a mid-year budget adjustment or cost 
overruns. The qualitative interviews indicated that although city central budget departments are 
quite skilled in estimating contractual raises, incidents such as the air quality standards test in 
City Seven can strain these anticipatory estimates. Operating expenses, as demonstrated by the 
regressions in the Results and Findings Chapter, are also influenced by unionization. These 
would include union requests for changes in equipment and weaponry. As discussed in previous 
chapters, any consideration related to working conditions is subject to collective bargaining in 
Florida’s public sector. This includes selection of equipment and supplies. Unions are thus 
justified in including requests for such items as changing weapon caliber, or the type of 
protective law enforcement  devices. Incidental costs, such as annually required physical 
examinations, are often borne by management.  
Research in this study, using cross-sectional data, failed to demonstrate that unions affect 
capital outlays. Cross sectional data, being restricted to the dynamics of a single year, fails to 
capture characteristics that occur over time. Results from a longitudinal study could yield more 
definitive evidence that unions do or do not affect capital outlays. Since capital outlays for police 
vehicles are often incurred as the result of a local purchase policy, unions could possibly exert 
voice in these type of policy decisions.  
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Managerial awareness of the extent of union influence on police expenditures provides 
the first step in controlling the effects of this type of influence. The decisions that impact police 
expenditures are often executed in the routine environs of day-to-day operations. But they can be 
built into the contract as well. Some police union contracts such as in City One in the Qualitative 
Perspectives Chapter V specify allowances for uniforms, equipment, annual physical 
examinations, development and training, and eye examinations. All of the foregoing costs are 
classified as operating expenses and are influenced by the union. Combined operating expenses 
for the 257 cities in the sample are over $250 million, and the total police expenditures for the 
study’s 257 cities is approximately $2 billion. The figures for police expenditures do not include 
data for sheriff’s offices, university police, state patrol or any of the other law enforcement 
agencies within the state.   
 
Policy and Managerial Implications 
 
Grievances and other attempts at dispute resolution often can be mitigated through 
enlightened labor policies and team efforts. Labor-management dialogues are critical not only in 
maintaining positive labor relations, but also ultimately in saving expenditures that are in reality 
caused by a breakdown in communications. Chapter II of this study examined the potential of 
labor-management partnerships(or collaborative management) that were successfully introduced 
in other locations around the country, particularly in Indianapolis. Although no Florida city is 
known to use the collaborative approach in police departments, some Florida school districts 
have used such an approach successfully with teaching employees (see the Collaborative 
Management section in Chapter II). Collaborative approaches to collective bargaining in Florida 
have been credited with saving costs by reducing the number of grievances (Franco, 2002: 110). 
 276
 
Research by Franco (2002: 97) also found that the collaborative approach actually resulted in 
lower salaries when compared with similar school districts utilizing traditional management 
methods. This approach may work with law enforcement employees as well. 
From a practitioner’s standpoint, labor relations training for managerial personnel would 
mitigate union impact on expenditures by advising supervisors in procedures related to dealing 
with disgruntled employees. Time spent on resolving grievances and accumulating 
documentation to resolve disputes contribute to a large portion of both personal services 
expenditures and operating expenses. Enlightened managerial employee relations techniques 
would minimize such expenses. Folger and Cropanzano (1998: 27-30) note that the level of 
interactional justice between an employer and an employee affects perceptions of fairness. If the 
employee perceives a lack of fairness resulting from the way he or she is being treated, the 
employee would then be more likely to utilize the grievance procedure. The ultimate result is 
increased expenditures. 
Labor relations training would also guide supervisory employees in the day to day 
relations with union representatives. Assenting to simple practices as contract cleaning the 
interior of vehicles on a regular basis could lead to such activities being included in contractual 
provisions of future collective bargaining agreements. Such concessions to the union, even if not 
formalized by written agreement could encumber managements with future commitments 
through “past practice” arguments. 
An undetermined number of Florida municipalities use cost analysis to estimate the 
changes in annual police expenditures caused by collective bargaining. Sharing this information 
with the union bargaining agents creates awareness of the impact of union demands, the voice of 
employees. Some municipalities do not calculate these types of expenditures until after an 
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agreement has been in effect for a year or more, not realizing that it is more difficult to remove 
agreed upon contractual provisions in concessionary bargaining. The qualitative inquiry 
indicated that once an item has been included in the collective bargaining agreement, the union 
tends to view a unilateral discontinuance of the item as a concession. There is thus more pressure 
on management negotiators to accept existing provisions of collective bargaining agreements. 
Even though the city may gain concessions voluntarily or involuntarily from the union, often 
rank and file members become disgruntled as a result of these concessions, and utilize union 
voice in grievance filing, an expensive consequence that affects police expenditures. Police 
departments recently unionized would especially benefit from such cost analysis to avoid 
reliance on concession bargaining during economic crises. In difficult times, city negotiators may 
have to pressure unions for concessions to ensure fiscal viability. As discussed previously, there 
is reluctance on the part of city negotiators to press for concessions. Proactive cost analyses 
usually provide information regarding pending economic conditions, and therefore would allow 
negotiators to anticipate such events during negotiations. Municipal finance officers usually have 
little trouble monetizing provisions in collective bargaining agreements, and indeed this should 
be done before administrative and legislative approval of labor agreements. Monetizing requires 
only an objective conversion of policy into dollar values. 
Results from the regressions of this study could also provide guidance to management 
bargaining agents and personnel who regularly negotiate with the union. The impact of the union 
on police expenditures has been demonstrated to be quite substantial. Moreover this impact 
affects not only the personal services expenditures but also operating expenses. Thus, 
management negotiators who consider union requests for additional or specific equipment and 
supplies as minor bargaining issues may also want to consider cost analysis to determine the 
 278
 
exact fiscal impact on police expenditures before conceding minor bargaining issues. The 
cumulative effects of unexpected requests by the union related to equipment and supplies may 
otherwise go unappreciated.  
Mid year adjustments to collective bargaining agreements which are created by labor-
management meetings, memorandums of understanding, and other means, tend to encumber the 
communities further by increasing police expenditures according to some of the administrators 
interviewed. One administrator pointed out that during these types of negotiations management 
is at a disadvantage because the union is engaging in risk-free bargaining on their part.  During 
regular collective bargaining sessions, everything is on the table, including wages, benefits, and 
other items of concern to union members.  
The give-and-take approach is absent during mid year negotiations because the major 
items of concern to the union (wages and benefits) are not part of the negotiations package. As a 
result, at least one city included in the interview restricts collective bargaining to the regularly 
scheduled session during contract renewal talks only unless the union request involves safety 
related matters. This policy, according to one official, mitigates cost increases resulting from 
union demands.  This type of approach, however, is considerably different than the one espoused 
by collaborative management theorists. The collaborative management proponents would 
maintain that a continual open dialogue is essential to their process of labor relations, and would 
therefore engage in collective bargaining throughout the duration of the contract. 
Basic formulas for salaries, supplemental pay, benefits, and other personal service 
expenditures are established during collective bargaining, but the expenditures actually incurred 
by police departments also fluctuate according to the use of human resources through staffing 
and scheduling. Performance audits relying on interjurisdictional benchmarking may reveal 
 279
 
contractual provisions that impede efficient allocation of resources.41 Such operational 
impediments would affect operating expenses as well as personal services expenditures.  An 
example of these types of situations would be decisions regarding the use of overtime and 
callback provisions. Restrictive policies regarding the use of overtime and the manner in which it 
is utilized may incur additional expenses. With the exception of safety considerations, overtime 
assignments for on duty employees may be less expensive than callbacks, which usually entail a 
specified amount of time the employee is to be paid at overtime rates (usually two hours) 
regardless of time required to perform the service.   
The change in expenditures wrought by unionization especially merits the attention of 
non-union police departments. Although, according to Zax (1988: 301), unionization results in 
spillover effects on wages and benefits of adjacent non-union bargaining units, the results from 
regressions of this study indicate that despite these spillover effects, unionization incurs 
additional expenses in unionized departments. These additional expenses are not restricted to 
personal services but also affect operating expenses. So even though an adjacent community 
without a union may have similar wages and benefits as its neighboring unionized police 





 Misspecification of variables, especially when dealing with human decision-making, 
could inadvertently result in critical relevant data being left out of the study. Some 
considerations that affect causality have yet to be identified or quantified. Certainly the 
                                                 
41 As an example, a performance audit of the K-9 training program in City Three would have revealed the advantage 
of outsourcing such training to the sheriff’s office. 
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diplomatic skills of a union leader can affect decision making outcomes that cause police budgets 
to fluctuate. However, such skills elude measurement because the perception of these skills is 
largely subjective. Unions also vary in type and temperament, and the labor climate may change 
from city to city. The effects of a more cooperative union may differ dramatically from the 
effects of a more militant union upon budgets. A militant union also drains more resources in 
application of the collective bargaining agreement by invoking grievance procedures at a greater 
rate and intensity than more cooperative unions. Management style also varies from organization 
to organization, and in many cases may be responsible for the posture taken by the relevant 
unions. Additional research is needed to measure the effects of union militancy and management 
style on expenditures. 
 Managerial and administrative skills also are factors which are not readily measured by 
regression techniques. Variables such as CSECLR1 may attempt to measure the efficiency of a 
department, but does not present the entire scope of efficiency or effectiveness of a police 
department. Other considerations affect department efficiency, including the abilities of 
supervisory personnel to schedule and staff properly. These abilities are intricate functions of any 
city operation and as such are very real determinants of police expenditures.  
Another limitation for consideration is the manner in which municipalities record 
expenditures. Some communities may not strictly adhere to state guidelines while reporting 
expenses according to the proper categories of expenditures.  It is anticipated that subjective 
categorization of the expenditures would be mitigated by the Florida Uniform Accounting 
System Chart of Accounts which directs Florida local governments to report expenditures in a 
consistent manner. Since the municipalities are required to submit information to the Florida 
Department of Financial Services, there is a subsequent standardization of line item categories.  
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However, the possibility continues to exist that some communities fail to record expenditures 
accurately according to state requirements. 
The study also makes some assumptions regarding the data, that the information is 
complete, when in reality no data set is complete. The Uniform Crime Report’s Part I crimes 
data, for instance, provides an example of this observation. Not all crimes are reported, and 
therefore the Part I crime rate and subsequent variable constructs based on crime rates (such as 
cases cleared) may not accurately reflect the strength of variables that control for crime related 
factors. Crime rates may be reported to a greater extent in the more affluent communities than in 
the less wealthy communities, thus skewing the data in some cases. Finally, since the study 
consists of cross sectional rather than longitudinal data, generalizability of the results will be 
constrained, and definitive causality can not be conclusively stated. 
In the qualitative inquiry, the limiting factors of interviews were inherent in the seven 
case studies. These factors include considerations that some interview data is based on 
recollections, opinions, and human memory. Although an attempt was made to standardize the 
questions, the questions were also open-ended and, as such, the responses to the questions may 
have been based on personal values.  Finally, some of the interviewed officials served very large 
agencies and it would be expected that their comprehensive understanding of their agencies was 
limited by their respective positions.  
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 
First and foremost, a longitudinal study would yield more reliable information regarding 
possible union influence on capital outlays. With the available information, it appears that as a 
result of long ranged strategies and policies for capital equipment purchases, unions exert little 
 282
 
influence in this expenditure category. A longitudinal study would be better situated to determine 
whether or not evidence exists that union voice affects capital outlays. A longitudinal study 
would also provide more reliable evidence that unions affect expenditures over long periods of 
time. Changing patterns of bargaining techniques with public sector unions may produce 
different results than those uncovered by this study. Concessionary bargaining in the private 
sector is an example of how bargaining may change under different economic conditions. The 
public sector may not be immune to similar conditions. 
The limited qualitative research in this study revealed contradictory opinions regarding 
the method of dialogue with employee unions. One side espouses a spirit of reconciliation 
through a collaborative approach in resolving differences. The obverse of this policy is that of a 
more restricted relationship, such as permitting collective bargaining only during specified dates 
to control expenditures. Future research may identify which policy would yield the desired 
results, and possibly under what conditions that policy would be preferred. The merits of the 
collaborative approach as compared to the restricted approach should be examined further by 
determining whether or not one approach differs from the other approach in terms of police 
expenditures. 
More research is needed to determine exactly why unions increase police expenditures in 
a more populous state such as Florida. Since many non-union police departments in Florida offer 
competitive wages, benefits, and other consideration, the findings of the study may be somewhat 
counterintuitive for some analysts. Florida, as the nation’s fourth largest state with over 16 
million residents, also is the 9th most densely populated state, with over 296 persons per square 
mile (United States Census Bureau, 2005). Although remote areas do exist in the state, over 80% 
of Florida cities are included in a metropolitan statistical area (see Table 5, descriptive statistics). 
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Yet less than 58% of the 257 cities that make up the study’s samples are unionized (Table 5). 
Some other factor related to the presence of unions (other than increased wages and benefits) 
may be responsible for increased police expenditures.   
A comprehensive study of labor contracts from unionized police departments would 
produce additional information as to the types of equipment, supplies and services are likely to 
be found in collective bargaining agreements that would tend to increase police expenditures. In 
a number of the collective bargaining agreements reviewed or discussed at the cities included in 
the qualitative study, an itemized list was included in provisions that specified the type of 
equipment, supplies, and services to be provided the law enforcement employees. A comparison 
of these items with items issued by non-union cities may provide additional information 



























Table A1. Model 1 Pearson’s Correlations 
1 .496** .718** .621** -.053 -.085 -.306** .202** .729** .411** .198** -.310** .099
. .000 .000 .000 .199 .088 .000 .001 .000 .000 .001 .000 .060
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.496** 1 .307** .261** .078 .015 -.092 .217** .309** .281** .121* -.265** .044
.000 . .000 .000 .107 .405 .071 .000 .000 .000 .027 .000 .242
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.718** .307** 1 .629** .003 -.034 -.214** .142* .856** .215** .109* -.186** .007
.000 .000 . .000 .481 .295 .000 .012 .000 .000 .041 .001 .456
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.621** .261** .629** 1 -.098 -.171** -.163** .083 .720** .174** .099 -.106* .048
.000 .000 .000 . .059 .003 .005 .091 .000 .003 .056 .045 .224
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.053 .078 .003 -.098 1 .508** .529** .654** -.123* .289** -.481** -.025 -.492**
.199 .107 .481 .059 . .000 .000 .000 .025 .000 .000 .345 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.085 .015 -.034 -.171** .508** 1 .408** .398** -.188** .057 -.217** -.107* -.301**
.088 .405 .295 .003 .000 . .000 .000 .001 .181 .000 .043 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.306** -.092 -.214** -.163** .529** .408** 1 .469** -.304** .076 -.479** .022 -.294**
.000 .071 .000 .005 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .112 .000 .362 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.202** .217** .142* .083 .654** .398** .469** 1 -.016 .416** -.332** -.150** -.472**
.001 .000 .012 .091 .000 .000 .000 . .402 .000 .000 .008 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.729** .309** .856** .720** -.123* -.188** -.304** -.016 1 .210** .128* -.154** .157**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .025 .001 .000 .402 . .000 .020 .007 .007
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.411** .281** .215** .174** .289** .057 .076 .416** .210** 1 -.088 -.243** .025
.000 .000 .000 .003 .000 .181 .112 .000 .000 . .079 .000 .347
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.198** .121* .109* .099 -.481** -.217** -.479** -.332** .128* -.088 1 -.082 .387**
.001 .027 .041 .056 .000 .000 .000 .000 .020 .079 . .096 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.310** -.265** -.186** -.106* -.025 -.107* .022 -.150** -.154** -.243** -.082 1 -.079
.000 .000 .001 .045 .345 .043 .362 .008 .007 .000 .096 . .106
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.099 .044 .007 .048 -.492** -.301** -.294** -.472** .157** .025 .387** -.079 1
.060 .242 .456 .224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .007 .347 .000 .106 .





















































LTTLPOL$ UNION TAXVALUE LANDAREA MAJRACE OVER65 OWNHOME EDUCATN POPULATN MSA CRIMERT1 CSECLR1 MILLAGE
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).**. 




Table A2. Model 2 Pearson’s Correlation 
1 .506** .713** .612** -.046 -.078 -.304** .203** .724** .414** .197** -.312** .100
. .000 .000 .000 .229 .106 .000 .001 .000 .000 .001 .000 .058
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.506** 1 .307** .261** .078 .015 -.092 .217** .309** .281** .121* -.265** .044
.000 . .000 .000 .107 .405 .071 .000 .000 .000 .027 .000 .242
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.713** .307** 1 .629** .003 -.034 -.214** .142* .856** .215** .109* -.186** .007
.000 .000 . .000 .481 .295 .000 .012 .000 .000 .041 .001 .456
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.612** .261** .629** 1 -.098 -.171** -.163** .083 .720** .174** .099 -.106* .048
.000 .000 .000 . .059 .003 .005 .091 .000 .003 .056 .045 .224
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.046 .078 .003 -.098 1 .508** .529** .654** -.123* .289** -.481** -.025 -.492**
.229 .107 .481 .059 . .000 .000 .000 .025 .000 .000 .345 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.078 .015 -.034 -.171** .508** 1 .408** .398** -.188** .057 -.217** -.107* -.301**
.106 .405 .295 .003 .000 . .000 .000 .001 .181 .000 .043 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.304** -.092 -.214** -.163** .529** .408** 1 .469** -.304** .076 -.479** .022 -.294**
.000 .071 .000 .005 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .112 .000 .362 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.203** .217** .142* .083 .654** .398** .469** 1 -.016 .416** -.332** -.150** -.472**
.001 .000 .012 .091 .000 .000 .000 . .402 .000 .000 .008 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.724** .309** .856** .720** -.123* -.188** -.304** -.016 1 .210** .128* -.154** .157**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .025 .001 .000 .402 . .000 .020 .007 .007
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.414** .281** .215** .174** .289** .057 .076 .416** .210** 1 -.088 -.243** .025
.000 .000 .000 .003 .000 .181 .112 .000 .000 . .079 .000 .347
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.197** .121* .109* .099 -.481** -.217** -.479** -.332** .128* -.088 1 -.082 .387**
.001 .027 .041 .056 .000 .000 .000 .000 .020 .079 . .096 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.312** -.265** -.186** -.106* -.025 -.107* .022 -.150** -.154** -.243** -.082 1 -.079
.000 .000 .001 .045 .345 .043 .362 .008 .007 .000 .096 . .106
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.100 .044 .007 .048 -.492** -.301** -.294** -.472** .157** .025 .387** -.079 1
.058 .242 .456 .224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .007 .347 .000 .106 .





















































LPER$ UNION TAXVALUE LANDAREA MAJRACE OVER65 OWNHOME EDUCATN POPULATN MSA CRIMERT1 CSECLR1 MILLAGE
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).**. 





 Table A3. Model 3 Pearson’s Coefficients  
  
 
1 .140* .252** .343** -.062 .007 -.113* .152** .300** .162** .078 -.124* -.035
. .016 .000 .000 .171 .457 .042 .010 .000 .006 .115 .028 .299
236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 230
.140* 1 .307** .261** .078 .015 -.092 .217** .309** .281** .121* -.265** .044
.016 . .000 .000 .107 .405 .071 .000 .000 .000 .027 .000 .242
236 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.252** .307** 1 .629** .003 -.034 -.214** .142* .856** .215** .109* -.186** .007
.000 .000 . .000 .481 .295 .000 .012 .000 .000 .041 .001 .456
236 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.343** .261** .629** 1 -.098 -.171** -.163** .083 .720** .174** .099 -.106* .048
.000 .000 .000 . .059 .003 .005 .091 .000 .003 .056 .045 .224
236 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.062 .078 .003 -.098 1 .508** .529** .654** -.123* .289** -.481** -.025 -.492**
.171 .107 .481 .059 . .000 .000 .000 .025 .000 .000 .345 .000
236 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.007 .015 -.034 -.171** .508** 1 .408** .398** -.188** .057 -.217** -.107* -.301**
.457 .405 .295 .003 .000 . .000 .000 .001 .181 .000 .043 .000
236 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.113* -.092 -.214** -.163** .529** .408** 1 .469** -.304** .076 -.479** .022 -.294**
.042 .071 .000 .005 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .112 .000 .362 .000
236 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.152** .217** .142* .083 .654** .398** .469** 1 -.016 .416** -.332** -.150** -.472**
.010 .000 .012 .091 .000 .000 .000 . .402 .000 .000 .008 .000
236 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.300** .309** .856** .720** -.123* -.188** -.304** -.016 1 .210** .128* -.154** .157**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .025 .001 .000 .402 . .000 .020 .007 .007
236 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.162** .281** .215** .174** .289** .057 .076 .416** .210** 1 -.088 -.243** .025
.006 .000 .000 .003 .000 .181 .112 .000 .000 . .079 .000 .347
236 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.078 .121* .109* .099 -.481** -.217** -.479** -.332** .128* -.088 1 -.082 .387**
.115 .027 .041 .056 .000 .000 .000 .000 .020 .079 . .096 .000
236 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.124* -.265** -.186** -.106* -.025 -.107* .022 -.150** -.154** -.243** -.082 1 -.079
.028 .000 .001 .045 .345 .043 .362 .008 .007 .000 .096 . .106
236 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.035 .044 .007 .048 -.492** -.301** -.294** -.472** .157** .025 .387** -.079 1
.299 .242 .456 .224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .007 .347 .000 .106 .





















































LCAPOUT$ UNION TAXVALUE LANDAREA MAJRACE OVER65 OWNHOME EDUCATN POPULATN MSA CRIMERT1 CSECLR1 MILLAGE
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).*. 






Table A4. Model 4 Pearson’s Correlations 
1 .416** .711** .633** -.109* -.116* -.321** .155** .716** .357** .201** -.269** .086
. .000 .000 .000 .041 .032 .000 .007 .000 .000 .001 .000 .088
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.416** 1 .307** .261** .078 .015 -.092 .217** .309** .281** .121* -.265** .044
.000 . .000 .000 .107 .405 .071 .000 .000 .000 .027 .000 .242
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.711** .307** 1 .629** .003 -.034 -.214** .142* .856** .215** .109* -.186** .007
.000 .000 . .000 .481 .295 .000 .012 .000 .000 .041 .001 .456
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.633** .261** .629** 1 -.098 -.171** -.163** .083 .720** .174** .099 -.106* .048
.000 .000 .000 . .059 .003 .005 .091 .000 .003 .056 .045 .224
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.109* .078 .003 -.098 1 .508** .529** .654** -.123* .289** -.481** -.025 -.492**
.041 .107 .481 .059 . .000 .000 .000 .025 .000 .000 .345 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.116* .015 -.034 -.171** .508** 1 .408** .398** -.188** .057 -.217** -.107* -.301**
.032 .405 .295 .003 .000 . .000 .000 .001 .181 .000 .043 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.321** -.092 -.214** -.163** .529** .408** 1 .469** -.304** .076 -.479** .022 -.294**
.000 .071 .000 .005 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .112 .000 .362 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.155** .217** .142* .083 .654** .398** .469** 1 -.016 .416** -.332** -.150** -.472**
.007 .000 .012 .091 .000 .000 .000 . .402 .000 .000 .008 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.716** .309** .856** .720** -.123* -.188** -.304** -.016 1 .210** .128* -.154** .157**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .025 .001 .000 .402 . .000 .020 .007 .007
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.357** .281** .215** .174** .289** .057 .076 .416** .210** 1 -.088 -.243** .025
.000 .000 .000 .003 .000 .181 .112 .000 .000 . .079 .000 .347
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.201** .121* .109* .099 -.481** -.217** -.479** -.332** .128* -.088 1 -.082 .387**
.001 .027 .041 .056 .000 .000 .000 .000 .020 .079 . .096 .000
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
-.269** -.265** -.186** -.106* -.025 -.107* .022 -.150** -.154** -.243** -.082 1 -.079
.000 .000 .001 .045 .345 .043 .362 .008 .007 .000 .096 . .106
257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 250
.086 .044 .007 .048 -.492** -.301** -.294** -.472** .157** .025 .387** -.079 1
.088 .242 .456 .224 .000 .000 .000 .000 .007 .347 .000 .106 .





















































LOPEX$ UNION TAXVALUE LANDAREA MAJRACE OVER65 OWNHOME EDUCATN POPULATN MSA CRIMERT1 CSECLR1 MILLAGE
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).*. 
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All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), UNIONa. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), UNIONa. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
13.832 .116 119.112 .000











































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), TAXVALUE, UNIONa. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), TAXVALUE, UNIONa. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
13.658 .086 159.605 .000
.855 .117 .305 7.307 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), LANDAREA, UNION, TAXVALUEa. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
13.583 .083 163.536 .000
.802 .112 .286 7.151 .000
2.74E-10 .000 .475 9.565 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), OWNHOME, UNION, LANDAREA, TAXVALUEa. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
14.702 .303 48.588 .000
.792 .109 .282 7.245 .000
2.59E-10 .000 .449 9.197 .000
1.98E-02 .004 .241 5.052 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), EDUCATN, LANDAREA, UNION, OWNHOME,
TAXVALUE
a. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
13.923 .346 40.260 .000
.685 .109 .244 6.302 .000
2.38E-10 .000 .413 8.602 .000
1.99E-02 .004 .243 5.251 .000
-2.6E-02 .005 -.242 -5.606 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), POPULATN, EDUCATN,













Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), POPULATN, EDUCATN, UNION, OWNHOME,
LANDAREA, TAXVALUE
a. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
13.533 .355 38.121 .000
.645 .107 .230 6.030 .000
1.28E-10 .000 .222 3.132 .002
1.30E-02 .004 .159 3.121 .002
-2.4E-02 .005 -.226 -5.339 .000
2.39E-02 .005 .218 5.019 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), MSA, OWNHOME,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), MSA, OWNHOME, LANDAREA, UNION, EDUCATN,
TAXVALUE, POPULATN
a. 





13.664 .342 39.970 .000
.573 .104 .204 5.531 .000
1.42E-10 .000 .247 3.613 .000
1.36E-02 .004 .166 3.403 .001
-2.3E-02 .004 -.215 -5.273 .000
1.51E-02 .005 .137 3.049 .003
7.10E-06 .000 .233 2.994 .003















































































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), CRIMERT1, MSA,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), CRIMERT1, MSA, LANDAREA, UNION, OWNHOME,
EDUCATN, TAXVALUE, POPULATN
a. 





13.150 .422 31.136 .000
.544 .104 .194 5.227 .000
1.35E-10 .000 .234 3.434 .001
1.31E-02 .004 .159 3.274 .001
-2.0E-02 .005 -.184 -4.243 .000
1.69E-02 .005 .154 3.382 .001
7.66E-06 .000 .252 3.231 .001
.662 .138 .183 4.782 .000


















































































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LTTLPOL$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), CSECLR1, OWNHOME,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), CSECLR1, OWNHOME, LANDAREA, MSA, UNION,
CRIMERT1, EDUCATN, TAXVALUE, POPULATN
a. 





13.502 .439 30.789 .000
.498 .104 .178 4.780 .000
1.29E-10 .000 .223 3.301 .001
1.34E-02 .004 .164 3.406 .001
-2.0E-02 .005 -.185 -4.327 .000
1.63E-02 .005 .149 3.309 .001
7.69E-06 .000 .253 3.279 .001
.608 .138 .168 4.396 .000
2.33E-05 .000 .071 1.844 .066



























































13.502 .439 30.789 .000
.498 .104 .178 4.780 .000 .784 1.275
1.29E-10 .000 .223 3.301 .001 .238 4.204
1.34E-02 .004 .164 3.406 .001 .468 2.135
-2.0E-02 .005 -.185 -4.327 .000 .591 1.691
1.63E-02 .005 .149 3.309 .001 .536 1.864
7.69E-06 .000 .253 3.279 .001 .182 5.481
.608 .138 .168 4.396 .000 .738 1.354
2.33E-05 .000 .071 1.844 .066 .725 1.379



















t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics

































































































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), UNIONa. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), UNIONa. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
13.584 .118 114.753 .000










































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), TAXVALUE, UNIONa. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), TAXVALUE, UNIONa. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
13.408 .088 152.694 .000
.913 .120 .317 7.606 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), LANDAREA, UNION, TAXVALUEa. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
13.334 .086 155.784 .000
.862 .116 .299 7.452 .000
2.80E-10 .000 .473 9.478 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), OWNHOME, UNION, LANDAREA, TAXVALUEa. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
14.473 .312 46.383 .000
.851 .113 .296 7.550 .000
2.65E-10 .000 .447 9.109 .000
1.94E-02 .004 .230 4.803 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), EDUCATN, LANDAREA, UNION, OWNHOME,
TAXVALUE
a. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
13.681 .357 38.324 .000
.743 .112 .258 6.616 .000
2.43E-10 .000 .411 8.515 .000
1.95E-02 .004 .232 4.988 .000
-2.7E-02 .005 -.240 -5.527 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), POPULATN, EDUCATN,













Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), POPULATN, EDUCATN, UNION, OWNHOME,
LANDAREA, TAXVALUE
a. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
13.274 .366 36.244 .000
.700 .110 .243 6.349 .000
1.29E-10 .000 .217 3.046 .003
1.23E-02 .004 .146 2.865 .005
-2.5E-02 .005 -.224 -5.257 .000
2.44E-02 .005 .217 4.968 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), MSA, OWNHOME,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), MSA, OWNHOME, LANDAREA, UNION, EDUCATN,
TAXVALUE, POPULATN
a. 





13.410 .353 38.044 .000
.626 .107 .218 5.858 .000
1.43E-10 .000 .242 3.527 .001
1.30E-02 .004 .154 3.140 .002
-2.4E-02 .005 -.213 -5.189 .000
1.52E-02 .005 .135 2.990 .003
7.42E-06 .000 .238 3.034 .003















































































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), CRIMERT1, MSA,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), CRIMERT1, MSA, LANDAREA, UNION, OWNHOME,
EDUCATN, TAXVALUE, POPULATN
a. 





12.887 .436 29.586 .000
.596 .107 .207 5.556 .000
1.36E-10 .000 .229 3.350 .001
1.24E-02 .004 .147 3.011 .003
-2.0E-02 .005 -.182 -4.172 .000
1.71E-02 .005 .152 3.319 .001
7.99E-06 .000 .256 3.266 .001
.687 .143 .185 4.812 .000
















































































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LPER$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), CSECLR1, OWNHOME,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), CSECLR1, OWNHOME, LANDAREA, MSA, UNION,
CRIMERT1, EDUCATN, TAXVALUE, POPULATN
a. 





13.249 .452 29.288 .000
.550 .108 .191 5.110 .000
1.29E-10 .000 .218 3.216 .001
1.28E-02 .004 .152 3.139 .002
-2.0E-02 .005 -.183 -4.255 .000
1.65E-02 .005 .147 3.244 .001
8.02E-06 .000 .257 3.315 .001
.632 .143 .170 4.427 .000
2.37E-05 .000 .071 1.817 .070























































Table C10. Collinearity Statistics for final LPER$ model (Model 2) 
 
Coefficientsa
13.249 .452 29.288 .000
.550 .108 .191 5.110 .000 .784 1.275
1.29E-10 .000 .218 3.216 .001 .238 4.204
1.28E-02 .004 .152 3.139 .002 .468 2.135
-2.0E-02 .005 -.183 -4.255 .000 .591 1.691
1.65E-02 .005 .147 3.244 .001 .536 1.864
8.02E-06 .000 .257 3.315 .001 .182 5.481
.632 .143 .170 4.427 .000 .738 1.354
2.37E-05 .000 .071 1.817 .070 .725 1.379



















t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics

























































































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), UNIONa. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), UNIONa. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
11.901 .122 97.834 .000










































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), TAXVALUE, UNIONa. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), TAXVALUE, UNIONa. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
11.722 .091 128.933 .000
.613 .124 .219 4.934 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), LANDAREA, UNION, TAXVALUEa. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
11.635 .087 133.056 .000
.553 .118 .197 4.679 .000
2.72E-10 .000 .471 9.010 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), OWNHOME, UNION, LANDAREA, TAXVALUEa. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
12.896 .317 40.657 .000
.541 .115 .193 4.721 .000
2.55E-10 .000 .442 8.632 .000
2.28E-02 .004 .278 5.560 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), EDUCATN, LANDAREA, UNION, OWNHOME,
TAXVALUE
a. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
12.249 .367 33.347 .000
.453 .116 .161 3.917 .000
2.38E-10 .000 .412 8.077 .000
2.29E-02 .004 .279 5.694 .000
-2.6E-02 .005 -.244 -5.323 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), POPULATN, EDUCATN,













Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), POPULATN, EDUCATN, UNION, OWNHOME,
LANDAREA, TAXVALUE
a. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
11.957 .382 31.309 .000
.422 .115 .150 3.669 .000
1.55E-10 .000 .269 3.529 .000
1.78E-02 .004 .217 3.961 .000
-2.5E-02 .005 -.232 -5.095 .000
1.96E-02 .005 .178 3.815 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), MSA, OWNHOME,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), MSA, OWNHOME, LANDAREA, UNION, EDUCATN,
TAXVALUE, POPULATN
a. 





12.070 .374 32.289 .000
.361 .113 .129 3.185 .002
1.67E-10 .000 .290 3.888 .000
1.83E-02 .004 .223 4.179 .000
-2.4E-02 .005 -.223 -4.994 .000
1.20E-02 .005 .109 2.217 .027
5.12E-06 .000 .168 1.976 .049















































































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), CRIMERT1, MSA,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), CRIMERT1, MSA, LANDAREA, UNION, OWNHOME,
EDUCATN, TAXVALUE, POPULATN
a. 





11.593 .463 25.045 .000
.334 .114 .119 2.926 .004
1.61E-10 .000 .278 3.729 .000
1.78E-02 .004 .217 4.065 .000
-2.1E-02 .005 -.194 -4.081 .000
1.37E-02 .005 .124 2.497 .013
5.65E-06 .000 .186 2.171 .031
.567 .152 .157 3.736 .000


















































































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LOPEX$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), CSECLR1, OWNHOME,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), CSECLR1, OWNHOME, LANDAREA, MSA, UNION,
CRIMERT1, EDUCATN, TAXVALUE, POPULATN
a. 





11.885 .484 24.582 .000
.296 .115 .106 2.575 .011
1.55E-10 .000 .269 3.618 .000
1.81E-02 .004 .220 4.157 .000
-2.1E-02 .005 -.195 -4.130 .000
1.32E-02 .005 .120 2.427 .016
5.67E-06 .000 .186 2.192 .029
.522 .153 .145 3.424 .001
2.18E-05 .000 .067 1.569 .118



























































11.885 .484 24.582 .000
.296 .115 .106 2.575 .011 .784 1.275
1.55E-10 .000 .269 3.618 .000 .238 4.204
1.81E-02 .004 .220 4.157 .000 .468 2.135
-2.1E-02 .005 -.195 -4.130 .000 .591 1.691
1.32E-02 .005 .120 2.427 .016 .536 1.864
5.67E-06 .000 .186 2.192 .029 .182 5.481
.522 .153 .145 3.424 .001 .738 1.354
2.18E-05 .000 .067 1.569 .118 .725 1.379



















t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics















































































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), UNIONa. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), UNIONa. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
10.876 .151 72.038 .000









































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), TAXVALUE, UNIONa. 
 
ANOVAb









Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), TAXVALUE, UNIONa. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
10.797 .149 72.326 .000
.213 .199 .071 1.071 .285













































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), LANDAREA, UNION, TAXVALUEa. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
10.686 .148 72.318 .000
.135 .195 .045 .695 .487
4.94E-11 .000 .077 1.019 .309












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), OWNHOME, UNION, LANDAREA, TAXVALUEa. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
11.113 .535 20.768 .000
.134 .195 .044 .686 .493
4.34E-11 .000 .068 .885 .377
2.61E-02 .007 .286 3.828 .000












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Model Summary






















Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), EDUCATN, LANDAREA, UNION, OWNHOME,
TAXVALUE
a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
10.169 .633 16.074 .000
2.53E-02 .196 .008 .129 .897
1.86E-11 .000 .029 .379 .705
2.60E-02 .007 .285 3.864 .000
-1.8E-02 .008 -.158 -2.150 .033












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), POPULATN, EDUCATN,













Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), POPULATN, EDUCATN, UNION, OWNHOME,
LANDAREA, TAXVALUE
a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Coefficientsa
9.856 .666 14.810 .000
-6.3E-03 .197 -.002 -.032 .974
-6.1E-11 .000 -.096 -.839 .402
2.10E-02 .007 .231 2.809 .005
-1.7E-02 .008 -.146 -1.990 .048
2.67E-02 .009 .224 2.980 .003












































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), MSA, OWNHOME,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), MSA, OWNHOME, LANDAREA, UNION, TAXVALUE,
EDUCATN, POPULATN
a. 





9.871 .667 14.805 .000
-2.1E-02 .198 -.007 -.104 .917
-5.8E-11 .000 -.091 -.792 .429
2.11E-02 .007 .232 2.821 .005
-1.7E-02 .008 -.144 -1.962 .051
2.45E-02 .010 .206 2.576 .011
6.03E-06 .000 .177 1.364 .174
















































































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), CRIMERT1, LANDAREA,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), CRIMERT1, LANDAREA, MSA, UNION, EDUCATN,
TAXVALUE, OWNHOME, POPULATN
a. 





9.290 .841 11.051 .000
-5.1E-02 .200 -.017 -.253 .800
-6.5E-11 .000 -.102 -.888 .376
2.07E-02 .008 .227 2.754 .006
-1.3E-02 .009 -.110 -1.379 .169
2.63E-02 .010 .221 2.728 .007
6.64E-06 .000 .195 1.492 .137
.199 .277 .049 .719 .473


















































































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), CSECLR1, OWNHOME,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), CSECLR1, OWNHOME, LANDAREA, MSA, UNION,
CRIMERT1, TAXVALUE, EDUCATN, POPULATN
a. 





9.541 .881 10.835 .000
-8.6E-02 .203 -.029 -.422 .674
-7.0E-11 .000 -.110 -.955 .341
2.09E-02 .008 .229 2.785 .006
-1.3E-02 .009 -.112 -1.401 .163
2.60E-02 .010 .219 2.698 .007
6.68E-06 .000 .196 1.500 .135
.167 .279 .041 .598 .551
2.62E-05 .000 .075 1.046 .296























































Table E10. Collinearity Statistics for final LCAPOUT$ model (Model 4) 
 
Coefficientsa
9.541 .881 10.835 .000
-8.6E-02 .203 -.029 -.422 .674 .802 1.247
-7.0E-11 .000 -.110 -.955 .341 .277 3.615
2.09E-02 .008 .229 2.785 .006 .540 1.852
-1.3E-02 .009 -.112 -1.401 .163 .577 1.733
2.60E-02 .010 .219 2.698 .007 .557 1.794
6.68E-06 .000 .196 1.500 .135 .215 4.651
.167 .279 .041 .598 .551 .786 1.272
2.62E-05 .000 .075 1.046 .296 .707 1.415



















t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics




























































All requested variables entered.a. 
Dependent Variable: LCAPOUT$b. 
 
Model Summary








Predictors: (Constant), CSECLR1, OWNHOME,














Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), CSECLR1, OWNHOME, LANDAREA, MSA, UNION,
CRIMERT1, EDUCATN, TAXVALUE, POPULATN
a. 





10.762 .722 14.907 .000
8.77E-02 .166 .028 .529 .597 .809 1.237
1.43E-10 .000 .231 2.368 .019 .240 4.174
1.37E-02 .006 .156 2.245 .026 .473 2.114
-2.5E-02 .007 -.208 -3.283 .001 .569 1.759
2.40E-02 .008 .196 3.050 .003 .554 1.803
6.57E-06 .000 .201 1.803 .073 .184 5.447
.401 .229 .094 1.750 .081 .792 1.263
6.55E-06 .000 .018 .319 .750 .689 1.452



















t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
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